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ABSTRACT
Throughout their history individual trade unions have amalgamated together to form 
new unions. The catalyst for amalgamation has come from a combination of 
sources; industrial change, government policy and legislation and internal 
motivations related to membership size and resources. At the same time local union 
organisation has remained integral to the structure of unions including their internal 
government, bargaining ability and engagement with members. This thesis relates 
these two features of trade union practice to each other by considering the effects of 
amalgamation on local union organisation, both in terms of the local level itself and the 
local level as part of the whole organisation of the union.
The thesis does this through a case study approach to the research. The case 
studies are of three major UK trade unions which have experienced amalgamation 
over a ten year timeframe and a local union organisation within each of these. The 
unions reflect a spread of industry, different forms of organisation and types of 
membership. The research examines the tensions and synergies between the 
different levels of organisation in a union and their leaders; in themselves and as they 
influence a process and outcome of amalgamation.
As a study of trade union organisation and behaviour the thesis engages with and 
complements the wider body of research into union mergers and that on local union 
organisation in unions. Its individual contribution is to the research on trade union 
mergers where the position of the local level of union organisation has been a 
neglected area of investigation. Beyond that it also provides further insights into the 
role and activity of paid officials and lay representatives as union leaders, the role 
and activity of organised factions within unions, the influence of unions’ industrial and 
ideological orientation on forms of local union organisation and the tension between 
different concepts of trade union structure and behaviour.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
During the preparation of this thesis, ballot papers dropped through the letterboxes of 
over two million trade union members across the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
including my own. I was asked to approve the amalgamation of Amicus and the 
Transport and General Workers Union to form the largest trade union in the UK and 
one of the largest worldwide. It was the third time I had participated in a ballot to 
approve the amalgamation of my trade union with one or more other unions. 
Members of the amalgamated union would be employed in virtually every industrial 
sector. They would have many skills and occupations and have incomes ranging 
from the National Minimum Wage to that of a highly paid professional. Not only 
would it be the largest union it would also be the most heterogeneous. It would also 
take five years before it achieved its definitive shape. However, it is only the latest of 
an ongoing trajectory of mergers between UK trade unions. This thesis is about such 
amalgamations: why they happen, how they are achieved, the problems that have to 
be overcome. However and most importantly, it is about the local context of 
amalgamation, the environment where union members have their most direct 
engagement with trade union activity.
As a union member, I was employed for nearly thirty years by a County Council as a
Chartered Accountant working successively on most of the services delivered by the
council. From the outset of that period, I was a member of the National and Local
Government Officers Association (NALGO) and the County Council branch of the
union. Within the union, I was successively the Treasurer, the President and finally
the Secretary of my branch. Beyond the branch, I was elected onto various District
(regional) Council committees of NALGO and then, for two years, as the Chair of the
District Council. Finally, I was elected onto the National Executive Council of NALGO
for two years and was a member of various national committees. For a period of
about thirteen years, I had paid release from 50 per cent of my council work in
recognition of my trade union activities. In 1993, NALGO amalgamated with the
Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE) and the National Union of
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Public Employees (NUPE) to form UNISON. The amalgamation coincided with my 
heavy involvement in trade union activity within NALGO at branch, regional and 
national levels. Subsequent to the amalgamation, I continued all this union activity in 
UNISON until my retirement from County Council employment in 1995.
In the final period of my activity, I also undertook study for a Certificate in Trade 
Union Studies at The University of Nottingham. On my retirement, I continued these 
studies with a Diploma in Labour Studies at Ruskin College and then a MA in 
Comparative Labour Studies at the University of Warwick. My involvement in the 
UNISON amalgamation as a union activist had developed into a research interest 
and I was able to pursue my interest through these studies. Since then and 
alongside the research for the thesis I found part-time employment with the Workers’ 
Educational Association (WEA) as a course tutor on training programmes for trade 
union representatives. Later I again became involved in union activity in 
Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF) and, following its subsequent 
amalgamations, in Amicus and now Unite the Union.
The present research grew out of my personal experience. I developed an interest in 
amalgamations and was able to follow my interest with academic research. My 
concomitant activity as an active trade unionist in the workplace underpinned this 
interest. The experience of amalgamation in NALGO followed by the amalgamations 
of MSF and Amicus and the environment of the workplace, brought that interest and 
experience together and generated the research.
This chapter introduces the research subject, outlines its parameters, indicates the 
context in which it is set, and starts to develop the argument that will underpin it. 
First, the personal context from which the research emerged will be outlined. Then 
the research will be set in the context of wider debates on trade union mergers and 
trade union activity in general. These contexts will be seen to generate an 
overarching research question for the thesis. How the research set out in later 
chapters seeks to answer the research question and support the argument will then 
be indicated. The chapter will conclude with an outline of the whole thesis.
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PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
Research can be generated from a variety of sources but for me it was the direct 
result of personal experience. My experience developed from straightforward 
involvement in the amalgamation process through tentative questioning of the 
processes and outcomes of that involvement. Early research generated more fully 
formed questions and culminated in this thesis. It is thus important and relevant to 
set out some personal history.
To reiterate, the research is concerned with amalgamations of trade unions but it was 
my own experience of and participation in an amalgamation involving my own trade 
union, NALGO, which was the catalyst for it. This amalgamation created UNISON. A 
large and significant element of my involvement and interest was located at a local 
level of trade union organisation and this activity generated the other and related 
concern for the research, the local context in a process of amalgamation.
As an active trade union member holding representative positions in my union I 
observed and participated in the amalgamation from inception through to approval 
and implementation. In retrospect, my participation was largely from a position of 
extolling the virtues of my previous union's practice. More than this, as the 
amalgamation developed I became increasingly conscious of the process being 
played out to reach agreement with individuals in two other unions.
The amalgamated union was promoted as being 'new1 (that is different to any of its 
predecessors) in its values, ways of working and organisational form. However, for 
me it quickly came to bear a remarkable resemblance to my previous union. This 
observation became increasingly prevalent as the amalgamated union went through 
a process of merging its organisation at local as well as regional and national levels.
A large part of my participation in NALGO had been located at local level and I saw 
organisation at that level as central to the functioning of the union. A further 
observation was that in many places the process of merger at local level had been a 
painful one, particularly for those from COHSE and NUPE who saw major changes in 
their roles and forms of organisation. In the context of the creation of a 'new1 
amalgamated union the continuation of practice from one of its predecessor unions
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seemed surprising or at least prompted questions over the process of amalgamation 
itself.
The amalgamation had a long gestation, there had been intense negotiations 
between the three unions to reach agreement and these had been accompanied by 
proclamations of 'newness' for the amalgamated union. I was prompted to ask, how 
could a situation of continuity from one participant union be the outcome? It was 
possible that one union had the better negotiators but since all three were skilled in 
such activity, such a conclusion could be set aside. Maybe the other two unions 
were simply content to adopt the forms and values of my previous union but the 
intensity of the negotiation period argued against that proposition. A superficial 
observation was that a higher level of debate and amendment to details of the 
amalgamation took place in my previous union than in the others but if that had 
produced the observed outcome what particular characteristics had that union which 
were apparently not present in the others. Clearly, there were important questions to 
be considered, not just in the context of a single amalgamation but on a wider basis. 
A research journey began.
DEBATES
Studies of trade unions are not new. Starting from the Webb's (1897) seminal work 
on their purpose and organisation and the writing of Marx and Engels (1848) and 
Lenin (1970) on their revolutionary potential, their activity and formation have been 
variously examined and debated. More recently writing from such as van de Vail 
(1970) and Tannenbaum (1968a) on leadership in unions and, in a more populist 
format, Lane’s (1974) advocacy of their socio-economic role, have developed these 
debates for the later twentieth century. Writing based on case studies of union 
activity in real workplaces has complemented and enhanced these debates, notable 
examples being work by Beynon (1973), Batstone and colleagues (1977) and 
Nicholson and colleagues (1981). Writing that is more recent has seen the 
development of debates on trade union typologies. This writing contains deeper 
concerns over the form and practice of democracy in unions, the presence and 
influence of bureaucratic tendencies and the role of leadership. Analyses sometimes 
typified individual unions as being 'centralist or leader-led' or 'workplace or member- 
led' (Drake et al 1980, Fairbrother 2000a, Heery and Kelly 1990, Undy et al 1981).
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These studies have been underpinned by analyses concerned with the presence of 
bureaucratic tendencies and the tension between national and workplace practice 
(Hyman 1979, 1989, 2001). Debates have also developed on change and 
development in unions, particularly in the context of rapid and continuing political, 
industrial and technological change. Prominent amongst these debates are the 
advocates of theories concerned with union renewal (Fairbrother 2000a) and union 
mobilisation (Kelly 1998).
However, hardly any of this considerable body of work carries any account of trade 
union mergers, despite its prominence in the organisational development of unions. 
Its value for the research is in providing the research basis for understanding the role 
and incidence of the various influences that contribute to the local context in a 
process of amalgamation. Prominent among these influences will be the role of 
leaders at national, regional and local levels of organisation (Tannenbaum 1968, van 
de Vail 1970) and the tension between these organisational levels partly generated 
through bureaucratic tendencies and leadership practice (Hyman 1979, 1989, 2001). 
The work on union typologies will enable these influences to be distinguished 
between individual unions involved in the amalgamation process (Drake et al 1980, 
Fairbrother 2000a, Heery and Kelly 1990, Undy et al 1981). The work concerned 
with the local context will provide a basis for appreciating its centrality and role within 
unions (Batstone e ta l 1977; Beynon 1973; Nicholson et al 1981).
Merger has been a feature of British trade unions throughout their history but has 
been particularly prevalent since the mid-1960s. Partly, merger activity has been 
facilitated by the Trade Union (Amalgamations etc) Act 1964 (Undy et al 1981; 
Waddington 1995), but more important have been the influences and motivations 
which have been the catalyst for drawing individual unions into a process of merger. 
Debates here have been located around two contrasting analyses. First, that merger 
is largely the result of instrumental action by individual unions, mostly by their 
national leaders and, in particular, their General Secretaries (Undy 1999a, Undy e ta l 
1981). Second, that external events and influences are also important motivators for 
merger (Waddington 1995). However, the context for both factors has been the 
global environment of rapid and ongoing political, industrial and economic change. 
For trade unions, the environment has seen challenges to their presence and 
relevance in many of the new and radically changed workplaces coupled with a
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marked deterioration of membership and resources in older, traditionally organised 
ones. The result has been a debilitating process of declining membership, resources 
and presence when those were needed to support recruitment and organising effort 
in the new environment. Merger has often been seen, amongst other developments, 
as an appropriate response to this challenge.
However, merger should also be located in the much wider analyses of union activity 
including the relationships between different levels of trade union organisation and 
those of leaders and paid officials at all levels of union organisation. Once merger is 
more widely considered, the parts played in the process by the national leadership, 
full-time officials and lay leaders at regional and local level become embedded in 
relationships peculiar to each individual union involved in the merger. Thus, the 
merger process is played out against the ongoing organisational life of the unions 
involved in it.
The debates on merger will be explored later where it will also be argued that 
their scope is limited in two ways. First, merger is frequently seen as an event 
marked at specific points in time, such as the formal completion of the merger (for 
example Undy et al 1981; Waddington 1995) and only latterly as a long-term 
ongoing process, before and after the formal merger (Keller 2005; Waddington 
2005a, Waddington et al 2005). Second, merger is seen as an event that is 
orchestrated at national level rather than a process with the potential of impacting 
on and being influenced by all levels of trade union organisation, including that at 
local level (Undy et al 1981; Waddington 1995).
The aim of the thesis is to address these limitations by exposing them to 
examination in the context of amalgamation, as it influences and is influenced by 
the local context, and from this examination gain a fuller understanding of 
amalgamation as an important and continuing manifestation of trade union 
activity. The rationale is that without a fuller understanding, consideration of 
amalgamation is itself incomplete. It is incomplete because for many 
commentators (for example Fairbrother 2000a) workplace unionism is the 
fundamental unit of trade union organisation, the unit which gives form, content 
and expression to union members’ experience of their trade unionism. It follows 
that without consideration of local trade union organisation and activity within a
process of amalgamation a full understanding of amalgamation itself will not be 
available.
It will also be contended that amalgamation is a process, which goes through 
periods of gestation, implementation and consolidation, and not just a single 
event in the history of unions. As such, it potentially involves all levels of the 
union and its membership, resulting in a considerably more complex picture. This 
complexity requires consideration of the role and influence of other forms of union 
activity in the amalgamation process alongside the consideration of trends, 
rationale, forms and mechanisms of amalgamation, and the instrumental role of 
national leaders (cf. Undy et al 1981; Waddington 1995).
RESEARCH QUESTION
The tentative question and concern coming from my early personal experience and 
these debates can be formulated as follows:
•  What are the effects of trade union amalgamation on local trade union 
organisation?
This is a complex question involving a range of influences on all levels of organisation 
and practice within a union. Alongside the variety and incidence of these influences 
and adding to the complexity of the research question are the variations of 
organisational form within and between unions. Within this complexity, it is important to 
distinguish between the union branch as part of a union’s constitution and a workplace 
group or committee established for bargaining or organisation purposes. These 
arrangements may be coterminous and/or complementary with each other. The 
relationship these forms of workplace and/or local organisation have with the wider 
union at regional and national levels and the relationship between full-time and lay 
leaders at the same levels provides another essential but complicating issue. In the 
thesis, it will be necessary to unpick these aspects in ways that enable identification of 
commonalities and comparisons between the experiences of the local level in different 
union amalgamations.
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One key to answering this question is my experience and knowledge of the local level 
of trade union organisation and trade union amalgamations. My background comes 
from three sources:
•  As a trade union activist with a strong commitment to and long experience of 
local activity and direct personal experience of three major union 
amalgamations;
• As a course tutor working with union representatives from a variety of 
workplaces and unions on TUC and individual union training programmes for 
union representatives; and
• As an academic researcher who has engaged in a series of research studies 
into trade union mergers and the position of local union organisation in relation to 
mergers.
In outline, three case studies, supported by the body of other research into trade union 
activity, provide the basis for the research. The case studies were selected to reflect a 
spread of industry, forms of union organisation and make-up of membership. They took 
into account such factors as the presence of previously merged unions, progress 
toward merged local union organisations and bargaining arrangements, and the 
legislative form of amalgamation they used. They also exemplified different stages of 
the amalgamation process, from initial proposals to post-completion.
Based on these criteria, the three amalgamations chosen as case studies were (in 
chronological order of amalgamation) Manufacturing Science and Finance (MSF) 
(1988), UNISON (1993) and UNIFI (1999). Crucially, they were all amalgamations and 
could be expected to have had similar experiences of agreeing and implementing a 
new structure for the amalgamated union through a process of negotiation and 
agreement.
The case studies will be used to explore the role of local union organisation within these 
particular processes of amalgamation. The primary source of data comprised 
structured interviews using a standard set of questions with a range of respondents, 
complemented by documentary analysis of amalgamation papers and related 
materials.
8
In developing the analysis, it will be necessary to establish an analytical framework that 
will take account of the debates around amalgamation, local union organisation and 
distinguishes between individual unions. Such a framework will enable the empirical 
research from the case studies to be assessed against these debates and against each 
other. In this way, an overall analysis of amalgamation from the perspective of local 
union organisation will be presented and a more complete assessment of 
amalgamation as a continuing feature of trade union organisation and activity will be 
made.
PLAN OF THESIS
Nine further chapters follow this introduction.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the existing research into union mergers and 
amalgamations, relating it to the local context in a process of merger and locating this 
research as a development of it. This survey of the debates is concerned with the 
procedures by which union mergers and amalgamations take place, the debates over 
developing analytical frameworks for understanding such mergers and the motives 
for and barriers to mergers. The chapter is concerned to identify the attention paid to 
the local context in a process of merger. It also concentrates on research into the 
outcomes of mergers, particularly in terms of seeing the merged union as a reflection 
of its predecessor unions and considering the local level of union organisation in the 
merged union.
Chapter 3 fulfils a similar function in focusing on research into local union 
organisation and shows how this research expands the analysis to include the role of 
union amalgamations in its development. The chapter explores the various debates 
on local union activity and those concerned with the relationships union members in 
the workplace have with employers and with their union. The debates concerned 
with the geographical identity of the workplace for union members and the nature of 
their collective identity supplement this analysis. One focus of the research has been 
on the importance of local union activity and, in particular, the relationship between 
leaders and members within unions. This work is concerned with the ‘leader-led’ and 
‘member-led’ forms of unionism within which the relationship plays out and the 
tension between democratic and bureaucratic tendencies that characterises it.
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Chapter 4 sets out the various methods utilised in the research. These include data 
emanating from my experience of union activity, my employment as a tutor and my 
earlier academic research. The chapter goes on to describe my selection and use of 
key informants as a research method including the formulation of questions for and 
location of interviews with these individuals. A description of the various documents I 
accessed for the research and their use in confirming and illuminating the responses 
of my informants follows this section. The chapter concludes with a description of the 
method used for analysing the interview data.
Chapter 5 provides an initial account of the three case study amalgamations. First, it 
sets out the history of the unions involved in each of the amalgamations, their 
structural organisation, the characteristics of their memberships and their forms of 
unionism. Second, the amalgamations themselves are described. These accounts 
include the procedures for amalgamation, the context for the amalgamation, the 
process of negotiation and agreement between the unions involved in each 
amalgamation and the outcome of each amalgamation in terms of the organisation 
and operation of the amalgamated union. Third, there are descriptions of the local 
union organisations that were studied within each case study and their experience of 
the amalgamation process.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 provide detailed analyses of the three case studies. These 
analyses follow the progress of each amalgamation from the pre-amalgamation 
situation of the participant unions, through the process of negotiation and agreement 
for amalgamation and finishing with the post-amalgamation implementation of the 
amalgamation agreement. Within each analysis particular attention is given to the 
local context at each stage of the amalgamation process and how that was 
influenced by the forms of unionism of the participant unions, the roles of leaders and 
factions, the provisions of the amalgamation agreement and the transition of the local 
union organisation into the amalgamated union.
Chapter 9 provides an assessment of the research. It considers the environment of 
the case study amalgamations and then concentrates on the local context in each of 
them. The union within the workplace is examined in the context of their organisation 
and their relationship with the wider union, their transition into the amalgamated
unions and the influences on them within the amalgamation process. The 
assessment then seeks to identify the outcomes of the three amalgamations and the 
influences that produced them. The chapter concludes with an overall argument for 
explaining the local union context in a process of amalgamation.
Chapter 10 is the conclusion. This completes the research through a series of 
interrelated themes. These are the process of trade union amalgamation, the 
practice and ethos of workplace unionism and the role of leaders and factions within 
divergent forms of unionism. The conclusion ends by setting out the implications of 
the research for unions engaged in the amalgamation process and the agenda for 
future research on amalgamated unions.
u
Chapter 2
TRADE UNION AMALGAMATIONS
Merger is a prevalent and ongoing phenomenon of trade union development. In 
many parts of the industrialised world, it is portrayed as the appropriate structural 
response to many of the challenges faced by unions (Waddington 2006: 631). 
Whether emanating from economic globalisation, rapid changes to forms of work, a 
volatile and flexible workforce or the individualisation of the employee/employer 
relationship, merger into larger organisations will provide the opportunity to respond 
to the challenges and secure the long-term viability and continued relevance of trade 
unions. Understanding the nature of this phenomenon is, therefore, a vital area of 
investigation for researchers interested in the organisation and activity of unions.
For union members their most imminent and relevant relationship with their union is 
at their place of work, with the local organisation of their union and the local union 
representatives. With the decentralisation of bargaining it is here that their interests 
are defended and advanced, that their individual employment relationship is played 
out and that they are most likely to personally engage with union activity. As such, 
the relevance and influence of this level of the union is essential to an understanding 
of trade unions.
My experience and knowledge of the UNISON merger of three trade unions into a 
new union raised questions over the inter-relationship between these two 
manifestations of trade union activity. For me merger was an episode in the life of a 
trade union but workplace activity was a constant feature before, during and after the 
process was completed. Since both forms of activity were being engaged in 
simultaneously, it seemed inevitable that each would have some influence and/or
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effect on the other. Undoubtedly, the merger had raised contentious issues both 
within and between the unions involved despite an overall commitment to its 
success. This continued after the formal merger and permeated all levels of the new 
organisation. It was also apparent that members of the new union were differentially 
affected, possibly in line with the experiences and practices of the previous unions.
Within the literature on merger, there was much debate over the motivations for and 
forms of merger. For UK mergers this included the distinction between two legal 
forms of merger, amalgamations and transfers of engagement (Waddington et al 
2005: 24-25). The UNISON merger and those of the other case studies in this study 
had been amalgamations. Consequently, the principal focus of this study is on 
amalgamations as a distinct legal form of merger in the UK However, little of the 
literature directly addressed the position of local workplace and branch union 
organisation in the process of transfers of engagement This is understandable as 
the local representatives and membership played little role in this type of merger. 
However, where merger came to involve the amalgamation of two or more large 
unions this was not the case. Oddly perhaps, the neglect of the workplace 
continued, with a concentration on the national leadership dominating discussion. 
Latterly issues concerning articulation and co-ordination in post-amalgamation 
unions have started to be identified (Waddington e ta l2005:16, Waddington 2005b) 
and this literature has focused more attention on the workplace as one structural 
component of these problems. It has also encouraged consideration of 
amalgamation as involving a series of linked phases with the actual act of 
amalgamation being only one of these phases (Waddington 2006; Waddington et al 
2005: 3-4). An outcome of these enquiries is that the problems of articulation and 
co-ordination within amalgamated unions have become a focus of study. However, 
despite this development and the centrality of the workplace in trade union action, 
amalgamation remained a nationally orchestrated event for most writers. It will be 
argued that a full appreciation of amalgamation can only be achieved when it is seen
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as a process of change from the perspective and role of the local workplace 
organisation and branch as well as the national leadership.
Finally, there was an absence of discussion into forms of unionism as an influence 
on the progress and outcome of amalgamations. The term forms of unionism’ 
implies that unions are constituted in different ways, organisationally and in their 
operation. Such features may have an impact on both the amalgamation process 
and outcome. Research suggested that each of the participating unions to an 
amalgamation would exhibit a particular form of unionism as would their successor 
(for example Carter 1991; Morris et al 2001; Terry 1996). Where these forms were 
apparent they might have a crucial influence over the role of local union organisation 
in the process.
The chapter is organised in the following way. First a definition of trade union 
merger and its different forms as amalgamations and transfers of engagement is 
provided. This section is followed by a consideration of the various analytical 
frameworks used in the literature on merger. Then the themes identified in the 
literature will be described along with discussion of commonalities and differing 
emphases between the various approaches to the subject. This consideration leads 
to a discussion of the difficulties that result from a lack of attention to the local 
context of union organisation and forms of unionism as influences within the 
process. The chapter will condude with an assessment of the literature in the 
context of amalgamation as a long-term process within which the role and influence 
of local union organisation becomes vital to a full understanding of union 
amalgamations.
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FORMS OF TRADE UNION MERGER: AMALGAMATIONS AND TRANSFERS OF 
ENGAGEMENT
Mergers are not a new manifestation of union organisation and activity. Waddington 
(1995) set out to place them in an historical perspective starting in 1892. However, 
all writers identified their increased prevalence from the 1970s onwards.
Defining the essential features of all mergers is a prerequisite for an examination of 
them. Michel son (2000) attempted to arrive at a definition as follows:
• A combination of two or more separate unions,
• A legal combination,
• A resultant loss of autonomy and control for at least one of unions
involved (even if this loss is only minor), and
• A reduced autonomy and control that occurs either at point of combination
or at some agreed stage thereafter (Michelson 2000:111).
Most writers used merger as the generic term for studies of the process. 
Nonetheless, they also differentiated between the form of merger entered into by 
small and large unions. The former were more likely to be the subject of a ‘take­
over (Undy 1993) or ‘absorption’ (Chaison 1986) by a larger, whereas the larger 
unions may also be engaged in some form of ‘amalgamation’ (Undy 1993; Chaison 
1986) with unions of an equivalent size. In the United Kingdom (UK), different 
legislative requirements apply to these forms of merger. The relevant legislation is 
the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964 which stipulates that for an amalgamation 
a simple majority of the members voting in a ballot in each amalgamating union is 
required whereas for a transfer of engagements (or ‘take-over*) only a simple 
majority of the members of the transferor union is necessary (Waddington et al 
2005: 24-25).
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The legislation, and the relative size of the merging unions, often determined the 
form of merger adopted. However, the form did have a crucial influence over the 
post-merger structure of the merged union. As Undy remarked, a merger may be:
On a continuum between, at one extreme, a new rulebook and system of 
organisation and the other a [take-over] type arrangement where the smaller 
of the unions accepts the existing rules of the dominant organisation (Undy 
1993: 4-5).
Chaison (1986), Undy (1993) and Waddington (1995) also claimed that either a 
transfer of engagements’ or an ‘amalgamation’ could result in the total loss of 
previous identity of any or all of the merging unions or the retention of substantial 
autonomy as a distinct section of a larger union in a transfer of engagements. Thus, 
the organisational structure of a post-merger union could exhibit a myriad of different 
forms (Waddington 2000b, 2005c, 2006; Waddington et al 2005: 4). Along with 
Chitayat (1979), these structural variations when put alongside differences in 
motivation, environmental circumstances, negotiations over merger and post-merger 
outcomes lead some to suggest that:
Evaluation of union mergers is likely to require a case-by-case assessment 
(Campling and Michelson 1997. 239).
Undy and colleagues (1981: 167-171) and Waddington and colleagues (2005: 227- 
231) both showed that amalgamations were generally predicated on an acceptance 
of equality between the partners to the amalgamation during the process of 
negotiation and agreement. Amalgamations were also the province of major unions 
in terms of membership size, resources and industrial strength. Minor unions and 
those suffering relatively high reductions in membership and resources were more 
likely to be the subject of transfers of engagement to major unions seeking to 
maintain their membership size or consolidate their position in particular industries 
(Undy eta! 1981:167-171; Waddington et a /2005:24-25).
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Transfers of engagements invariably resulted in little change for the acquiring 
union’s structures, whereas an amalgamation was likely to result in structural 
change for all the participant unions. For the local union organisation in workplaces 
and branches, a transfer of engagements mainly affected those within the transferor 
union. There, they were either absorbed into the acquiring union’s existing 
structures at local level or retained an unchanged local autonomy. In contrast, a 
process of amalgamation implied the possibility of structural change on a wide basis 
including change for local organisation. The UNISON merger and the recent merger 
that produced Unite the Union were amalgamations, implying the possibility of 
change for union organisation in workplaces and branches.
The problem with many studies was that conflating ’amalgamation’ and ’transfers of 
engagement’ within the generic term of ’merger’ resulted in difficulties in isolating 
consideration of the role and place of the local union organisation in a process of 
amalgamation. Concentration on merger as an event in the organisational history of 
merging unions rather than distinguishing between amalgamations and transfers of 
engagement frustrated an appreciation of the potential long-term effects on local 
levels of union organisation in these two forms of merger. The result was that the 
previous research largely ignored the presence of union workplace organisation in 
the context of merger activity.
Waddington and colleagues (2005) went on to suggest that there were two strands 
to the merger process:
First, it is a process in relation to its historical role in the development of trade 
union structure ... [and second], a process in relation to changes in union 
governing structures and policies (Waddington et al 2005: 3).
The latter strand involved three stages in the process of merger; pre-merger 
debates, agreement on terms for the merger and post-merger implementation. The 
first strand may have provided opportunities or promote disruption that lead to 
further re-structuring. Examination of the case studies in this research will exemplify
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these facets of merger as they relate to amalgamations.
DEBATES ON MERGER
Both Undy and Waddington have developed and devised an analytical framework 
for the merger process that allows for these variations. Undy (1993, 1999a, 1999b) 
and Undy and colleagues (1981: 167-168) saw unions having distinctive policies 
toward merger. Thus, in territorial terms, mergers involved changing the job territory 
or membership base of unions. Unions may have a policy which is ‘aggressive’ 
(active search for merger not necessarily in existing territory), ‘consolidatory’ 
(strengthening an existing industrial or job position) or ‘defensive’ (protecting a 
weakened position). Absolute changes in size, usually in terms of decline in 
membership, produced a defensive approach as affected unions sought to protect 
their weakened position (financial problems and difficulty in maintaining services) 
through merger with a major union. Relative changes resulted in consolidatory 
and/or aggressive mergers. These mergers could be to consolidate a union's 
position in a particular industry as competitors made inroads into its traditional 
territory. Unions may also have sought to attract unions searching for defensive 
mergers or looked to extend their territory into new areas of representation through 
merger.
Waddington (1995) also provided an analytical framework for the study of trade 
union mergers arguing that two aspects of merger activity needed to be understood 
and related to each other, its rate (‘the urge to merge’) and its character in terms of 
changes in union purpose. In seeking to recognise the distinction, the argument 
was that there were three sets of relationships in the bargaining process that must 
be considered. He noted that
The bargaining position of unions relative to employers and the state; the 
bargaining position of a union relative to that of competitor unions; and
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factional bargaining within unions. ... The interaction between these 
relationships is termed the politics of bargaining (Waddington 1995: 4-5). 
Waddington's conclusion was that all three relationships influenced the character of 
structural change whilst that relative to employers and the state was the main 
influence on the rate of merger activity.
Waddington's explanation of mergers was set against postulated waves of merger 
activity that could be identified with particular periods of economic change and other 
environmental factors. In contrast, Undy and colleagues (1981) and Undy (1993) 
developed a framework that focused more on internal relationships within trade 
unions. Thus, a debate over the relative influence of exogenous and endogenous 
factors has been generated (Undy 1996; Waddington 1997; for summaries see 
Michelson 2000, Undy 1999a). Campling and Michelson (1998) have set out an 
interesting approach to integrating endogenous and exogenous factors along with 
the influence of internal and external agency using strategic choice-resource 
dependence theory. Their argument stressed the importance of internal and 
external agency in reaching strategic choices in the context of internal and external 
environments and the dependence for survival of the union on adequate resources: 
Deliberate and emergent strategic decisions are made through initiatives 
taken within a given environmental landscape that essentially aim to 
command control of critical resources. Strategic choice is therefore an 
integral part of the process of managing organisational resource 
dependencies which, through choice, can shift over time (Campling & 
Michelson 1998: 596).
However, while opening up debate, there was still no dear resolution to the different 
assessments.
19
MOTIVES FOR AND BARRIERS TO MERGER
In the literature on trade union mergers, there was an overwhelming tendency to see 
trade unions as single, homogenous entities whose organisation and activity were 
focused at a national level of management and leadership for both amalgamations 
and transfers of engagement. The emergent themes were largely related to the 
concerns and aspirations of the national level of the participating unions to the 
merger. Thus, the factors that might frustrate a proposed merger were those 
experienced at a national level.
Most writers cited membership decline and financial difficulty as the main 
motivations for merger (Chaison 1986; Chitayat 1979; Michelson 2000; Undy 1993; 
Waddington 1995; Waddington et al 2005: 5-8). They produced a vicious circle of 
decline where membership loss resulted in financial problems and an increased 
inability to provide an adequate service for members that led to further membership 
losses. Many smaller unions in the harsh dimate of the 1980s found themselves in 
such a position and actively sought merger as a means of extricating themselves 
from the situation, invariably through a transfer of engagements to a larger union 
(Undy 1999a; Willman 1996). As Carter (1991), Undy (1993) and Waddington 
(1995) pointed out in the British context, most unions experienced membership 
dedine during the 1980s. Undy noting that:
Many of the major unions faced sim ilar... problems and were highly receptive 
to such mergers [in the form of transfers of engagements] as they sought 
compensatory membership increases [for] the dedine in their own 
membership (Undy 1993:13).
However, there were also examples of mergers where partidpants were not in any 
immediate finandal difficulty and others where membership had actually increased 
prior to the merger (Michelson 2000). It was probable that, as Chaison noted: 
Membership dedine and finandal hardship are symptoms of motivating 
factors, and relate more to absorbed and amalgamating unions than to 
absorbing ones (Chaison 1986: 58).
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In practice the decline of old craft distinctions through technological change and the 
consequent impact on craft-based unions had been a significant factor in the dedine 
of mainly smaller unions (Chaison 1986). Similarly, in many cases the inability of 
smaller unions to maximise economies of scale in the face of dedine compounded 
by increasing membership expectations for individual as against colledive 
representation and the growing complexity of labour legislation, encouraged a 
search for merger through a transfer of engagements to a major union (Chaison 
1986; Chitayat 1979; Undy 1993; Waddington 1995).
Implicit in the merger process, there was an assumption that increased size 
benefited effidency and effectiveness. However, as Gill and Griffin argued, these 
two objects were fundamentally different
Effidency concerns the use of resources to obtain given ends and can be 
assessed according to economic and administrative rationality. In contrast, 
effectiveness can only be assessed in terms of the achievement of the 
particular sodal, political and industrial objectives, which a union has set for 
itself (Gill and Griffin 1981: 369).
The members set these objectives of effectiveness and only they could judge their 
achievement. In practice Carter (1991), Chaison (1986), Waddington and 
colleagues (2005: 12-13) and Undy (1993) found difficulty in establishing whether 
there had been increases in effidency arising from merger. Often, employment and 
administrative practices continued through transitional periods, making the 
achievement of economies of scale only a long-term objective. This difficulty was 
compounded by the increased diversity of membership and bargaining patterns in 
the merged union.
Chaison maintained that
[Increasing bargaining power] has almost become traditional for union officers 
to state [as] the prindpal reason for mergers (Chaison 1986: 51).
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Such claims came from an ability to coordinate negotiations with the same employer 
or provide greater resources to support negotiations. Where potential partner 
unions dealt with the same employers or with the same industry, bargaining power 
might be a primary motive for merger but it was also widely promulgated elsewhere. 
Thus, the impact of the decentralisation of bargaining (Waddington 1995) and the 
growing complexity of employment legislation (Undy 1993) also argued for merger to 
maintain and increase the resources needed for effective bargaining capability (see 
also Waddington et al 2005: 14-15).
Both institutional and bargaining concerns could also be assisted by the elimination 
of inter-union competition and rivalry (Chaison 1986; Chitayat 1979; Terry 1996; 
Undy 1993; Waddington 1995). Amalgamation could be an effective way of 
combating the debilitating impact of larger unions in particular competing with each 
other for members. It might also strengthen negotiating positions in the face of 
hostile employer strategies, economic movements and state policies.
Studies of mergers have questioned whether the merged union was more effective 
at bargaining or organising. Chaison (1986), in particular, was sceptical that 
increased bargaining power resulted from anything other than a small number of 
mergers. He recognised the many other influential forces on the merger decision 
such as, the fragmentation of bargaining that might encourage union coordination 
without any need for merger, employer resistance to a unified union approach, 
economic factors and prospective union density. Still, it must be acknowledged that 
none of these factors is necessarily affected by union merger. Undy (1993) was 
more sanguine over the prospective benefits of merger suggesting that, in many 
cases, merged unions were waiting for a less hostile period for their realisation and 
access to increased resouroes for members of small unions might reap some 
immediate benefits. For some large unions an immediate objective of merger had 
been to compensate for their membership decline and merger provided little 
incentive for further growth. As Waddington (1995) concluded, merger was often a
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response to a position of vulnerability whether as amalgamation or transfer of 
engagements:
The urge to merge will remain in the form of pressures arising from increasing 
administrative costs, membership dedine and bargaining weaknesses 
relative to employers (Waddington 1995: 213).
As such, its promotion as a route to greater effidency and effectiveness was 
founded more on the imperative of convinang a voting membership of the benefits of 
merger than any sustainable calculation.
Writers on the British scene (Carter 1991; Terry 1996; Undy 1993; Waddington 
1995) and in Australia (Gardner 1988; Hose and Rimmer2002; Tomkins 1999) have 
also been concerned to identify the influence of external bodies such as the 
TUC/ACTU and the Labour Party as motivations for merger. In national 
environments where these external bodies could wield influence over governmental 
economic and employment polides such influences were most likely to be evident.
Undy (1993) and other commentators (Chaison 1986; Terry 1996; Streek and Visser 
1997; Undy et al 1981; Waddington 1995 and 2005a) saw merger as a vehide for 
national leaders to achieve sought-after reform of internal strudures and 
government. Often manifesting itself in increased central control of union policy and 
resources and the establishment of semi-autonomous trade groups as an attradion 
for prospective merger partners through transfers of engagements:
Merger ... could be but part of a much wider strategy intended to reform the 
union's system of government and redired its energies into new territories 
(Undy 1993: 17).
There was a consensus between most writers that merger tended to create in unions 
more powerful centralised government. This outcome was most obviously the case 
where there was a high level of integration (Carter 1991; Chaison 1986; Gardner 
1988; Streek and Visser 1997; Undy 1993) but even strudures modelled around 
trade groups often had a strong central body exercising control over resources and
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overall union policy. The actual form of these structures varied greatly. As Undy 
remarked with regard to amalgamations of large unions:
There was a general tendency to greater centralisation of control over issues 
determined in the non-bargaining channel of decision-making, following some 
mergers. Union leaders with long-running concerns over the problems of 
regionalisation and decentralised control over subscription income, have 
used, or sought to use, mergers to reduce the role of regions and other lower 
levels of organisation (Undy 1993:20).
Many writers recognised the role played by national leaders in the merger process 
(Chitayat 1979; Michelson 2000; Tomkins 1999; Undy ef a /1981; Undy 1993). A 
dose assodation between the senior officers of prospective merger partners often 
generated the initial proposal (Undy et at 1981) and they usually had the main 
responsibility for conducting the negotiations (Chitayat 1979). As a result, it was to 
be expected that such leaders would play a major role in these activities.
However, many proposed mergers did not reach a successful condusion (Chaison 
1986; Wiliman 1996). Most writers identified internal concerns as being the main 
source of barriers to merger proposals. Undy and colleagues found that
All the unions examined, regardless of their systems of government, were led 
into merger by their national full-time offidals (Undy et al 1981:214).
In such arcumstances, it was not surprising that without the support of national 
leaders virtually no merger would succeed. Chaison crystallised the condusion of 
many writers by commenting that
The primary reason for officer opposition is the pursuit of their economic and 
political self-interest (Chaison 1986: 71).
Any threat to status, power, prestige or pay could arouse opposition. Accordingly, 
political affinity between the leaders of unions could assume an importance in 
merger negotiations beyond questions of industrial or bargaining logic. Successful 
opposition generated from a membership base was rarely found although that did
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not preclude them from an Important degree of influence over the final shape of 
individual amalgamations (Carter 1991; Terry 1996).
Internal institutional differences could also prove to be barriers to merger. All writers 
recognised the extent to which structures required change and the difficulty that 
could pose in terms of levels of autonomy, forms of democracy and administration 
(for example Waddington et al 2005: 9). This was particularly prevalent in 
amalgamations where all parties to the amalgamation could expect changes to their 
existing practices but much less in transfers of engagements where the transferor 
union usually accepted those of a larger union. As Chaison wrote:
The resolution of institutional differences has to be within the boundaries of 
what is acceptable and capable of winning approval ... The joining of union 
structures may often be more of a political than a technical problem (Chaison 
1986: 85).
Having considered questions of motivation and banners to merger Chaison 
concluded that:
Whether or not there is a merger, is determined by the balance between the 
motivating factors and the barriers rather than just their individual importance 
(Chaison 1986: 86).
While the emphasis here has been on national (and regional) leaderships, it is also 
necessary to consider the way that the local context has been considered in the 
amalgamation process.
THE LOCAL CONTEXT OF TRADE UNION AMALGAMATION
As Waddington and colleagues suggested:
A wide range of substantive issues is negotiated during a merger 
(Waddington et al 2005: 5).
Waddington and colleagues went on to suggest that the negotiations would 
encompass union form and union character (Waddington et al 2005: 5) (see Fryer
25
2000: 29-33 for a full exposition of these concepts). ‘Form’ represented those formal 
aspects of rules, procedures and structures within a union whilst ‘character’ referred 
to the more intangible concepts of ethos, ideology and relationships, formulations 
that characterise the local context along with the wider union. Chapter 3 will 
consider the incidence of ‘form and character* within this research.
There was within much of the literature an absence of consideration of the 
workplace level of union organisation and the branch, and their relevance to the 
amalgamation process. This neglect resulted in two complementary problems in 
developing a full understanding of the amalgamation process. First, the presence of 
the local workplace and branch as integral elements of union organisation that 
would be an influence on or be influenced by an amalgamation was ignored. 
Second, the lack of an analytical framework that encompassed all aspects of trade 
union organisation and activity inevitably limited the perspective of the research to 
that prescribed by the national level of organisation and activity.
This aspect confirmed the problem that I identified from my previous experience and 
knowledge. Although some writers cited issues of contention as barriers to 
amalgamation (Chaison 1986; Waddington et a /2005: 9-11; Willman 1996; Undy et 
al 1981), these barriers mostly related to issues of structure and self-interest, or 
personal animosity amongst national full-time officials. These issues did little to 
explain the experiences at a local level within or between unions going through 
amalgamation. Equally, the absence of the local context in the literature meant that 
the overarching question of the influence on and by union organisation at the 
workplace and branch in an amalgamation was not addressed. The paradox here is 
that the organisation and activity of the union at the local level is often seen as a 
defining feature of trade unions. Thus, its relative absence from literature concerned 
with unions was surprising and was likely to result in partial assessments of union 
amalgamation.
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Exceptionally Chaison (1983) did address the particular issue of the merger of union 
workplace organisations within an amalgamation, the key point being the 
considerable variation between merging unions. Chaison found that it was a rarity to 
find a requirement for local mergers even where there was duplication of 
organisation. The influencing factors were the perceived need for local mergers, the 
degree of local resistance, the level of national pressure to merge, and the number 
of local bodies involved. However, little attempt was made to extend consideration 
to the wider question of workplace influence on the whole process.
Issues relevant to the workplace and branch were raised indirectly in some of the 
literature on merger. Thus, recent studies on merger identified concerns around 
articulation and co-ordination within trade unions resulting from amalgamations (Due 
and Keller 2005; Waddington and Hoffman 2000; Waddington 2000a, 2000b, 
2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Waddington et al 2005:16). Articulation was defined as:
The density of inter-linkages between vertical levels of the union 
(Waddington 2005a. 27).
Co-ordination, in contrast was defined as:
The horizontal linkages [between different groups of members] within a union 
(Waddington 2005a: 27).
These issues became increasingly significant as amalgamations resulted in a 
growing heterogeneity in the membership of unions (Ebbinghaus 2003; Keller 2005; 
Waddington 2000b, 2001; Waddington et al 2005:15-16).
This literature relates closely to the extent of member participation in the local 
activity of the union. Those commentating specifically on the workplace level of 
union activity and on occasion in the literature on merger (Waddington 2000b) 
strongly identified that it was in the workplace that most members identified with the 
union. As earlier commented by Crouch (1993).
[An articulated union is] one in which strong relations of interdependence 
bind different vertical levels, such that the actions of the centre are
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frequently predicated on securing the consent of lower levels and the 
autonomous action of lower levels is bounded by the rules of delegation 
(Crouch 1993: 54-55).
Later, Waddington commented on co-ordination that:
[A co-ordinated union is one where] dense horizontal linkages facilitate 
cohesion between different groups of members and thus mitigate the 
adverse effects of increasing membership heterogeneity on interest 
aggregation (Waddington 2005a: 27).
Without the workplace and the branch level being appropriately integrated into the 
structure and organisation of the amalgamated union, the adverse effects 
associated with a reduced level of articulation and co-ordination were likely to 
become more apparent and member participation aggravated.
Some attention has been given to attempts by individual newly amalgamated unions 
to introduce innovative organisational and structural forms to counter these 
problems (Keller 2005; Terry 1996, 2000a; Waddington 2006: 648) but there is little 
evidence of any coherent approach to investigating the problem from the standpoint 
of local union organisation. Given the importance of the issue of member 
participation in trade union activity identified in the literature on the workplace and 
now, that on the Organising Model with much of its focus also on the workplace 
(Heery and Kelly 1994; Heery 2002; Heery et al 2003), this failure seemed a 
surprising gap in the literature on amalgamation. However, the need for attention at 
the local level has been identified, with Waddington commenting that:
Given the current pattern of development of the merger process, it would be 
particularly beneficial to understand the impact [of mergers] on membership 
participation (Waddington 2005c: 390).
By implication, Waddington was referring to workplace and branch levels of union 
activity and involvement.
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A partial explanation of this gap is the attention paid by many writers to motivation 
and implementation in all forms of union merger rather than distinguishing (in the 
UK context) between amalgamations and transfers of engagement (Campling & 
Michelson 1997; Michelson 2000; Undy 1993, 1996, 1999a, 1999b; Undy et al 
1981; Waddington 1995, 1997, 2005c). Within that prism, they concentrated on 
national leaders as prime motivators of mergers and those with the main 
responsibility for negotiating the terms of the merger and its implementation. A 
process of amalgamation requires a simple majority in ballots of the membership 
in all of the unions participating in the amalgamation, rather than just in the 
membership of the transferor union within a transfer of arrangements. It follows 
that the campaign for a YES vote in an amalgamation has to be co-ordinated 
across all the participating unions and vigorously prosecuted amongst all the 
separate memberships to ensure a positive result. It is only through the national 
leadership that such a campaign can be successfully put together. Inevitably, 
this puts them at the forefront of the campaign to mobilise members in favour of 
the amalgamation. However, they failed to acknowledge the widespread change, 
including for the local level, that could emanate from an amalgamation as 
opposed to the complete take-over or retention of autonomy that were the usual 
outcome of a transfer of engagements. The role of and impact on the workplace 
level of organisation was a consequence of amalgamation rather than an integral 
part of the process itself.
Yet my experience of amalgamation from the perspective of a local union officer 
contradicted this assessment Prospective amalgamation was debated at all levels 
in the union, contentious issues were raised and hotly debated and the campaign to 
secure agreement in the final ballot was largely prosecuted in the workplace. After 
the formal amalgamation, the full impact of the agreements reached with the other 
unions started to impinge on union organisation at the workplace and branch. A 
further period of contention, negotiation and implementation ensued. Numbers of 
longstanding local representatives in all three previous unions either lost positions or
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were not prepared to adapt to the changed situation and left active involvement. 
The notion that union members and local officers were virtual bystanders whilst 
national leaders orchestrated a major change such as amalgamation was not one 
that I experienced. However, despite some belated recognition in the literature that 
issues of member participation, articulation and co-ordination can be studied as a 
consequence of amalgamation, there has been little attempt to examine how they 
influence the whole process (for example see Waddington et al 2005: 225-231).
OUTCOME OF AMALGAMATION
Much attention has been paid to procedures for amalgamation and there were 
attempts to provide frameworks for the examination of amalgamations but there was 
little effort to explain the appearance of the emergent amalgamated union in terms of 
its predecessors. The conclusion some commentators reached was that the leaders 
of certain unions saw an opportunity for change through amalgamation from an 
existing constitution toward greater central control of finances and policy (for 
example Waddington 2005a). Others have seen this aspiration as circumscribed by 
a need to satisfy the interests of dominant groups and factions in partner unions in 
order to reach an agreement for amalgamation (Campling and Michelson 1998; 
Undy 1999b). The straightforward result provided by a number of researchers was 
that unions were individual organisations. They had different amalgamation policies, 
and experienced different environmental circumstances, amalgamation negotiations 
and post-amalgamation outcomes. As a result there was no consistency in the 
consideration of the outcomes for amalgamated union structures (Hose and Rimmer 
2002; Morris et al 2001; Waddington 2005c, 2005b).
Once merger, in the form of an amalgamation, is seen more as a process than 
an event in the development of trade unions, the relevance of the workplace and 
local forms of union organisation to a full understanding of union amalgamation 
becomes much more apparent. As Waddington questions:
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Does the merger process allow the development of articulated and co­
ordinated post-merger union organisation and activity through which an 
agenda appropriate to current circumstances may be generated and 
delivered (Waddington 2005a: 28)?
This question begins to open up the way in which local branches and the workplace 
organisation fit into the amalgamation process. However, subsequent discussion of 
it has tended to concentrate on the post-amalgamation implementation of 
agreements and policies coming from the amalgamation rather than the experience 
of union members in their place of work within this period (Waddington et al 2005: 
205-216). The inconclusive assessment was that:
The process of post-merger adjustment is long-term, contested, and is 
unlikely to be predetermined by the terms of the merger agreement 
(Waddington et a /2005: 216).
The result was an inadequate response to the position of the union within the 
workplace in an amalgamation process.
Others also recognised that the post-amalgamation period may result in a long 
period of introspection as new structures were put in place (Keller 2005; 
Waddington 2000b, 2001, 2005c, 2006: 647-648; Waddington and Hoffmann 
2000). However, despite the growing recognition of the post-amalgamation 
period as vital to the overall success and eventual outcome of the amalgamation 
it was only belatedly that attention was being paid to this aspect. As Keller 
remarked:
The post-merger period's significance is great for the 'sustainability' and 
overall success of the project, but it is mostly underestimated in theory 
and practice. ... The empirical evidence demonstrates that it generally 
takes longer to implement a merger than to agree to it in the first place 
(Keller 2005: 212).
The concerns over articulation, co-ordination and member participation that were 
closely associated with the workplace level of organisation were not sufficiently
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addressed and this failure was compounded by a similar lack of attention to the local 
level in the post-amalgamation period. These omissions were largely attributable to 
a failure in associating these issues with the two legal forms of merger prevalent in 
the UK, amalgamations and transfers of engagement, and acknowledging their 
widely different presence within them. Without consideration of amalgamation as a 
long-term process involving initial proposal, negotiation, decision and post­
amalgamation implementation, it is not possible to gain a full understanding of it. 
The process also involves all levels of union organisation and that at the workplace 
and branch is an essential component of that consideration.
CONCLUSION
The focus of the thesis is an examination of amalgamation as a process 
involving all levels of trade union organisation and activity. Latterly there has 
been some acknowledgement that amalgamation can produce a more 
heterogeneous membership in amalgamated unions. This result leads to issues of 
articulation, co-ordination and member participation in the post-amalgamation 
situation. Three points should be noted. First, these issues have to be understood 
in the context of the whole union with the workplace and local branch organisation 
as the foundation for member participation. Second, seeing amalgamation as a 
long-term process enables them to be examined in the context of amalgamation. 
Third, there is a need to provide a framework within which all aspects of 
amalgamation can be seen.
Based on this literature review, the research question becomes:
• What is the place of the local branch and workplace organisation within the 
amalgamation process?
This survey of the available literature on merger has shown an overwhelming 
concentration on the national level. Given the centrality of the workplace and
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branch to trade union practice, failure to examine local experience in any detail 
may seem surprising. The explanation is rooted in the predilection of much of 
the literature to see merger, first as a singular event rather than a lengthy 
process, second the national leadership as the prime arbiters of that event and, 
third as a generic form rather than contrasting between amalgamations and 
transfers of engagement. Within this framework, there is little space for 
consideration of the workplace since its influence and role only becomes 
apparent over time and in the context of two distinct legal forms of merger.
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Chapter 3
TRADE UNION AMALGAMATIONS: THE 
WORKPLACE AND THE LOCAL CONTEXT
Many writers have attested that the basic unit of trade union organisation is at the 
workplace (for example Fairbrother 2000a: 3; Mcllroy 1995: 162-163). It is in the 
workplace and the local branch where members have their immediate contact and 
interaction with their union. It is here that the immediate aspects of their 
employment relationship are played out. Consequently, members’ interest and 
activity in the operation of their union is expressed most forcefully in the day-to-day 
circumstances of the workplace and the discussions that ensue in shop steward 
meetings and at the branch.
The employment relationship may also be played out at regional and national 
locations and levels of organisation. The individual workplace may also be subject 
to employer and management directive from a regional, national and even multi­
national level. State legislation may also impinge on employee pay and conditions; 
it may also shape the employer’s policies and management discretion. The union 
requires an organisational form to co-ordinate its activity and resources at these 
levels alongside providing the resources to support effective organisation in the 
workplace. Nevertheless, for the ‘ordinary’ trade union member this activity is mostly 
one-step removed from their daily experience and infrequently encountered, in 
contrast to the ongoing life of the workplace. For the union member the local level 
remains the basis of the employment relationship and the basis of trade union 
organisation through which that relationship is mediated.
With the decentralisation of bargaining, most workplaces now constitute bargaining 
units. Willman (2001) argues that it is the viability of these workplace/bargaining
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units, which collectively determine the viability of the whole union. Maintaining 
workplace/bargaining units and countering the weakening effects of reduced 
membership on levels of activism and resources has led unions to consider new or 
revitalised initiatives to ensure their survival and reverse the debilitating trends of 
the 1980s and 1990s (Fairbrother 2000a, 2000b), for example the Organising Model 
(Heery 2002: 26-31). Amalgamations can be seen as one union response to a 
changed environment. A further two contrasting theories on how employees can 
respond to external change have also been advanced which stress “Renewal” 
(Fairbrother 1996, 2000a) and “Mobilisation” (Kelly 1998). However, in order to 
evaluate the potential of either of these approaches we need to understand the 
internal representational and organisational structure of the union, how this relates 
to the local level and how this in turn relates to the wider structures of the trade 
union.
DEBATES ON THE WORKPLACE
Change is part of the fabric of union activity in the workplace. Governments enact 
legislation aimed at employment and health and safety conditions; employers 
reorganise working practices, declare redundancies and seek to introduce new pay 
systems; unions launch recruitment campaigns; new union leaders want to change 
longstanding practices; union members become dissatisfied with union polices and 
action; and, of course, unions amalgamate. Some change agents are external and 
some are internal, but any or all can influence union activity and organisation in the 
workplace. Responding to change takes many subtle but also overt forms. Here we 
are particularly concerned with amalgamation as an agent of change in the 
workplace and local organisation of the trade union. To develop insights into that 
process requires a wider examination of how change manifests itself and the 
response of unions.
There has been much debate about sources of organisational and operational 
change in unions. Heery (2005) considers the results of a survey of full-time officials 
on the influences that encourage change. Change could be generated within the 
union by members demanding a response to change in the workplace (Fairbrother 
1996: 133-140), managerially from national union leaders concerned with the long
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term viability of the union (Willman 2001), or new policy initiatives such as the 
Organising model (Heery 2002: 26-31). Influences for change may also be 
generated externally from collective bargaining activity, public policy, legislation, and 
external agencies such as the TUC. Heery's conclusion is that there are no 
overriding sources of internal pressure for change but that the current approach by 
the UK and the EU on employment legislation provides opportunities for change to 
which union officials responded.
However, change should also be seen in the context of two contrasting theses on the 
conditions that encourage change in trade unions and re-affirm the importance of the 
local context in that process. Renewal theory suggests that the fragmentation of 
bargaining and managerial control has provided the conditions for a reorientation of 
union activity to the workplace. This focus is the result of members' dissatisfaction 
with the response of a centralised and hierarchical leadership to the changed 
employment relationship and the need for member engagement and activity in the 
workplace as the appropriate response. Much of the empirical research on Renewal 
is concentrated in the public sector (for example Fairbrother 1996, 2000a), where 
unions are already recognised (Gall 2003b: 232). Mobilisation theory emphasises 
the role of leaders in objectifying members' dissatisfaction with the union and 
grievance against the employer and then organising a collective response to them 
(Kelly 1998, Darlington 2002, Gall 2006). In contrast to Renewal theory, 
Mobilisation theory has been shown to have a particular salience for empirical 
research in the private sector where campaigns to build trade unionism have 
revolved around the issue of trade union recognition (Gall 2003a: 16-18, Gall 
2003b:234-235). Thus, there is a contrast between the research and application of 
these theories between the two sectors. In the public sector where union recognition 
is generally unproblematic, issues concerned with the role of an established union 
leadership come to the fore. Whereas in the private sector where recognition is a 
prevalent problem, especially in new and expanding workplaces and industries, 
union leadership becomes a wider issue concerned with the generation of union 
activity and building union membership in unrecognised workplaces alongside their 
role where unions are already established.
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Both theories have been subject to criticism. The Renewal theory has been 
criticised for being a desirable objective in itself rather than contributing to the 
achievement of real goals for workplace trade unionism. Further, the theory has 
been questioned because it fails to take account of wider political and economic 
influences on union activity in the workplace or acknowledge the role of political 
activism (Gall 1998). Mobilisation theory has been criticised for denying the place of 
members' self-activity and participation in the generation of collective action rather 
than this being the result of vanguardist action by a small cadre of individuals 
(Fairbrother 2005, ). Empirical study of these theories has resulted in a mixed bag 
of evidence (for the public sector see Carter 2004; Danford et al 2002; Johnson and 
Jarley 2004 and for the private sector see Bacon and Blyton 2004; Darlington 
2009;McBride 2004; Simms 2007; Taylor and Bain 2003 ;). What is important, 
however, is the recognition of the centrality of union organisation in the workplace 
and the branch, the presence of leaders and members, and the processes of union 
change including amalgamation.
THE UNION AND THE WORKPLACE
The straightforward descriptions of ‘the workplace’ emanate from two distinct 
relationships both located at a local level, that of union members with their employer 
and that with their union. For observers like Coates and Topham (1988), the first will 
usually comprise an organisation of union members and stewards or 
representatives, and represent individual work areas or a collection of work areas 
associated with the same employer. In practice, 'organisation' here can be 
envisaged as a continuum of increasing formality of structure and rules accompanied 
by a range of informal dialogue and action at the workplace (Coates & Topham 
1988: 161-163). It comprises a group of members and their leaders acting 
collectively in their relationship with the employer. However, as noted by Coates 
and Topham:
The relationship between workplace democracy and the formal organs of trade
union authority from the branch upwards are seldom defined in rules (Coates &
Topham 1988:154).
Instead, accountability and recognition in the union is regulated through the 
presence of elected workplace leaders, stewards or representatives whose status,
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functions and responsibilities are recognised in the union’s constitution and rules 
(Coates & Topham 1988: 153-154).
The relationship of union members with their union is conducted through their local 
branch as the lowest level of organisation recognised by the union’s constitution and 
rules. All members belong to a branch and are entitled to attend its meetings, elect 
its officers, and vote on issues under debate. In some unions, branches may also be 
the principal focus for union members’ relationship with the employer and fulfil both 
relationships (Coates & Topham 1988: 74-80). Distilling these two relationships in 
terms of union organisation, the branch is the formal means of representation within 
the union that integrates the workplace within the union. In the thesis, it may be 
necessary to distinguish the branch as the formal unit of union structure within the 
wider relationship of workplace members with their union to illustrate these 
characteristics of individual unions.
The problem with this description is that it tends to homogenise these relationships 
into somewhat simplistic organisational terms, when the reality may be considerably 
more complicated. Coates and Topham (1988) were concerned with multi-employer 
unions (Coates & Topham 1988: 41-50) and this constraint excludes consideration of 
unions or staff associations associated with single employers, a feature of union 
organisation in the finance industry (for example see Gall 1997). Here the 
relationship of union members with their employer and that of their union with the 
same employer may be synonymous; as a corollary members’ relationship with their 
union may be contained within the same intimate relationship. These union 
members are locally employed. Their lay representatives are locally based. There 
are industrial relations issues to be resolved locally. ‘Local’ extends to a single 
national employer who has a one-to-one national bargaining relationship with the 
union and to that of members with their union, which identifies solely with their work 
situation.
The model also fails to take account of the many variations in the actual practice of 
the two relationships within multi-employer unions. The members’ relationship with 
their employer will take many forms dependent on the location of the employer as a 
single locally-based entity, a highly decentralised national or multi-national
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company, or a centralised one. Union branches can be based on single local 
employers or locations of national ones, local industries, or local geographical areas. 
In some unions, branches will also be the focus for the bargaining relationship 
alongside the relationship with the wider union. A multi-employer union may be 
structured around one or a variety of these arrangements (Coates & Topham 1988: 
74-80). However, it should also be noted that in single-employer unions and staff 
associations the tight-knit relationship between members, union and employer might 
result in unions eschewing altogether the need for branches (Blackburn 1967: 103).
To appreciate the centrality of the ‘workplace’ for union members’ relationship with 
their employer and their union it is necessary to elaborate on the organisational 
arrangements described by Coates and Topham. Conceptualising the meaning of 
workplace’ and ‘local’ for those who work, live and engage in union activity within 
them is an essential stage in this process. Here the work of economic geographers 
such as Ward (2007) and W ills (1996) becomes important.
W ills remarked, before going on to contrast union activity in retail banking between 
two UK regions, that:
As institutions forged through the relationships of employment, trade unions 
are one of the most important mechanisms by which labour markets are 
differentiated across space. Shaping the communities in which workers live, 
as well as the workplaces in which they are employed, the extent and 
complexion of local trade union organisation can make a profound and 
significant difference to working experiences, expectations and behaviour. 
(W ills 1996: 360)
Ward goes on to discuss the geographical dimension of social relations in terms of 
three concepts that are the foundation for incorporating this dimension into such 
research -  place, space and scale. ‘Places’ are not simply locations on a map but 
socially constructed, the product of a host of human practices’ (Ward 2007: 269). It 
follows that to understand what is actually going on within an identifiable place (or 
workplace’) it is necessary to take account of external activity which is bound up 
with local activity or as Ward puts it, recognising that ‘the non-local is increasingly in 
the local’ (Ward 2007: 270). This concept also recognises that other places are 
subject to other sets of external activity but may still be connected by those that are
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common to all of them. Union activity beyond the workplace is not separate from 
activity in the workplace or even simply connected to it as an intrinsic element of that 
activity. The concept of ‘space’ encapsulates the position that places are not islands 
but connected to other places, either through competitive or co-operative influences 
(Ward 2007: 271, W ills 1996: 360). ‘Space’ underpins the value of trade union 
organisation to employees where co-operation between workers in different 
workplaces seeks to establish common levels of pay and conditions. ‘Scale’ 
captures the situation where workers live and work in specific locations but are able 
to influence their conditions in that location by acting on a wider canvas. Union 
activity on a wider scale mediates and enhances union activity in the workplace.
Maintaining a position of the importance of the workplace within trade union activity 
rests on the immediate relationship between union members and their union at that 
level. However, accepting that premise inevitably raises the question of the 
evidence for the level of engagement members have with their union in the 
workplace. A widely acknowledged view is that member attendance at branch 
meetings is very low, Coates and Topham (for example) remarking that:
Branches are commonly sparsely attended, and never more than when they 
are organised on a geographical rather than an industrial basis. A very large 
number of studies document the poor attendances and low participation ratios 
that commonly characterise branch meetings. (Coates & Topham 1988: 78) 
Against that, other studies (for example McBride 2004: 139) have found high levels 
of engagement when issues concerning the employment relationship are the 
principal concern at workplace meetings. Such a dichotomy potentially strikes at the 
heart of the collective concept that characterises trade unions.
However, as Stephenson and Stewart (2001) and subsequently McBride (2006) 
point out, seeing worker collectivism as solely related to positions of antagonism with 
employers denies other types of collectivism in the workplace. Together these 
comprise ‘trade union collectivism’, ‘workplace collectivism’ and ‘the collectivism of 
everyday life’ (Stephenson & Stewart 2001: 12-18). Trade union collectivism’ 
captures that of union members and their leaders acting together in pursuit of 
common objectives against their employer, ‘workplace collectivism’ the support given 
by workers to each other in the workplace over work and non-work related issues
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and ‘collectivism of everyday life’ the support and friendship provided by workers to 
their colleagues beyond the workplace. This wider view of worker collectivism, and 
its three dimensions, provides a more rounded picture of the many threads that bind 
workers together in the workplace. It also shows how members engage with their 
union in ways other than attendance at union meetings. Casual discussions with 
other workers and union leaders in and out of the workplace and informal support 
networks can readily result in more formalised union activity but also remain at a 
lower level of mutual support. What is relevant for union activity in the workplace is 
the presence of the union as a catalyst and focus for these various forms of 
collectivism.
Putting these concepts alongside the straightforward description of the workplace in 
Coates and Topham (1988) facilitates an appreciation of union activity that takes 
account of the many variations of organisational form and collectivism in the 
workplace. These variations also reinforce the centrality of the workplace for union 
members and the importance of understanding its position in a process of union 
amalgamation.
Certain organisational features can be identified within these parameters, despite 
the considerable variation between individual workplaces and within individual 
unions. Of prime importance to this variation is the relationship between leaders 
(stewards, representatives etc) and members. However, this relationship still 
portrays a somewhat one-sided picture of the complexities experienced in the 
employment relationship at the workplace. It is the contrast between individual and 
collective action, which distinguishes the non-presence or presence of union 
organisation. Collective action is the touchstone of union activity in the union 
organised workplace. The assumption is that workers can only effectively counter 
the corporate power of the employer if they act together (Hyman 1975). This 
straightforward understanding of collective action underpins much case study 
evidence on workplace union organisation and action (for example Batstone et al 
1977; Nichols and Armstrong 1976; Nicholson et al 1981; Darlington 1994; 
Fairbrother 2000a; Me Bride 2004). It is the formulation of collective action, which 
brings together the understanding of members and the need for an organisational 
form to focus it in relation to the employer.
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How members and leaders come together to create and maintain the collective 
organisation and action which is the substance of the union presence in the 
workplace has been the subject of much debate (for a summary see Upchurch et al
2002). The exposition of Mobilisation theory (Kelly 1998) has encouraged a revival 
of these debates focused on the extent to which leaders are the essential catalyst for 
generating collectivity. Thus, a question arises of how far the relationships that 
workplace and other leaders have with those in the wider union and with members in 
the workplace, have a crucial influence on the process of amalgamation and the 
extent to which the collective principle is a fundamental element of that process.
LEADERS AND MEMBERS
The central relationship in all these debates is that between leaders and with 
members. It is expressed in different forms and reflected from different perspectives 
in the change process as it relates to local union organisation. It is through leaders 
that the aspirations and grievances of members are negotiated with the employer, 
through them that their membership of the wider union is given reality and presence, 
through them that their individuality becomes subsumed in a collective 
consciousness. As such, it is the essential relationship for local trade union activity.
Tannenbaum suggests that:
Organisation implies control. A social organisation is an ordered arrangement 
of individual human interactions. ... It is the function of control to bring about 
conformance to organisational requirements and achievement of the ultimate 
purposes of the organisation (Tannenbaum 1968b: 3).
Trade unions are social organisations and it is the establishment and exercise of 
control within them that establishes the importance of the role of leaders. For, as 
Tannenbaum maintains:
The responsibility for creating and sustaining order tends to be distributed 
unevenly within organisations. Often it is the few who decide on the kind of 
order to which many must conform. But regardless of how order is created, it 
requires the conformity of all or nearly all to organisational norms 
(Tannenbaum 1968b: 4).
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Tannenbaum goes on to suggest that there are two variables to be considered in the 
presence and exercise of control: First, where in the organisation’s hierarchy control 
is exercised and second, the total amount of control that is available (Tannenbaum 
1968b: 12-14). Thus, in a trade union, the hierarchy extends from the membership 
to the General Secretary and the amount of control varies through the hierarchy, the 
higher the amount of control of the membership relative to the General Secretary the 
greater the level of ‘democratic control’. However, the total amount of control within 
the union can only be known by aggregating the amount of control at each level. 
Thus, even though the amount of control exercised by the membership in a union 
may be lower relative to that of the General Secretary than in another union, if the 
aggregate amount is greater the membership in the first union may still be in a more 
powerful position (Tannenbaum 1968c). This aspect becomes particularly relevant 
in the context of relative levels of autonomy and resources between local, regional 
and national levels in different unions. Therefore, the position of leaders at all levels 
within unions and their relationship with members is relative to the presence and 
exercise of control at the different levels of organisation within unions. These ideas 
inform the following debates on leadership within trade unions.
Fairbrother (2000a) distinguishes two forms of unionism that describe the 
relationship between leaders and members, 'centralised and layered (organised 
according to the principle of leadership predominance) or devolved and participative 
(organised according to the principle of membership participation) (Fairbrother 
2000a: 27-28)'. More specifically, a union organised around leadership 
predominance (or 'leader-led') will exhibit a downward flow of information to the 
membership, leaders who have position through expertise rather than close 
association with the membership and centralised forms of accountability throughout 
the union. Members have no shared responsibility with leaders for the development 
of policy, their involvement being orientated toward YES or NO referendums (or their 
equivalents) on leadership proposals rather than any influence over the actions of 
those leaders. The union resembles more an insurance company, where members 
pay a subscription for the provision of a service rather than an organisation where 
collective action achieves gains.
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In contrast, a union organised around member participation (or 'member-led') sees 
members actively involved in the affairs of the union. Bargaining, policy and the 
activity of full-time officials and leaders are all potentially open to influence and 
control by members. Leaders will be keen to encourage member involvement 
through open and regular forms of communication and a 'continuous dialogue 
between members, representatives and officials throughout the union' (Fairbrother 
2000a: 29). This feature of trade unionism is enabled through a participative 
democracy based on the principle of collective activity. The union is not another 
service provider but an organisation that enables workers to use their collective 
strength to protect and enhance their individual and collective interests.
Heery and Kelly’s (1994) analysis of the role of trade union leaders set out a range 
of approaches that approximate to these models. Professional Unionism 
('professional negotiators to service a largely passive membership' (Heery & Kelly 
1994:1)) is the ‘leader-led’ form or Servicing/Partnership model (for Servicing see 
Heery & Kelly 1994: 2-10, for Partnership see Heery 2002. 21-26). Participative 
Unionism ('activist conception of union membership and a facilitating role for union 
officialdom' (Heery & Kelly 1994:1)) is the ‘member-led’ form or Organising model 
(Heery 2002: 26-31). They extended the descriptions to Managerial Unionism 
('union members as reactive consumers whose needs must be continually tracked 
and responded to by unions drawing on the techniques of strategic management' 
(Heery & Kelly 1994:1)). This characterisation has similar features to the ‘leader-led’ 
form or Servicing/Partnership model.
Batstone and colleagues (1977) also identified two leadership styles to characterise 
the relationship between leaders and members, 'delegate' and 'representative'. The 
'delegate' relationship is one where the steward merely acts on the instruction of 
members whereas the 'representative' also leads members by taking personal 
initiatives alongside expressing their wishes. However, for leaders to retain the 
support of members whilst exercising leadership of them entails a participatory style 
and a collectivist outlook (Darlington 1994 & 2002; Fosh and Cohen 1990; Greene et 
al 2000; McBride 2004). Members need to be encouraged and facilitated to 
participate in the activity of the union and stewards need to promote issues as 
potentially affecting all members rather than individuals.
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Whilst not denying the importance of individuals, particularly in the role of leaders, 
the centrality of the local union organisation for union members has to be reaffirmed 
(Fairbrother and Waddington 1990; Fairbrother 2000a). Whatever the 
contradictions in the role of stewards and the different personal qualities and 
perceptions they bring to it, their position as local leaders and the workplace focus of 
union activity is vital to the engagement of members with the union.
Clearly, the relationship shop stewards have with full-time officials says much about 
the particular form of trade unionism involved. For members, both may be seen as 
leaders dependent on circumstances and the issue at stake. Not every bargaining 
issue is negotiated at the local level and political and industrial campaigns organised 
and promoted at the national level are an important part of union activity. For these 
and other major policy changes such as amalgamation the prerogative, at least 
initially, lies with full-time officials (in particular the General Secretary) and national 
lay leaders. Accompanying the increased sophistication of workplace union 
organisation, senior stewards and convenors often acquire similar skills, knowledge 
and status as local full-time officials (Darlington 1994; Batstone et al 1977).
Yet, as Heery and Kelly (1990) maintain:
[It is] claimed by a large number of writers that the line between FTOs and lay 
activists constitutes a fundamental cleavage within unions and that the 
interests of those on either side systematically and consistently diverge' 
(Heery and Kelly 1990: 76).
In Heery and Kelly's analysis (1990: 76-81) this division can be seen in competition 
between full-time officials and stewards with each seeking to expand their area of 
leadership at the expense of the other or following the Marxist analysis:
The [steward] an exponent of class struggle, the [full-time official] a manager 
of discontent (Heery and Kelly 1990: 77); (see also Hyman 1979 and 
Darlington 1994).
Many will also claim that full-time officials and stewards have different relative 
objectives. Full-time officials are more concerned with maintaining the security of 
the union and a continuing place at the bargaining table whereas stewards are more
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interested in the outcome of bargaining. Looking to the institutional interests of the 
union, full-time officials will also make lower and narrower demands on employers 
than stewards. To ease the bargaining process and maintain the bargaining 
relationship, they will also favour use of procedures over mobilisation of members to 
achieve results (Hyman 1979, Darlington 1994).
On the distribution of power between full-time officials and stewards, Heery and 
Kelly’s (1990) survey of the available literature sees some writers arguing from 
Michels’ (1962) influential analysis that full-time officials use their greater expertise 
and control of the union machine to dominate stewards and ensure their preferences 
take priority. Against this analysis, others argue that strong workplace union 
organisation enables stewards to challenge the power of full-time officials (Beynon 
1973). Empirical research into the relationship (Batstone et al 1977; Darlington 
1994; Heery and Kelly 1990) suggests a much more confused and fluctuating 
picture. There is a reciprocal relationship, with full-time officials often reliant on and 
supportive of stewards fulfilling a bargaining role in the workplace whilst stewards 
are dependent on full-time officials for advice, resources and support in those 
negotiations. The relationship at local level will often be more comfortable and 
mutually supportive than the relationship with higher levels in the union hierarchy.
Fairbrother (2000a) and others (Batstone et al 1977; Heery & Kelly 1994; Terry 
1986) have commented that the ‘member-led’ and ‘leader-led’ forms of unionism are 
a continuum and unions will have exhibited them in various combinations or in very 
distinct ways. Thus, labelling individual unions in this way or as adherents to 
Organising, Servicing or Partnership models, can be problematic. Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of this discussion the distinctions provide a sufficiently robust 
nomenclature to characterise and differentiate the role of the local workplace and 
branch in the amalgamation process. First, the local level in individual unions will fit 
more easily into one form than the other at particular moments in their history, as 
during a process of amalgamation. Second, the tensions inherent in these forms 
have a universal aspect to them: decentralised or centralised organisational forms, 
egalitarian or hierarchical structures and participative or remote forms of 
membership involvement. The debates around these tensions prompt questions as 
to why, in an amalgamation process, unions exhibiting different forms of unionism
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and practising different responses to the need for change result in local union 
organisation in workplaces and branches having a differential influence over the 
amalgamation process.
DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY
Leadership in the context of a trade union raises important analytic questions of a 
more abstract nature. Relating back to the earlier discussion on change in unions 
and different organising models in both ‘member-led’ and ‘leader-led’ forms of 
unionism the same groups of potential leaders are present; members, stewards and 
officials (elected and employed at national and regional levels). As organisations 
espousing democratic principles, the leadership relationship in the context of trade 
unions is mediated through participative processes. As organisations, trade unions 
will also exhibit bureaucratic features, which may also impinge on this central 
relationship at the local workplace and branch (Hyman 1978).
Latterly the debates on union democracy have been revisited (Morris and Fosh 
2000; Fairbrother 2006) with the issue of democracy seen as a complex of practices 
and relationships. The earlier concentration on elections and decision-making 
(Lipset et al 1956; Martin 1968; Edelstein and Warner 1975) has given way to more 
subtle ways in which influence and involvement can manifest themselves in trade 
unions. The emphasis on the role of local leaders (Fosh and Cohen 1990) failed to 
account sufficiently for the many nuances in that role when the relationship with 
members is considered. The informal ways in which consensus is achieved and 
action agreed in the workplace, is largely absent from this work.
Some commentators have leant toward the concept of a representative workplace 
leadership giving voice to members’ issues (for example Heery and Kelly 1994; Gall
2003). However, this concept underplays the complex ongoing interplay of the 
relationship between members and leaders, and particularly in the immediate 
environment of the workplace (Hyman 1979; Fairbrother and Waddington 1990). 
The relationship between members and leaders is one aspect of union democracy. 
The question is how far leaders are the prime motivators in that relationship (Heery 
2005) or whether in the presence of actively involved members a much more
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complex relationship of mutual support and influence develops (W ills 2003). 
Fairbrother (2006) suggests that by using the concept of deliberative democracy 
where democracy is a process of open debate and discussion between members 
and leaders, union democracy becomes a collective process. How far these 
different concepts and practices of democracy influence a process of amalgamation 
becomes a relevant question in relation to the local workplace and branch.
Underpinning the debates on democracy is the tension between organisational 
effectiveness and a participative form of activity (Hyman 1979; Fairbrother and 
Waddington 1990; Darlington 1994). Both can be seen as features of union practice 
particularly during a period of uncertainty for unions’ institutional security but also 
with the progressive decentralisation of bargaining, encouraging the growth of strong 
union organisation in local workplaces and branches. Both give rise to the 
development of bureaucratic tendencies to support the requirement for 
organisational effectiveness. The danger is an increasing commonality of purpose, 
activity and objectives for those occupying the bureaucracy and a distancing from 
the membership to which they are accountable. Hyman developed a theory of 'the 
bureaucratisation of the rank and file' (Hyman 1979: 58) to describe the development 
of these tendencies. Fairbrother and Waddington related the theory to workplace 
union organisation by commenting that:
The bureaucratisation of shop stewards’ organisation involves a change in the 
relationship between stewards and members from 'control for’ to ‘control over1 
membership (Fairbrother & Waddington 1990: 36).
Member-led’ implies 'control by' the ordinary membership whereas ‘leader-led’ 
implies 'control o f the membership. Bureaucracy provides the sinews of 
organisation by which both forms of control are able to operate. This observation 
does not imply that oligarchic tendencies are not also present in the ‘member-led’ 
form. However, it does suggest that the ‘member-led’ form is based on principles of 
member participation most often seen through deliberative democratic processes.
The inherent tensions in the relationship between members and leaders in the local 
workplace and branch have been the subject of analysis by Hyman (1979, 1989). 
Hyman also goes on to illustrate the tension between local and national levels of
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union organisation and activity (Hyman 1989, 2001). He sees a pervasive tension 
between the perceived requirement for organisational effectiveness at national level 
and autonomous membership activity in the workplace (Hyman 1989: 166-187; also 
Fairbrother & Waddington 1990: 41-43). Hyman remarks that:
There is value in conceptualising bureaucracy as a social relation pervading 
trade union practice at every level: a social relation corrosive of the 
foundations of collective solidarity (Hyman 1989: 181).
These arguments have a long history (Hyman 2001), memorably encapsulated by 
Gramsci when discussing the relations between Factory Councils and the national 
union and maintaining that:
The trade union is not a predetermined phenomenon: it becomes a 
determinate institution, that is, it assumes a definite historical form to the 
extent that the strength and will of the workers who are its members impress a 
policy and propose an aim that defines it (Gramsci 1920: 14).
As democratic institutions, unions should be susceptible to such influence and 
change generated by their members.
The problem identified by Hyman was, not only that national levels of union 
organisation may be subject to bureaucratic tendencies, but that bureaucratisation 
also extended to workplace union organisation (Hyman 1979, 1989). The potential 
impact of this relationship was to stifle and frustrate members’ influence and self­
activity and facilitate self-perpetuating oligarchies of full-time officials and local lay 
leaders. Yet, this pessimistic outlook has to find its place in organisations where 
bureaucratic effectiveness at national level is often reliant on activity at local level to 
implement its policies. Workplace and branch organisation that may challenge 
those policies from a basis of their own self-activity or, as suggested by Fairbrother 
and Waddington:
The tensions between bureaucracy and democracy are rooted in the process 
whereby union members come together to realise their sectional interests and 
aspirations within organisations which attempt to generalise and formalise these 
interests (Fairbrother and Waddington 1990: 43).
The process of amalgamation inevitably involves bureaucratic procedures in 
organising and processing democratic processes of internal debate, decision-making 
and balloting for its approval and subsequent implementation.
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FORM AND CHARACTER
Building on the work of Turner (1962) on the morphology of trade unions, which was 
mainly concerned with the recruitment and organising territories of unions, Fryer 
(2000) developed an analytical framework of ‘form and character1 to capture the 
characteristics of the individual unions involved in the UNISON amalgamation, their 
policies for the amalgamation and UNISON as a merged union (see also 
Waddington et al 2005: 5 for a wider use of this framework). ‘Form’ was:
All those many explicitly ‘rational’ arrangements of structure -  organisation, 
finance, rules, procedures and structures (Fryer 2000: 29).
Character’ was that:
Rich collection of aims, values, purposes, ways of working, relationships, 
moods, signs, symbols, rites, ‘feel’, orientations and identities which go to 
make up what has sometimes been referred to as the ethos of an organisation 
(Fryer 2000: 29).
It will be apparent that the position of local workplace and branch organisation in 
individual unions at the point of amalgamation will be reflective of a unique 
combination of the relationships and tensions illustrated earlier in this chapter:
• Formal union organisation within the workplace in relation to the employer 
and through union branches with the wider union,
• Concepts of ‘workplace’, ‘local’ and ‘collectivism’,
• Distinctions between ‘member-led’ and ‘leader-led’ forms of unionism,
• Relationships between leaders and members, and
• Democratic and bureaucratic tensions within and between workplaces and 
branches, and the wider union.
This complexity presents a problem for studying the position of the local context 
within individual amalgamations and then drawing comparisons between them. 
Fryer, when considering the UNISON amalgamation found a similar difficulty, 
commenting that:
The otherwise valuable accounts of aggregated patterns of trade union 
amalgamation activity are, of necessity, couched in terms of high 
generalisations, which lose their analytical purchase when applied to the
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natural history of one particular amalgamation (Fryer 2000: 28).
Useful as ‘form and character’ was in differentiating between the individual unions 
within the UNISON amalgamation it begins to break down once the intricacies of 
relationship between the local level and the wider union and between leaders and 
members are considered. Those intricacies are partly embedded in ‘character1 but 
work through the organisational mechanisms in ‘form’. However, they have been 
shown to be essential to an understanding of local union organisation. Whilst the 
distinction between ‘form and character1 captures a way of evaluating unions in an 
amalgamation it is important to look at it in the context of the earlier discussion about 
organisation and locality, and leaders and led. Waddington et al remarked that: 
There is likely to be a continual interplay between issues of union character 
and issues of union form during the amalgamation process (Waddington et al 
2005: 5).
In that context, ‘form and character1 will be used to capture these complex 
relationships.
CONCLUSION
This literature review leads to two further research questions:
• How do the ‘leader-led1 and ‘member-led1 forms of unionism influence the 
position of the local branch and workplace organisation in a process of 
amalgamation?
• How do the relationships of leaders within the local branch and workplace 
organisation and those in the wider union influence the position of the local 
level in a process of amalgamation?
The principal relationship for trade union activity in the workplace is that between 
members and leaders. This relationship is in a constant state of flux and adaptation 
as organisational, bargaining and legislative circumstances change. Amalgamation 
is one of a number of responses considered by unions to this changed environment 
(Dolvik & Waddington 2004). However, whichever response or combination of 
responses is chosen the local workplace and branches retain their central position in 
trade union organisation. Isolating amalgamation as the change agent at a
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particular moment in a union's history makes it possible to envisage a situation in 
which the local level also has a particular set of characteristics and relationships, or 
'form and character1, relative to the pre and post-amalgamation period.
For an analysis concerned with the role of the local workplace and branch in a 
process of union amalgamation setting these relationships as ‘member-led’ and 
leader-led’ is a complex process, involving pre-established forms of unionism and 
the ‘amalgamated’ form. The distinctions between the forms of unionism can be 
discussed around debates concerned with different patterns of workplace 
leadership, set within the debates concerned with the tension between bureaucratic 
and democratic practices within trade unions. These debates can be used to 
distinguish the differing sets of relationships to be found in the ‘member-led’ and 
leader-led’ forms of unionism. Amalgamation can be seen as an endogenous 
change agent that may upset such longstanding sets of relationships. For the local 
level, it is the facility and robustness with which its ‘form and character’ responds to 
that change which influences its role in the amalgamation process and, conceivably, 
the ‘form and character’ in which its relationships appear in the amalgamated union.
Two forms of unionism are relevant. The 'member-led' form o f unionism may be 
participatory and open to continuous dialogue between the various levels of the 
union's structure. Workplace and branch leadership exercises influence locally, with 
legitimacy and identification coming from the participatory leadership style and 
commitment to collectivist principles practised in the ‘member-led’ form. In a process 
of union amalgamation, such characteristics may enable the local workplace and 
branch to exercise influence by conferring on it three attributes. The first attribute is 
that members have the ability to formulate and express their own views and policy 
on the amalgamation. The second one notes that it is possible for members to use 
their facility to influence the process of amalgamation. In the third case, members’ 
access to leaders accountable to local democracy may enable them to retain 
influence within the wider union.
The other form, representative democracy of the ‘leader-led’ form o f unionism allows 
for a relatively passive form of participation by the membership. The central 
leadership disseminates policy and directives from a national level and local leaders
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gain their legitimacy from a position within the union rather than an identity rooted in 
the local workplace and branch. Such attributes stifle debate and favour decisions 
on policy formulated by the national leadership.
Inevitably, such characterisations can appear overstated, failing to account for the 
many nuances in behaviour and variations in practice to be found in organisations 
founded on principles that encourage debate and change. Nonetheless, they serve 
to illustrate how leadership plays a crucial role in shaping the position of the local 
level in a process of amalgamation. Seeing the presence of forms of unionism in the 
context of case studies on amalgamation will permit an understanding of its influence 
on the position of the local level in particular trade union amalgamations. This 
framework may enable a neglected dimension of the amalgamation process to be 
evaluated and considered. Based on this analysis it may then be possible to draw 
conclusions from comparisons between different amalgamations.
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Chapter 4
METHODS
This chapter is concerned with the fieldwork for the thesis. It considers my own 
relationship to the process, the research methods I chose, the analysis of the results 
and my experience of the research itself. It will be apparent that the experience was 
a dynamic one. It was essential therefore, that rigour and objectivity were imposed 
on the process to ensure that the results had integrity and substance and were not 
just a passing reflection. The chapter will also address how I sought to impose that 
rigour and integrity.
The genesis of this research was my past experience as a lay union representative 
and leader (in particular that associated with NALGO and UNISON), my later 
employment as a tutor on training courses for union representatives and my earlier 
academic research on union mergers. Since I regard my research as progressing 
and developing that experience and research, the data I collected and utilised over 
that period is also an important and relevant resource for the research. This chapter 
will detail that data, say how it is integral to the research, and how it has enabled me 
to refine the research methods I chose.
Rigour and integrity are prime objectives of the research and because I have a 
particular position in relation to the research, I address that issue first. Then I will 
outline the data available from my personal experience and academic research and 
from this survey go on to describe the research methods I chose and the justification 
for those decisions. The next section elaborates those decisions with the necessary 
detailed work before the fieldwork could start. This description is followed by a 
section devoted to the fieldwork itself. This covers the initial steps in the research, 
my experience of carrying it out and the detail of what was done. Following this 
section there will be a description of the documents I accessed for the research. This 
will include their nature, origin and location. Next, the analysis of the raw data is 
explored showing, the problems encountered with the data, the objectives of the 
exercise, the method of analysis chosen and the experience of carrying it out. The
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final section reflects on these research methods and provides an assessment of the 
research process as a whole.
GOING OUTSIDE
It will be apparent that I have long experience of trade union activity and the 
organisational and environmental context in which it happens. In addition, my earlier 
research meant that I was fam iliar with fieldwork research on the position of 
workplace and branch union organisation in a process of trade union amalgamation. 
My background and experience were the impetus and initial informant for this PhD 
thesis. Both had prompted research questions and generated further stages of 
research. From the literature research for this thesis, some questions had started to 
be answered and for others the issues were clearer. However, I was still puzzled 
over matters.
A methodology was required to achieve my research objectives but my personal 
background and prior trade union and research experience meant I already had a 
close connection with the research subject. This connection had to be recognised as 
both a potential liability and positive benefit to the fieldwork. In fact, it became a 
prime consideration in ensuring the rigour and integrity of the fieldwork. To achieve 
this rigour and integrity two closely interrelated issues are apparent and require 
elaboration and exemplification; my personal position as a researcher and bringing 
together a coherent set of research questions.
Coffey's work on the ethnographic self asserts that:
The ethnographic self cannot be separated out from the facets and phases of 
qualitative research (Coffey 1999: 158).
The relationship with and prior knowledge of the research subject brought by the 
researcher should be acknowledged and welcomed (Coffey 1999: 159). In 
preparation for the fieldwork, I was conscious of my personal knowledge and 
opinions, and the advantages and disadvantages these brought to the research. The 
personal contact with respondents, which would form the core of the fieldwork and 
the prime source of data, would be with individuals of similar trade union background 
and experience to me (Coffey 1999: 17-37). Whilst that had the potential of enabling 
informed discussion from positions of mutual understanding of the issues and the
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mechanisms involved, my personal beliefs must not be allowed to skew my 
response. To an extent, all social research is rooted in the common experience of 
researcher and researched, and establishing and maintaining objectivity in the 
research is a continuing issue. I was very aware that my close involvement 
heightened the problem.
As stated in earlier chapters the three research questions that guide the study are:
1. What is the place of the local branch and workplace organisation within the 
amalgamation process?
2. How do the ‘leader-led’ and ‘member-led’ forms of unionism influence the 
position of the local branch and workplace organisation in a process of 
amalgamation?
3. How do the relationships of leaders within the local branch and workplace 
organisation and those in the wider union influence the position of the local 
level in a process of amalgamation?
However, I already had a considerable corpus of data from my personal experience 
and earlier academic research that had contributed in part, to the development of 
these questions and would enable me to hone the research methods appropriate to 
addressing them. It is necessary for that data to be set out in some detail in order to 
provide the context for how I approached this task.
The data fell into four categories:
1. My experience of the UNISON amalgamation as a lay union representative 
and leader.
2. My academic research at Ruskin College, the University of Nottingham and 
the University of Warwick.
3. My employment as a tutor on training courses for union representatives.
4. My activity as a lay trade union representative and leader in MSF, Amicus and 
Unite the Union.
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UNISON EXPERIENCE
My personal background has been the catalyst for forming and refining the research 
questions that motivated and focused the earlier academic research and now the 
current thesis. Table 1 provides a guide to my trade union activity and employment 
over a period of some forty years. I have been a trade union member since 1966 and 
the table illustrates the length and wide range of my trade union activity across all 
levels of union organisation.
Table 1. Personal experience 1966 to present
YEAR EMPLOYMENT UNION UNION
POSITION
STUDIES AND 
RESEARCH
UNION
MERGERS
1966 CORBY
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Auditor
NALGO Member None
1967 NORTHANTS 
COUNTY COUNCIL 
Auditor 
Accountant
1968 Branch Treasurer
1980 Branch President
1982 Branch Secretary
1983 East Midlands 
District Council and 
Committees
1991 National Executive 
Council and 
Committees
1992 UNIVERSITY OF 
NOTTINGHAM Certificate 
in Trade Union Studies
1993 UNISON Branch Secretary. 
East Midlands 
Regional Council 
and Committees. 
National Executive 
Council and 
Committees.
UNISON
1995 NONE Member RUSKIN COLLEGE 
Diploma in Labour Studies
1996 UNIVERSITY OF
WARWICK
MA in Labour Studies
1997 WORKERS’ 
EDUCATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION 
Course Tutor
MSF Member
1998 UNIVERSITY OF
CARDIFF
PhD
2002 National Secretary
2003 Amicus National Secretary Amicus
2007 Unite the 
Union
National Chair Unite the 
Union
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My membership of NALGO lasted some 23 years with little consideration of or any 
involvement in amalgamation, until 1989. The initial proposal in 1989 to amalgamate 
NALGO and NUPE was followed in 1990 with a proposal to include COHSE. The 
following four years of debate and negotiation eventually resulted in successful 
ballots in all three unions to create UNISON.
During this time (1989-1993), I was centrally involved in NALGO at branch, regional 
and national levels. The daily business of representing members, dealing with 
members' issues and negotiating with management and the employer continued 
unchanged. Despite attempts to engage members’ interest in the amalgamation, 
most remained steadfastly concentrated on issues affecting them and their 
workplace. The grand descriptions of new concepts of representation within the 
union, working partnerships between lay leaders and paid officials and innovative 
aims and values seemed to have little relevance or reality in the context of grievance 
and disciplinary cases, budget cuts, departmental reorganisations and job evaluation. 
Amalgamation was an event happening elsewhere, orchestrated by unknown 
national leaders and of no relevance to the concerns of members and their 
workplace. There were virtually no attempts to bring NALGO and NUPE together to 
present a single voice with the employer, organise jointly in the workplace or even 
acquaint each other of their respective practices and structures. In practice, the 
historic hostility in the workplace between the two unions seemed to worsen as the 
prospect of them becoming members of the same union approached. Longstanding 
rivalries over recruitment, negotiating agendas, political affiliations and relationships 
between respective groups of members were exacerbated by prospective 
competition for leadership positions, rival forms of workplace and branch 
organisation. All of this accentuated personal animosities. Certainly in NALGO, and 
it was assumed in COHSE and NUPE, the local workplace and branch were said to 
be the core unit of organisation in the union, and workplace lay leaders the essential 
group of union activists (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1991). If amalgamation was the all- 
embracing benefit being promulgated by national leaders, that benefit should be seen 
locally if anywhere in the union. Yet my experience did not substantiate such claims.
By 1991, I was a senior lay leader in NALGO: the Branch Secretary of a large local 
government branch, a leading member of the East Midland District Council and its 
committees, a member of the National Executive Council and its committees, a
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delegate to the annual National Conference. I was directly involved in or closely 
associated with much of the internal debate within NALGO, and the negotiations with 
COHSE and NUPE, over the 'form' of the amalgamated union (personal experience 
1989-1993). Negotiation and agreement took place over such issues as:
• The size, composition and regularity of meetings of the National Conference.
• Similar considerations for the National Executive.
•  The representation for women and other disadvantaged groups within the 
union.
• The financing of branches.
• The collection of subscriptions (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992).
The 'character' of the amalgamated union was dressed up in notions of it being 'new* 
and 'different' to its predecessors. These concepts were easily accepted because 
they seemed positive and forward looking but were devoid of any indication as to 
how it would actually 'feel' to be active in the amalgamated union or the sense of loss 
that might be experienced from losing its predecessors. Everyone felt safe arguing 
through details of rules and procedures and seemed to assume that there was a 
generalised set of principles such as unity, democracy and justice, which all trade 
unionists adhered to and did not require agreement (personal experience 1989- 
1993). These principles are expressed through an intangible web of informal 
relationships, ways of working, expression and experience, but were not discussed or 
even recognised. They make for individual unions having a set of definite, but ill- 
defined, characteristics. Each union knew their own characteristics but they could 
only be appreciated in comparison with that of others.
Argued from a straightforward principle of collective strength with common employers 
it was almost impossible to find anyone in NALGO who opposed the amalgamation 
(personal experience 1989-1993). However, once the detailed negotiations and 
proposals were debated there were intense and opposed arguments at all levels in 
the union. The arguments were mainly predicated on preserving the NALGO 
structure (in particular) and, implicitly, its characteristics in the amalgamated union. 
From this standpoint, other than their members, there was little that the other two 
unions could contribute to the new union. Partly it arose from strongly held views of 
the inferior nature of their ‘culture’ as opposed to ‘ours’. Research commissioned by 
UNISON into the ‘culture’ of UNISON and its predecessor’s defined ‘culture’ as an 
individual set of ‘values and beliefs’ (Ouroussoff 1993: 1). ‘Culture’ was epitomised
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by the notion that NALGO was controlled and led by its members and lay leaders, 
whereas COHSE and particularly NUPE were controlled and led by their full-time 
officials, personified in the General Secretary (see Ouroussoff 1993: 3-6). The 
confirmation that it was only in NALGO that the interim proposals could be amended 
at the annual National Conference confirmed this perception and the superiority of 
NALGO in virtually any other facet of trade union activity. Against that, there was an 
equally well-organised and vocal opinion that supported compromise and new ways 
of working as the path to amalgamation. Eventually it was these arguments that 
succeeded and won support for the amalgamation.
The rancour within NALGO was undoubtedly compounded by the lack of knowledge 
of and often contact with those from COHSE and NUPE. My experience from 
attending three of the joint meetings that were organised was that they were stilted 
and awkward affairs and little was learnt of each other's 'culture'. It seemed that the 
suspicions and misconceptions rife in certain sections of NALGO were replicated in 
COHSE and NUPE. Despite a continuing commitment to its successful conclusion, 
the pre-amalgamation period was characterised by internal contention, 
misinformation and stereotyping. It was hardly surprising that this environment 
should spill over into the early days of UNISON. How far those in COHSE and NUPE 
had similar experiences was an open question for me but it seemed reasonable to 
assume that they were largely replicated.
My union activity in UNISON continued at the same levels of involvement and 
organisation as in NALGO. In the workplace and branch, apart from some details of 
administration and finance, nothing changed. NUPE had also organised in the same 
employer and relations with them had been characterised by distrust, personal 
animosity, and a lack of joint working. Largely, this division continued unabated. At 
regional and national levels, activists previously in the predecessor unions had to 
come together in new or revised structures. NALGO lay leaders had been relatively 
successful in the pre-amalgamation negotiations in ensuring these regional and 
national structures would replicate much of the NALGO structures. For me, 
therefore, there was a level of familiarity with the structures supplemented by the 
presence of new individuals. Initially we formed ourselves into separate groups at 
meetings and eyed each other with a certain level of suspicion and lack of 
understanding. In the smaller committees, the division began to break down within
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the first year but elsewhere continued with little change throughout my two-year 
period of activity in UNISON. An unwritten but assiduously applied 'rule of 3' meant 
that individuals representative of the three predecessor unions had to be present in 
many positions and levels of organisation. Despite a gestation period of four years, 
intense negotiations, and isolated individuals promoting a forward-looking agenda for 
UNISON, any sense of a 'new* and 'different' union was largely a mirage. At the first 
National Conference and as a member of the National Executive Committee I recall 
being asked which predecessor union I was from, not how I saw progress in 
UNISON! There were two separate social evenings at the conference replicating the 
same events in NALGO and NUPE and the whole edifice almost fell apart over the 
question of exercising influence in the Labour Party.
Along with some other members of the National Executive Committee, I came to the 
conclusion that unless UNISON became a reality in local workplaces and branches 
by amalgamating branches from its predecessor unions into single UNISON 
branches, the amalgamation would never achieve its ambitions. This policy became 
a reality just as I took an opportunity to retire early from full-time employment. The 
implementation of this policy became the subject of part of my later research.
This history confirms the problems and advantages I would experience as an ‘inside’ 
researcher, those discussed earlier from Coffey’s (1999) work on the ethnographic 
se lf As Hammersley and Atkinson also commented:
In studying such settings the ethnographer is faced with the difficult task of 
rapidly acquiring the ability to act competently, which is not always easy within 
familiar settings, while simultaneously privately struggling to suspend for 
analytical purposes precisely those assumptions that must be taken for 
granted in relations with participants (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983: 93).
My personal experience within NALGO and UNISON would facilitate the acceptance 
of certain assumptions over trade union practice and organisation in my relations with 
participants and so facilitate my access to them. However, my experience might also 
frustrate an ability to apply analytical research methods to the settings I was 
investigating by elevating assumptions over the behaviour of participants above the 
objectively researched reality of their experience.
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ACADEMIC RESEARCH
My first engagement with trade union amalgamations for research purposes was in 
1993 in the immediate aftermath of the UNISON amalgamation. I was then studying 
for a Certificate in Trade Union Studies at the University of Nottingham and, amongst 
other roles in UNISON, was a member of its National Executive Council. For a small 
research project (Payne 1994), I chose to circulate a short questionnaire on their 
experience of the amalgamation to other members of the National Executive Council, 
some national full-time officials, and interview a senior national full-time official.
It became apparent that while some were happy to co-operate, others saw my 
enquiries as a thinly veiled attempt to identify individuals for criticism or to destabilise 
the amalgamation at a critical early stage in its development. These reactions were 
common to individuals from each of the unions involved in the amalgamation and can 
be seen as an indication of the tensions involved in the merger process. I recall a 
very senior full-time official leaving a meeting solely to tackle me with concerns 
expressed by lay members. I was characterised as partial, through my activity in one 
of the predecessor unions to UNISON. It was claimed that the wording of certain 
questions betrayed a hostile predilection toward the policies and practices of the 
official's predecessor union.
The UNISON commissioned research into the problems of amalgamating the cultures 
of the three unions involved in the UNISON amalgamation identified the presence of 
stereotyping of those from the unions other than one's own (Ouroussoff 1993: 3-6). I 
experienced this sentiment at first hand. At an early stage, I had been confronted 
with a crucial issue for the researcher, adopting and being accepted as adopting an 
impartial position in relation to the research subject. However, in relation to 
amalgamation itself the experience was a stark illustration of the contentious nature 
of the process. Reflecting back on the almost four-year period of internal debate 
within each union and negotiation between them, it was a microcosm of the rancour 
and rivalry within my previous union and between it and the other unions during the 
pre-amalgamation period.
In 1995 I had the opportunity to pursue such questions, but in the context of the 
workplace and branch level of trade union organisation, with studies for the Diploma 
in Labour Studies at Ruskin College, Oxford. Ruskin has particularly strong links with
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the trade union and labour movement and many lay trade union activists have 
completed the Diploma as a way of developing their knowledge and, on occasion, re­
directing their union activity. The Diploma includes a requirement for a research 
project. My period of study coincided with implementation of the policy, which I had 
been promoting during my membership of the UNISON National Executive 
Committee that all branches in UNISON should be merged or re-formed as UNISON 
branches. It seemed appropriate for me to see how it would be achieved within 
employer boundaries where there could be a number of branches conforming to the 
pre-amalgamation union structures. I was also able to build on my previous research 
on the UNISON amalgamation by moving from a national perspective to one 
concentrated on the workplace and branch. The project (Payne 1996) included 
research on literature concerned with trade union mergers, documents on the 
UNISON amalgamation and fieldwork interviews with full-time officials and lay 
leaders involved with the branch merger process.
My position as a Ruskin College student seemed sufficient to distance me from direct 
association with the research subject, despite my previous close involvement. As a 
result, the fieldwork was conducted in an open fashion. In addition, I had personally 
identified and contacted the fieldwork respondents. There was no suggestion that I 
was associated with any part of the UNISON structure, had any interest in particular 
UNISON policy positions on branch mergers or had any 'hidden agenda' that I was 
working to on behalf of other interested parties. My experience illustrated the 
privileged position the academic researcher has in the fieldwork environment. As a 
result, I was the recipient of a wide range of conflicting views and personal 
standpoints. I was trusted that these responses would be treated with absolute 
confidentiality and only used in the context of academic work.
Two outcomes of the research are relevant for the following chapters. First, I was 
able to collect disparate views from respondents over the prospect of merging with 
other branches within the same union. Despite the presence of the same employer, 
pay and conditions, for some respondents it was as if the UNISON amalgamation 
had taken place elsewhere and had little or no connection with the local organisation 
of the union. As such, there was no rationale for merging UNISON branches and 
open hostility to its perceived imposition. Others were entirely sympathetic to the 
process. Significantly, the divergence in view could largely be located with
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respondents based on their past association with one or other of the pre­
amalgamation unions. As with the previous experience, it seemed that activity in 
individual unions coloured attitudes on the amalgamation and potentially affected its 
progress and outcome. Second, I became aware that the available literature on 
amalgamation paid little attention to the conditions I was finding in workplaces and 
branches whereas conversely the literature on local union organisation had little 
interest in the reality of amalgamation at that level.
The research opened up stark research themes for me, perhaps epitomised by the 
first question in my viva interview at the college: "Was the UNISON amalgamation 
more a take-over by NALGO of NUPE?" Attempting to unravel the underlying 
conundrums that were now interesting me, formed the basis of my dissertation for the 
MA in Labour Studies at the University of Warwick (Payne 1997). The MA in Labour 
Studies provided an opportunity to consider a wide range of research into the 
experience of work and the employment relationship. As a result of essay research 
for modules and my dissertation I was able to further explore themes about union 
merger in particular, and trade unionism in general. The research for the MA 
dissertation was based on existing research into trade union mergers and trade union 
activity in workplaces and branches. It amply illustrated the gap in research relating 
to the local context. The prevailing research on mergers concentrated on the 
national level of organisation whilst that on union organisation and activity in local 
workplaces and branches took little account of the effect of merger on their operation. 
The workplace and branch as the basic unit of trade union organisation and merger 
as an important moment for trade unions were not brought together in most research.
This earlier academic research left unresolved questions concerning the position of 
local union organisation within a process of amalgamation, the variation in the 
experience of amalgamation between those coming from the individual unions 
involved in the process and the influence of relationships between the local, regional 
and national levels of the unions on the process. These concerns were refined, 
modified and crystallised into the new research questions that form the basis for the 
thesis.
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
The amalgamations
As is apparent the large majority of my trade union experience has been with 
UNISON and NALGO, one of its predecessors, including the whole period of the 
amalgamation negotiations and the first two formative years of UNISON. In addition, 
the other substantial case study fieldwork I carried out (Payne 1996) was located in 
UNISON and two UNISON workplaces. This background places me in a position of 
knowledge, affinity and research experience with UNISON. However, I was also 
conscious that concentration on UNISON as a research subject potentially raised real 
difficulties for the research itself and myself as the researcher. It was necessary to 
establish how far the UNISON experience of amalgamation was unique or replicated 
in whole or part in other amalgamations. My own close involvement in the UNISON 
amalgamation as an active member also meant that my research results might be 
contaminated by personal experiences, policy positions and prejudices. As a 
researcher, I needed checks on these results from sources other than UNISON to 
test their objectivity. Research which would allow me to investigate and compare a 
number of amalgamations and provide the necessary checks against any unique 
characteristics of the UNISON amalgamation and any subjective influences on the 
research results emanating from my own involvement in the union.
Subject to these limitations, but recognising the advantages of experience and 
knowledge, UNISON remained an appropriate choice. The other amalgamations 
would need to be selected against criteria that would provide a sustainable basis for 
providing credible research results within each one and in comparison with each 
other. Such credibility was necessary if conclusions of more universal relevance to 
the local context in union amalgamations were to be available.
I reasoned that the constraints of turnover in informants and experience of the 
amalgamation process, limited the selection of other amalgamations in addition to 
UNISON to little more than a ten-year timeframe. In practice, this produced a ten- 
year period up to 1999. It has been seen in Chapter 2 that the legal requirement in 
the UK for approving ballots in all the participating unions to an amalgamation and 
the associated acceptance of parity between them in the negotiations, inevitably 
limits the number of successful amalgamations. These conditions also predict that 
amalgamations invariably involve large unions with some equivalence of membership
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size, resources or industrial affinity. Conversely, a similar timeframe would see a 
considerably larger number of transfers of engagement involving small unions being 
absorbed into much larger ones.
These limitations produced a population of eight amalgamations (including UNISON) 
for the period under consideration (Undy 1999a, 1999b). They were:
1988 MSF
1989 GMB
1992 AEEU
1993 UNISON
1995 CWU
1996 PTC
1997 PCS
1999 UNIFI
Of these, the GMB amalgamation involved two unions of very different membership 
size, GMBATU (797,000) and APEX (80,000) whilst PCS was effectively a 
continuation of the PTC amalgamation. The large difference in membership sizes in 
the GMB amalgamation suggested limitations to questions of parity between the 
amalgamating unions in comparison to UNISON and was eliminated from 
consideration. Given the constraints of time and resources for the research, I 
decided to limit consideration to two amalgamations in addition to UNISON. 
Consideration also had to be given to questions of contact and access with the 
remaining unions. These were not in question with UNISON from my past 
involvement and research but might be problematic elsewhere. However, I was a 
member of MSF and had been engaged in some educational work with the union 
through the WEA. As such, I had already established a level of contact that could be 
expanded in the context of the research. Of the remaining four amalgamations, I 
sought to identify a third union for investigation. PTC/PCS involved unions 
concentrated within the Civil Service giving a similar public sector location to 
UNISON and the rapidly succeeding amalgamations could be expected to add 
complications to any research. CWU and AEEU were both located in the private 
sector and for AEEU often with the same employers as MSF. However, a further 
perspective on the amalgamation process to set alongside UNISON and MSF could 
be provided by UNIFI, which organised in the financial sector. The outcome of these
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deliberations was that MSF, UNIFI and UNISON were chosen as the subjects for the 
research. Table 2 summarises the three amalgamations.
Table 2. Summary of the amalgamations.
MERGER PREDECESSOR METHOD MEMBER INDUSTRIAL DATE OF
UNIONS USED CHARACTERISTICS SECTOR MERGER
MSF ASTMS
TASS
Amalgamation Professional
Administration
Technical
Manual
Manufacturing
Finance
Health
1988
UNISON COHSE
NALGO
NUPE
Amalgamation Professional
Administration
Technical
Manual
Local
government
Health
Energy
Transport
1993
UNIFI BIFU
NWSA
UNiFI (Barclays)
Amalgamation Professional
Administration
Technical
Finance 1999
It is appropriate to consider the characteristics of the members of the three 
amalgamations. UNISON was essentially a non-governmental public sector union 
with a high proportion of white-collar and skilled members alongside a substantial 
membership of low-paid manual workers. Like UNISON, MSF and UNIFI also had 
relatively high memberships from white-collar and skilled workers and to a lesser 
extent a membership of low-paid and manual workers. Despite some difference in 
their membership profile and UNISON being a predominantly public sector union, 
there did seem sufficient similarity between them to justify their selection for study.
The amalgamations also provided an opportunity for the research results to be 
examined in the context of amalgamation as long-term process. When this research 
project began, UNISON was some four years into its post-amalgamation period whilst 
UNIFI was at an early stage in its development. Meanwhile, MSF was some ten 
years old and had achieved a level of maturity. These timescales provided a point of 
comparison based on the longevity of the amalgamations.
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Case studies
The number of amalgamations available for study totalled eight. Of these, the 
individual circumstances of the GMB, PTC and PCS amalgamations reduced that 
number to six. Selecting three as subjects for the research represented 50% of those 
available. The next decision was to design the research into the selected 
amalgamations.
One method that suggested itself was the use of surveys and questionnaires 
amongst members, lay representatives and full-time officials. However, achieving a 
representative sample given the heterogeneity of membership, employer locations 
and industries in such large unions presented resource implications beyond those 
available for PhD research.
It was also apparent from the literature search that other writers had mainly relied on 
interviews with key informants to support their results. However, a difficulty with this 
approach had been a concentration on responses from individuals in influential 
senior positions. This emphasis had contributed to perspectives on the 
amalgamation process that emphasised the presence and influence of the national 
leadership and discounted that of local union organisation in workplaces and 
branches.
Given the difficulties presented by a lack of resources and the necessity of giving 
proper attention to the local context, the case study approach appeared to be the 
most amenable research method. This could allow for an in-depth examination of 
three amalgamations and include the experience of an example of local union 
organisation. It could be argued that such a small sample, particularly for the local 
context, would be unrepresentative of an individual amalgamation and 
amalgamations as a prevalent process. However, the benefit would be a 
concentration on the amalgamation process in a single locality but set within the 
experience of the wider union. Such an approach would be manageable within the 
available resources and counter the bias of other writers toward a national 
perspective.
Case studies are a widely used research method in the social sciences. George and 
Bennett (2004) define the method as follows:
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The case study approach is the detailed examination of an aspect of a 
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be 
generalisable to other events (George & Bennett 2004: 5).
However, case studies need to be structured and focused if they are to provide data 
that is amenable to general application. Structure is provided with interview 
questions that are applied on a consistent basis between the case studies and focus 
by concentrating attention on particular experiences within the case studies (George 
& Bennett 2004: 67). For the cases in this research, structure is provided through 
use of the interview questions described in pages 74-75 and focus with the position 
of the local union organisation in the three amalgamations. In selecting case studies, 
George and Bennett suggest three factors that should be considered (George & 
Bennett 2004: 69). First, they should be representative of the subject for the 
research. For this research, the cases are representative of trade union 
amalgamations. Second, selection should be guided by an identified research 
objective. The setting down of an overall research question and supplementary 
questions in the earlier chapters satisfies this consideration. Third, the cases should 
lend themselves to analysis and evaluation with theories concerning the organisation 
and activity of the research subject. In this research, the theories on forms of 
unionism and the tension between bureaucratic and democratic tendencies within 
unions that have been discussed in earlier chapters will underpin much of the data 
collected from the case studies.
With a substantial body of data already available and in part directly relevant to the 
selected case studies, I was able to focus the fieldwork for this research on a 
relatively small number of carefully selected key informants located in an individual 
local union organisation and the wider union within each amalgamation. However, I 
also recognised that I would need to build on the academic writing already accessed 
as the writing developed through the period of the research and to ensure that the 
secondary research remained relevant and captured the current debates on the 
subject. Further, the current research extends the earlier literature research with its 
explicit focus on debates about workplace unionism, debates that received a much 
more limited treatment in the earlier work.
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The workplaces
Selecting the local case studies within each amalgamation presented a number of 
problems. First, the available resources meant that only a single locality within each 
amalgamation could be studied. W ithin each amalgamated union, there would a 
large number of possible sites. For MSF and UNISON, these would be located in a 
wide range of industries and types of employer. Local union organisation in 
workplaces and branches would also be subject to variation, as would the profile of 
individual memberships. For example, amongst other industries, UNISON had a 
large membership in local government and the NHS. A study could be centred on a 
particular local authority or hospital. However, in either case, there was considerable 
variation in size of employer and membership between individual localities. Not only 
that, COHSE as an equal partner to the amalgamation had only organised in the 
NHS and the prevalence of former NUPE membership varied widely between 
individual hospitals and local authorities, whereas NALGO had been almost 
universally present in all the locations. MSF presented an even wider spread of 
industrial location and employers and, whilst UNIFI was constrained with the finance 
industry, its localities still exampled a wide range of employers between insurance 
companies and high street banks.
Second, the case study approach implied an in-depth local study of the 
amalgamation as a microcosm of the wider process. This meant that the selected 
locality would need to have had a history of robust union organisation from at least 
two of the predecessor unions and a single union organisation following the 
amalgamation. Such a parameter would exclude from selection a large number of 
localities where certain of the predecessor unions were not either present or were 
relatively insignificant, or where there was a continuation of pre-amalgamation local 
union organisation.
Third, there was a requirement for ease of access to informants within the selected 
locality and for that locality to be geographically convenient within the West Midlands. 
As nationally organised unions, this restriction would frustrate consideration of 
regional variations within and between the amalgamations and, through difficulties of 
access or availability of informants, reduce the number of possible sites even within 
the West Midlands.
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It was apparent, therefore, that whichever localities were selected for study they 
could not be presented as representative of the heterogeneity of localities that was 
present within each amalgamation. However, by adopting the in-depth case study 
approach to the research, this difficulty could be countered on the basis set out 
earlier.
The site of the local case study for UNISON was a large metropolitan council in the 
West Midlands, where both NALGO and NUPE had large memberships. However, 
whereas there had been one large NALGO branch representing all non-manual 
occupational groups for the whole council plus some associated employers, there 
had been three much smaller NUPE branches representing mainly manual employee 
groups in the council. W hilst all these branches had been engaged in negotiation 
and representation with the employer before the amalgamation, the NALGO branch 
had a more formal and structured bargaining relationship across all departments of 
the council. It also had a facilities infrastructure of office space and equipment (partly 
provided by the council), employed administrators and a functioning structure of 
branch and stewards committees, all supported by a substantial financial allocation 
from member subscriptions. The bargaining arrangements of NUPE were on a much 
more informal basis and financial support was paid directly to branch secretaries 
rather than to a branch fund. The largest NUPE branch also enjoyed some office 
facilities provide by the employer. There had been a history of rivalry between these 
branches and personal antipathy between their lay leaders. Following the UNISON 
Conference decision that all such branches should merge into single UNISON 
branches there was friction and dissent within and between the previous branches, 
which was only resolved by the active intervention of Regional full-time officials. This 
process had only been completed in 1996 and was closely followed by the 
acrimonious resignation and subsequent early retirement of one of the former NUPE 
lay leaders. The whole episode was still fresh in the memories of the interviewees 
and provided a reference point for their responses.
The locality chosen for the MSF case study was a large tyre manufacturer in the 
West Midlands. During the 20 years preceding, the date of the interviews 
employment in this company had reduced from some 20,000 to 1,700 through a 
succession of take-overs, product and technological change, and reorganisations. 
This drastic change in circumstances was a backdrop to the trade union activity of
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the interviewees and their experience of the MSF amalgamation. Although the 
workforce was much reduced, it retained a high level of union membership and 
relatively well-organised unions. Both ASTMS and TASS had organised in the 
workplace. Historically they had organised discrete groups of employees, 
differentiated by task or skill, but increasingly these boundaries had become blurred 
as technology and production techniques went through some radical changes. Any 
historic rivalry between the two unions had become increasingly irrelevant in the face 
of the serious industrial relations issues produced by the changes being instigated by 
the employer and amalgamation was a logical and sensible development. In the 
workplace, union organisation involved a stewards committee and joint negotiation 
with the employer, but the unions had continued to have separate stewards and 
convenors for their own membership. Although these arrangements survived the 
amalgamation, they rapidly broke down with the onset of employer-generated 
redundancies, restructuring and wholesale changes in production. However, formal 
local organisation through union branches was quite different. ASTMS had a branch 
based on the workplace whereas the TASS branch was based on a geographical 
area. ASTMS members, stewards and convenor were organised through the ASTMS 
branch but their TASS counterparts organised through a stewards committee. Both 
branches continued unchanged into MSF. Post-amalgamation the need to respond 
to the industrial relations issues in the workplace encouraged the development of a 
MSF organisation independent of both branches as the only practical way of 
organising and representing the membership with the employer. This organisation 
had no formal recognition in the MSF constitution and rules and the two branches 
remained the vehicles for member representation within the union, despite them 
becoming increasingly distant from the life of the workplace.
For the UNIFI local case study, it was decided to concentrate attention on one 
national institution and the local union activity associated with it. This institution was 
one of the UK clearing banks, which historically had been organised by BIFU and 
NWSA. The history of BIFU and NWSA in this institution had been characterised by 
bitter rivalry in recruitment and in negotiation with the employer. A history that the 
amalgamation was expected to nullify. Post-amalgamation the national negotiations 
continued but now from an amalgamated union basis and all members found 
themselves in branches coterminous with those previously established in BIFU. 
Local workplace issues continued to be dealt with by local representatives in similar
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manner to the pre-amalgamation situation. However, for those from NWSA the 
establishment of a local branch structure was a major change from past practice, as 
was the autonomous form of the post-amalgamation National Company Committees 
for those coming from BIFU. These changes in local organisation and negotiating 
practice provided a particular backdrop to the fieldwork.
KEY INFORMANTS
The fieldwork interviews focused on a number of key informants, relying on their 
experience and knowledge as the primary source of data. Using key informants as 
an important source of data is a reputable and valuable research method for 
ethnographic research (Fetterman 1998: 47-51; Wolcott 1999: 156-159). Such 
individuals:
Can provide detailed historical data, knowledge about contemporary 
interpersonal relationships (including conflicts), and a wealth of information 
about the nuances of everyday life (Fetterman 1998: 48).
The danger of the method is that the data may be partial and not reflective of the 
wider group. Careful selection of the informants and the checking of accounts 
through triangulation techniques are essential if that potential problem is to be 
avoided (Fetterman 1998: 48).
In a trade union setting, there is the added complication that the selected informants 
will be leaders if they are to be sufficiently knowledgeable of the issues and the intra- 
union relationships that relate to them. In an environment where 'membership 
apathy* is often ascribed to a scenario of low involvement by members in the activity 
of the union and a disjuncture between the views of leaders and members, selecting 
leaders as informants might result in a distorted view. However, the work of 
Tannenbaum (1968d) and van de Vail (1970: 102-108, 152-179) showed that, at 
least as far as those members participating at some level and more certainly for 
those holding representative roles, attending meetings is not the only prerequisite for 
knowledgeable participation. A more subtle process of communication is going on 
which produces a level of knowledge and accountability between leaders and 
members (also see the discussion on locality' and ‘collectivity’ in Chapter 3, pages 
39-42). Selecting such individuals as informants potentially opens access to an 
appreciably wider and representative range of experience.
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SELECTING THE INFORMANTS
At this stage, it was possible to predict that the collection, transcription and analysis 
of the fieldwork data would be a lengthy process. My earlier experience of fieldwork 
(Payne 1996) had also shown that unexpected and new questions would become 
apparent. The fieldwork also had to be set in the context of the existing and 
developing debates around amalgamation and the local context. For my research to 
be relevant and contemporaneous I would need to maintain and develop my grasp of 
the developing literature and use it to help explain the questions which were 
emerging or enable me to set out a critique of it from my own results.
My experience of union activity and my prior research had demonstrated that most 
individuals involved in trade union activity had an instrumental view of 
amalgamations. My subsequent work as a tutor on training courses for union 
representatives confirmed my experience from a wider canvas of workplaces and 
unions. Commonly held opinions were that, contention was 'part and parcel' of 
amalgamation, unions were just 'different' to each other, relationships vary between 
leaders and with members, union organisations in workplaces and branches vary 
within and between different unions, democracy is 'in the eye of the beholder1, all 
organisations are bureaucratic and so on. I needed to find a way of getting beyond 
these accounts and I did this by focusing on the individual's experience of the union 
within the workplace and branch, looking back to the time of the amalgamation 
process. I could then relate their experience to the research questions and draw 
responses to them. To achieve this result I developed a set of interview questions for 
use with the respondents designed to elicit responses in a number of defined areas, 
some quite specific and others of a more general nature. The questions used related 
to a number of discrete but inevitably inter-linked subject areas concerning 
amalgamation. They had particular reference to its effect on workplace and branch 
organisation and operation, and the ongoing relationship between local 
organisations, the wider union, union members and employers (see Appendices 1 
and 2 for the full questions). In summary the subject areas were:
• Introductory and concluding questions on the respondent's overall reaction to 
the amalgamation and its continuing effects.
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• The changes in steward organisation within the local organisation resulting 
from the amalgamation.
• The rationale for the amalgamation.
• The procedure for the amalgamation.
• The changes in local organisation since the amalgamation.
• The reaction of union members to the amalgamation.
• The changes in the union's structures and government resulting from the 
amalgamation.
• The changes in the relationships between local organisation and full-time 
officials, national and regional levels, and employers, resulting from the 
amalgamation.
• The influence on the amalgamation of political views and organised groups 
within the union.
The intention was to collect sets of data that related experience of the amalgamation 
from the perspective of local, regional and national levels, and explored the 
relationships within the amalgamated union and its predecessors through which that 
experience was mediated.
Collecting data from local, regional and national levels was essential. Whilst they 
form discrete areas of activity and organisation within a trade union, they are, 
nevertheless, inter-connected and inter-dependent. A difficulty identified with the 
literature on union amalgamations was an over-concentration on the national level of 
organisation and that by largely failing to acknowledge the presence of the local level 
an important aspect of amalgamation had been ignored. I was seeking to redress 
that imbalance by considering the influence on and influence of the workplace and 
branch in a process of amalgamation. However, I was conscious of not falling into a 
similarly partial analysis by not taking into account the wider union organisation (cf for 
example Waddington et at 2005). Importantly the data would also allow analysis 
between and within the three case study amalgamations.
My next task was to identify appropriate key informants in each case study. I 
envisaged a case study on a particular branch and workplace organisation in each 
amalgamated union. However, it was important that this entity also matched the pre­
amalgamation situation. The boundaries of the case study needed to have been 
unchanged by the amalgamation. This was most easily achieved by local union
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branches based on single workplaces. The form was likely to vary with each union, 
reflecting their individual organisational structures. However, this arrangement would 
enable me to collect data that reflected the pre and post-amalgamation situation in a 
single locality. To gain a rounded appreciation of the position of the workplace and 
branch in the amalgamation I would also need to collect responses from regional and 
national levels of the union.
As key informants, individuals had to be (a) representative of the pre and post­
amalgamation situation, (b) be in positions that provided them with a wide 
appreciation of the amalgamation, (c) have an understanding of the organisation and 
operation of their pre and post-amalgamation unions and (d) have wide experience of 
trade union activity. Since the data would be sourced from the standpoint of the 
same individuals, my conversations would encompass the full experience of the 
amalgamation. I envisaged that the workplace and branch respondents would be lay 
representatives and leaders whilst those at regional and national level would be 
employees of the union.
I knew that I would need a first contact that would facilitate my entry into the 
branches and provide an introduction to the key informants. Trade unions are 
complex social structures embodying significant groups of voluntary and employed 
participants at every level of their operation. Not only that, the location and 
parameters of the relationships between these participants varies widely within and 
between individual unions. The difficulty for a researcher is identifying a point of 
entry into this complex web. However, my long experience of union activity made me 
aware that personal contact with appropriate individuals was a necessary first step in 
gaining entry. My knowledge also facilitated me in identifying the regional full-time 
officials as the most amenable participants to act as gate-openers. The location and 
role of these individuals places them as the intermediary between the national and 
local levels of union activity and in close contact with participants at both levels. 
Each of the amalgamated unions in the study had a regional level office based in the 
West Midlands and it seemed appropriate and convenient to find support for the 
project there.
As a region, the West Midlands also resonates with other features of the environment 
for the case studies. As illustrated by Fairbrother (2000a: 63-80), it has a strong
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tradition of trade union activity and particularly that located in the workplace 
(Fairbrother 2000a: 75-78). It also suffered from all the socio-political problems that 
formed part of the rationales for the amalgamations (Fairbrother 2000a: 70-73). Its 
tradition of workplace trade unionism was usually seen as emblematic of the 
engineering sector (the location of the MSF workplace case study). However, as 
Fairbrother showed, trade union members in all sectors are rooted in the same socio­
economic environment (Fairbrother 2000a: 77) and the UNISON and UNIFI 
workplace case studies were likely to display a similar characteristic. Martin and 
colleagues (1996) were also able to show that the position of the West Midlands as 
the mid-point between the even stronger trade union traditions of the more heavily 
industrialised North and West and the relatively under-unionised service industries of 
the South and East made it an appropriate barometer for UK-wide considerations.
I had anticipated that the Regional Secretaries of the three unions would be 
amenable to their union being the subject of a case study on mergers. The Regional 
Secretary would also have the necessary level of authority to either agree to my 
proposal or liaise with the appropriate national full-time ofFicial to secure agreement, 
and have a good level of knowledge and experience of their union and its presence 
in the region. As a result I hoped to have fieldwork sites and respondents at local 
and national level suggested and 'doors opened' to facilitate me progressing the 
work. They would also qualify as key informants to reflect a regional perspective in 
the fieldwork data. Clearly, I would need to establish a good rapport with this 
individual if my intentions were to achieve success. Fortunately, I already had some 
contact with such individuals in UNISON and MSF and this acquaintance eased the 
contact process in both cases. With those contacts already established it was 
relatively straightforward to approach UNIFI on a similar basis. For all three I made 
formal and informal contact and supplied a copy of my research proposal. In each 
case, usually accompanied by discussion of the proposal and appropriate workplaces 
for conducting the fieldwork, the official was willing to co-operate with the research 
and facilitate contacting respondents. The basis for the three case studies had been 
established.
Further discussions with these key contacts established three suitable workplace 
sites, contacts for each and a contact at national level. Although all three undertook 
to facilitate these further contacts that proved to be problematic and after a number of
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false starts it became clear that I needed to make the contacts personally. In 
practice, none of the contacts was resistant to being interviewed whether contacted 
by the full-time official or myself.
THE INFORMANTS
MSF, UNIFI and UNISON, their predecessors and the history and background to their 
respective amalgamations will be described in detail in the next chapter but to 
appreciate the environment in which the fieldwork was conducted it is necessary to 
provide an overview here. Constitutionally trade unions are democratic organisations 
accountable to their members, formally evidenced through processes of election and 
policy and rule-setting conferences. Organisationally each of the amalgamated 
unions had national, regional and local levels of organisation and these levels all had 
similar functions. The national level was responsible for overall policy, national 
negotiation, national and political campaigning, research, finance, publicity, education 
and training, and administration. The main responsibilities of regional level were for 
the provision of full-time official support for negotiation, representation, recruitment 
and organising, regional campaigning and publicity, and training courses. The local 
level was the principal focus for negotiation and representation, recruitment and 
organising, and for all three unions was structured as formal branches of the union, 
informal workplace organisations or a combination of both. The large majority of lay 
representatives and leaders were located at local level with a small number elected 
to lay regional and national committees. In these committees, they acted alongside 
full-time officials in the delivery of regional and national level responsibilities and 
provided governance of the union between national conferences.
In practice, this description of trade union organisation is very superficial. It could be 
applied to virtually all UK unions. Beneath the veneer there is a myriad of different 
formal and informal practices, understandings, trade-offs and relationships which 
together construct the individual features of each union. This complexity was 
something that I planned to document through the fieldwork. However, in each of the 
cases there were equivalent sets of individuals who had crucial roles, either in 
mediating the role of members, or in policy formulation and direction (such as that of 
amalgamation), or in both.
78
As such, I was able to identify three sets of informants. First, there were lay leaders 
who had the immediate relationship with members and provided the focus of member 
engagement in the union. Second, there were regional full-time officials who also 
had a close relationship with members and lay leaders through their professional 
support in negotiation and representation, but who also acted as conduits of 
communication for national policy as well as their administrative responsibilities. 
Third, there were national full-time officials and national lay leaders who were 
involved in the formulation and implementation of policy. This provided the rationale 
for my selection of key informants for the fieldwork.
These interviews took place at regional and national union offices, union branch 
offices, workplaces and homes. Before the interviews, I supplied the interviewees 
with copies of my research proposal and the interview questions. I also gave a 
guarantee of confidentiality. This is a necessary commitment from the researcher 
since otherwise some informants might feel constrained in their responses from a 
concern that sections of the thesis clearly reflected their personal views.
Gibbs remarked in discussing the ethics of collecting qualitative data that:
Ensuring confidentiality and privacy is a particular problem in qualitative 
analysis because of the richness of data collected. It is an even greater 
problem with in-house research, where it will be harder to anonymise or hide 
the details that make respondents and settings identifiable (Gibbs 2007: 101). 
Ensuring that informants have the opportunity to give informed consent to their 
participation in the research and making a commitment to anonymising the results 
are vital considerations in contacting prospective informants (Gibbs 2007: 101). In 
organisations like trade unions where personal relationships are endemic to their 
operation the association of views with particular individuals could adversely affect 
their position within the union. For the researcher searching for unbiased responses 
it is essential to eliminate such concerns and a guarantee of confidentiality is an 
important element of achieving that.
UNISON 
National official
This official was Head of Organisation and Development and before the 
amalgamation had been employed by NALGO as a National Officer for local
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government negotiations. Their current role had a strategic overview of staffing and 
lay organisation within the union with an emphasis on establishing a 'culture' for the 
union and dealing with the post-amalgamation issues of forging a new entity from the 
preceding three unions. Their role in NALGO had included the co-ordination of 
national bargaining activity and the provision of advice on nationally agreed terms 
and conditions. In addition, the official had a pivotal role at the NALGO Annual 
Conference in the conduct of debates. Both of these latter roles brought contact with 
lay leaders and branches, resulting in insights into the position of the workplace and 
branch in NALGO. An important element of their current work was the development 
and commissioning of research into workplace and branch organisation and activity 
(for example Fairbrother et al 1996).
Regional officials
Both officials had been employed before the amalgamation, one as a Senior District 
Officer in NALGO and the other as a Divisional Officer in NUPE. They were now 
employed in the West Midlands Region as the Regional Secretary having previously 
been the Deputy Regional Secretary in the East Midlands Region and the Acting 
Head of Negotiations and Member Services having previously been a Senior 
Regional Officer. Unlike the national official, they were individuals who had 
experienced the amalgamation from two of the predecessor unions and were now 
working together in the amalgamated successor.
Local lay representatives
Three leaders from the branch for a large metropolitan council in the West Midlands 
were selected. One was the Branch Chairperson having previously been the 
Chairperson of a former NUPE branch in the same council. Another was the Branch 
Employment, Terms, and Conditions Secretary for Former Manual and Craft Workers 
and was previously the Secretary of another former NUPE branch in the council. The 
third interviewee was the Branch Secretary, previously the Assistant Branch 
Secretary for Employment and Conditions, and had been the Branch Secretary in the 
former NALGO branch for the council. These individuals had wide experience of the 
pre and post-amalgamation situation and ongoing local union activity. They were 
working together in a newly merged branch, had been closely involved in both the 
formal amalgamation of the three unions and the subsequent merger of three former
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NUPE branches and one former NALGO branch, and were all experienced lay 
representatives and leaders.
MSF
National official
This official was the Research Officer and held a similar position in former ASTMS. 
Their work included research into the development of workplace and branch 
organisation. This individual was able to take an objective view of the amalgamation 
process having had little direct involvement in the acrimony that had been a feature 
of the immediate post-amalgamation period when two factions battled for dominance 
in the amalgamated union.
Regional officials
One official was the Regional Secretary and had previously been a Regional Officer in 
ASTMS. The other had previously been a Regional Officer in TASS and had recently 
been elected as the National Craft Officer but retaining a regional role. As Regional 
Officers, they both had dose and regular contact with workplaces and branches in 
representing members and negotiating with employers alongside lay stewards and 
representatives. They had also been actively involved in the amalgamation process 
and had either partidpated in or dosely observed the confrontation of the post­
amalgamation penod.
Local lay representatives
Three leaders were seleded. One had been the Senior Representative for TASS 
members during and after the period of the amalgamation and was the Secretary of a 
former TASS branch. Another had held the same position for ASTMS members and 
was currently the Secretary of a former ASTMS branch. The third was a workplace 
representative for TASS members at the time of the amalgamation. Now they were 
Senior Representative following the successive retirement of the other two 
interviewees. This individual was also Chair of the Shop Stewards Committee. They 
were members of two branches replicating the pre-amalgamation ASTMS workplace 
branch and a TASS geographical branch. These individuals had wide experience of 
the amalgamation period from the perspedives of the two individual unions involved 
alongside that of long and deep activity in the ongoing life of the workplace and 
branch.
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UNIFI
I interviewed five individuals: a national lay officer, a regional full-time official, two 
workplace representatives and one ex-workplace representative. The last three also 
either had or currently held positions on a national negotiating committee. Four of 
these individuals were active in BIFU before the amalgamation and one in NWSA. 
This apparent imbalance reflected first, the considerably larger size of BIFU against 
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) and second, the scarcity of current activists from pre- 
amalgamation unions other than from BIFU.
National official
This official was the National President. Previously they had been a Joint Vice- 
President and held the Vice-President position in BIFU prior to the amalgamation. 
These were all lay positions but the individual had secured full-time secondment from 
their employment with a major financial institution in order to carry out these roles. 
From these positions, the informant had been closely involved in the negotiations and 
eventual agreement of the terms for the amalgamation and its subsequent 
implementation, but retained a perspective rooted in the local level.
Regional officials
One official was a lay member of the Midlands Regional Council and previously had 
been a member of the National Executive. Previously, they had been a full-time 
Seconded Representative for NWSA and a member of NWSA's Executive Council. 
The other was a Regional Organiser for the Midlands Region having previously held a 
similar position in BIFU. They both had long experience of working with and supporting 
local lay representatives but with a perspective that also encompassed activity at 
national level. They had also been heavily involved in either the negotiation or the 
implementation of the amalgamation. This experience was also contrasted between 
two of the unions involved in the amalgamation.
Local lay representatives
I interviewed two leaders. They were both lay workplace representatives and members 
of the Royal Bank of Scotland (formerly NatWest) National Company Committee, one 
being the Chair of that committee. Both were also members of the Midlands Regional 
Council and, before the amalgamation, had held similar positions in BIFU. However,
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their importance as key informants was their extensive activity in the workplace on 
both sides of the formal amalgamation and their insights into the relationship at local 
level between two of the unions involved in the amalgamation.
To summarise, I interviewed seventeen individuals. Seven of these individuals were 
employees of the amalgamated union, two at national level and five at regional level. 
The other ten were all or had been lay leaders as representatives and stewards in 
local workplaces and branches. Some were Secretaries of union branches or held 
elected positions on workplace stewards' committees and joint negotiating 
committees, whilst others also held representative positions on regional and national 
committees. All the respondents had held similar positions in the predecessor unions 
involved in the three case study amalgamations. They were selected for their wide 
experience of union activity at national, regional or local levels, their extensive 
involvement in the process of amalgamation and their representing most of the 
individual unions involved in the case study amalgamations. As such, they could be 
regarded as key informants for the fieldwork. I dealt with each case study in turn: first 
UNISON, then MSF, and finally UNIFI. The interviews for each case study were 
conducted in sequence and completed between July 1999 and August 2001. As 
such, I spent approximately 4/6 weeks collecting interview data on each of the cases. 
Each interview lasted about 90 minutes and, with the respondent's agreement, was 
tape-recorded.
The process of data analysis allowed me to reflect on the material I had collected and 
identify patterns of behaviour, relationships and influence within a process of 
amalgamation. However, the lengthy interval between the collection of the data and 
the commencement of the final writing-up of the thesis suggested an opportunity to 
strengthen and enrich it with a further set of interviews. These would benefit from the 
interval by widening the perspective offered by the informants on the case studies 
and providing a longer-term reflection on them. These interviews were conducted in 
2007.
In selecting these interviewees, I sought a range of respondents who would be able 
to comment on the amalgamations from different perspectives. First, I was interested 
to re-interview individuals who I had talked with for the earlier fieldwork to see 
whether their view of the events and issues had changed and, with the benefit of
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longer experience of the amalgamated union, whether their earlier assessments 
required modification. For these interviews, I was able to talk again with a senior full­
time regional official from MSF (which by now had amalgamated into Amicus) and a 
similar individual from UNISON. Then I deemed it appropriate to discuss one of the 
amalgamations with a senior full-time national official, who had not been one of the 
earlier set of interviewees, but had also been involved with the process. Such an 
official would provide new insights on the amalgamation but with the benefit of 
hindsight. Here I was able to talk with such an official from UNIFI (which by now had 
transferred into Amicus). In practice, their intense involvement with the 
amalgamation at a national level and their earlier position as an equally senior full­
time official in BIFU provided further valuable material on the UNIFI amalgamation.
Beyond these officials, who had all been directly involved with their respective 
amalgamations, I was also anxious to meet with those who were currently involved 
with the amalgamated union but had no involvement with the amalgamation which 
had created it. These individuals would have little or no knowledge of the 
amalgamation itself but would be able to provide insights into the operation of the 
amalgamated union untainted by association with its predecessors. For this group I 
was able to talk with another senior full-time official who worked with the Finance 
Sector of Amicus, the successor to UNIFI following its transfer of engagements into 
Amicus, and who had considerable contact with workplaces and branches in their 
development and the negotiation of national terms and conditions. In addition, I also 
used the opportunity provided by my being the tutor on a TUC Health and Safety 
course of discussing UNISON with a group of UNISON health and safety 
representatives.
Finally, I met with a senior full-time official of Amicus who had no direct connection 
with any of the predecessor or amalgamated unions apart from knowledge of MSF 
and UNIFI being merged into Amicus. This official had previously worked closely 
with a variety of workplaces and branches and was able to provide a perspective on 
amalgamation and the local position from outside the concerns of the case studies.
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IN THE FIELD
Previously a lay activist in UNISON, I was in 1999 active as a lay representative for 
MSF members employed by the WEA. I had also undertaken some work for the 
union as a course tutor. This gave me some confidence in approaching both these 
case studies. However, I had no personal association with UNIFI or its 
predecessors. At the time, this amalgamation had only just been completed and, as 
it seemed prudent to allow this to settle in, it became the final case study for the 
fieldwork.
I had taken great care in preparing the ground for the interviews. My initial 
discussions with the Regional Secretaries had been helpful and my contacts 
throughout the area had been useful in identifying the cases and providing 
background information on each of them. Consequently, none of the respondents 
refused to be interviewed. My guarantee of anonymity also gave a level of security to 
the respondents that their responses would not be apparent to others in the union 
since for some, without this guarantee, their situation or job prospects might have 
been compromised.
With this guarantee and my expressed preference for its use, all respondents were 
content to allow the interviews to be tape-recorded. Apart from the benefits this 
method has for retaining all comment from respondents, I believe it also allows for a 
more conversational and discursive style of interview and this method potentially 
produces more open responses than a more tightly constrained one.
Each of the interviews was conducted in an open and frank atmosphere. I 
anticipated different perspectives on the amalgamation to be expressed from local, 
regional and national level and this expectation proved to be the case. Generally, 
respondents were very candid over their experience of the amalgamation. At no 
point did I gain a perception that responses were nuanced to reflect a position not 
held by the informant. I believe that was a reflection of the open nature of the 
interview questions, which enabled all opinions to be expressed. I also allowed 
considerable flexibility in the conduct of the interview not wanting to constrain 
responses when they strayed from conformity with the interview question. The 
experience of the interview process went to confirm that my careful preparation for it,
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my selection of key informants and my formulation of questions were able to produce 
robust and credible data.
There were no particular difficulties in gaining access to these individuals but to 
provide a flavour of each case study I will now provide a brief impression of the 
atmosphere and context in which each series of interviews were conducted. In 
UNISON my earlier experience of talking to lay leaders and representatives at the 
workplace and branches selected for the case study (Payne 1996) was during the 
process of merging three former NUPE branches with a much larger former NALGO 
branch. Then, this process was proving a problematic and potentially divisive 
procedure characterised by personal animosities, concerns for personal leadership 
positions, and branch structures capable of accommodating a large and 
occupationally diverse membership. Subsequently I learnt from informal personal 
contacts that the merger had been secured, but with the loss of some individual 
workplace leaders who either refused to engage with the merged branch or resigned 
for personal reasons. I was particularly interested, therefore, to revisit the workplace 
and see how the merged branch was working out some three years after my earlier 
visit. It was gratifying to find a very different and overwhelmingly positive atmosphere 
to that I encountered previously, although the earlier experience still permeated many 
of the responses I received. This period also provided the backdrop for my 
conversations at regional and national level. Here informants were much more intent 
on considering the wider picture of the amalgamation and seeing the difficulties of the 
branch merger process in the context of a positive view of the future progress of the 
amalgamation.
My conversations in MSF were with a similar range of individuals to those in 
UNISON. The amalgamation had now reached a level of maturity but I was aware 
from my earlier research (Payne 1997) that the initial post-amalgamation period had 
seen bitter infighting between the ASTMS and TASS sections for control of the 
amalgamated union. This confrontation had permeated all levels of organisation and 
included full-time officials and lay leaders and representatives. For my interviews, I 
was interested to see that this legacy continued to provide a context for most 
informants' experience of the amalgamated union.
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The interviews with UNIFI informants portrayed little of the rancour that had provided 
a substantial part of the context for those from UNISON and MSF. The whole 
process of amalgamation appeared to have been a virtually seamless and welcome 
development.
DOCUMENTS
The documents I accessed for the research had a variety of sources, included 
published and unpublished material and took a variety of formats. They had two 
important uses for the research. First, they were used as a primary source of data. 
Second, they provided a crosscheck on the interview data collected from key 
informants.
I used three sources for these documents. First, my earlier period of activity in 
UNISON and NALGO provided a quantity of material relevant to the UNISON 
amalgamation. Second, some full-time officials provide me with a small but highly 
relevant number of documents. Third, I accessed archived material held by the 
Modern Records Centre at the University of Warwick. It was unfortunate that the 
Centre’s archives were not comprehensive for all the unions involved in the case 
studies and for the unions involved in the MSF amalgamation a substantial quantity 
of relevant material was subject to closure periods. The inevitable result of using 
these sources was that documented material for some amalgamations was more 
readily available than for others. Mainly, this provided relatively good documentation 
for the UNISON amalgamation and a reduced quantity for the MSF and UNIFI 
amalgamations.
The UNISON documents I accessed included published and unpublished reports, 
minutes and agendas of NEC meetings and National Conferences, rulebooks and 
codes of practice and correspondence. The published reports included:
• Three joint NEC reports of COHSE, NALGO and NUPE on the UNISON 
amalgamation to their respective Annual Conferences in 1990, 1991 and 
1992.
• A separate report of the NALGO NEC on the amalgamation to the 1992 
Special Conference of NALGO.
• A NEC report on Branch Funding to the 1995 Annual Conference of UNISON.
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• A UNISON report on Integration and Participation in UNISON.
The unpublished reports included:
• A UNISON report on Building a New Culture.
• A report by a lay member of the UNISON NEC on UNISON Finances.
• A UNISON report on UNISON Branch Organisation.
• A UNISON report on the activities of a ‘far left’ faction in UNISON.
The minutes and agendas I accessed included:
• The agenda for the NALGO Special Conference on the UNISON 
amalgamation held in 1992 and the NUPE internal report on its proceedings.
• The agenda for the NUPE Annual Conference held in 1992.
• The minutes of the meetings of the UNISON NEC and the agenda for the 
UNISON Annual Conference in the formative years of the amalgamated union.
The other documents available to me included.
• The rulebooks and standing orders for the conduct of the Annual Conferences 
of COHSE, NALGO and NUPE.
• The UNISON Code of Good Branch Practice.
• UNISON correspondence and reports on the merging of former COHSE, 
NALGO and NUPE branches into single UNISON branches.
• Materials produced by COHSE, NALGO and NUPE for consultation over the 
UNISON amalgamation in workplaces and branches.
• NUPE speaker notes on the UNISON amalgamation for use at the 1992 
Annual Conference of NUPE.
• A note to the NUPE NEC by their academic advisor on the proceedings and 
outcome of the debates at the 1990 Annual Conferences of COHSE, NALGO 
and NUPE on the proposed amalgamation.
The MSF documents I accessed included:
• The MSF rulebooks and standing orders for the conduct of the Annual 
Conference for the early years of MSF.
• The agendas for the early Annual Conferences of MSF.
• Some early issues of the MSF journal concerning the MSF amalgamation and 
the early retirement of Clive Jenkins, the ex-ASTMS General Secretary and 
Joint General Secretary of MSF.
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The only documents relevant to the UNIFI amalgamation I was able to access were 
the minutes and reports of the NEC of UNiFI (Barclays) for the period immediately 
preceding the amalgamation.
In addition to the documentation specific to the amalgamations studied in the thesis I 
also maintained a wider interest in union mergers through access to other 
documents. The principal source of this data was the publications of the Labour 
Research Department, in particular Labour Research and Workplace Report. Both of 
these publications include articles on developments in trade union structures in the 
UK and internationally. As a member and lay workplace representative in MSF, 
Amicus, and Unite the Union, I also received publicity on the Amicus and Unite the 
Union amalgamations. I used these two sources to maintain an overall perspective 
on the development of union mergers and as a cross-reference against the 
procedures and progress of the amalgamations in the thesis.
Prior (2003) maintains that the document has a dual relationship to social action:
First, it enters the field as a receptacle (of instructions, commands, wishes, 
reports, etc.). Secondly, it enters the field as an agent in its own right, as a 
resource for further action, as an enemy to be destroyed, or suppressed (Prior 
2003: 3).
This conception of a document sees it not just in terms of its content but also the 
social context of its production and use (Prior 2003). Thus, the documents accessed 
for this study were relevant for their content but they also played a role in promoting 
the position of some protagonists in the amalgamation process, frustrating the 
aspirations of others and guiding the eventual outcome. This dual role will become 
more apparent as the cases are analysed in the following chapters.
It follows that the documents were used in a variety of ways. For all three, they 
conveyed something of the socio-economic and intra-union contexts for the 
amalgamations and the atmosphere in which the amalgamation negotiations took 
place. This data contributed toward the development of an overall perspective on the 
fluctuating interaction between the unions within each amalgamation and in 
comparison with the other cases. The more comprehensive documentation for the 
UNISON amalgamation confirmed my own experience of its progress and provided a 
verifiable source of data to generate and support the narrative of the thesis. I also
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sought to crosscheck the interview data against documents, where this referred to 
decisions and agreements in the amalgamations. Whilst this was mostly achieved 
with the UNISON interviews, the scarcity of documents for MSF and UNIFI made this 
problematic. However, the evident reliability of the UNISON interview data from this 
process provided some reassurance that the equivalent data for MSF and UNIFI had 
a similar level of integrity. The documents were an important source of data for the 
research, which provided substance and evidence for the bargaining process that 
resulted in amalgamation and from their content substantiated data from the interview 
material.
DATA ANALYSIS
Making sense of the mass of information collected from the interviews was my next 
task. Potentially every response had value however discursive it might be. Some 
interviews had, perhaps inevitably, strayed widely from the question being asked 
whilst others had been considerably more focused. It would be important to value the 
discursive alongside the incisive and not to lose an insight merely because of how 
the respondent presented it. Gibbs introduced the subject of qualitative data analysis 
by remarking that:
The idea of analysis implies some kind of transformation. You start with some 
(often voluminous) collection of qualitative data and then process it, through 
analytical procedures, into a clear, understandable, insightful, trustworthy and 
even original analysis (Gibbs 2007: 1).
These clear and laudable objectives had to be set against the particular nature of the 
interview data that was now available to me.
To give full value to all the interviews it was necessary to transcribe them verbatim. 
First, it seemed necessary to encapsulate the objectives of the exercise. Once those 
had been established an identification of the problems generated by them in relation 
to the actual data would be necessary. Then a form of analysis could be devised 
which would tackle the problems and meet the objectives
If the fieldwork were to contribute to a coherent response to the research questions 
driving the whole research it would be necessary to isolate from the data sets of key 
themes that related to those questions. The raw data evidenced a wide range of
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responses to the questions asked at the interviews. Merely to reflect uncritically 
those responses would result in an analysis with little shape and few firm 
conclusions. A conclusion that, Trade union amalgamations in their impact on 
workplace organisation and workplace organisation's role and influence on the 
amalgamation produce a complex set of results incapable of informing the 
amalgamation process', would be a highly unsatisfactory outcome to the research. 
To avoid such a result there would need to be a framework of themes, which could 
then be used as the basis for setting out the findings of the fieldwork. Gibbs, as an 
exemplar of using this ‘coding’ process, defines it as:
A way of indexing or categorising the text in order to establish a framework of 
thematic ideas about it (Gibbs 2007: 38).
In this way, a robust shape could be established for the research that would enable 
two forms of analysis. First, a facility for identifying examples of similar data from 
across the material and, second, an ability to analyse the relationships between the 
different themes once they could be seen in juxtaposition to each other (Gibbs 2007: 
39).
To enable this primary objective to be achieved, a secondary objective was apparent. 
This goal was to devise a method of analysis, which would ensure that all responses 
relevant to the key themes were identified and located with them. However, it was 
also recognised that in achieving this objective the responses could become 
dislocated from the interview question that generated them. The context, which 
produced the response, might not be apparent and there would almost certainly be a 
need to access that context as the process of analysis proceeded. Therefore, it 
would also be necessary to incorporate a referencing system that would enable the 
question that gave rise to the response to be readily identified.
Identifying the objectives was straightforward. However, it was also quickly 
recognised that problems would inevitably be encountered in managing the process 
of analysis. Once started it might be difficult to retrace one's steps back to the raw 
data and it was best to try and identify the potential problems first and then take them 
into account within the method of analysis adopted.
The overriding problem was to isolate the key themes from the data whilst remaining 
conscious of the research questions being asked. Not only were many interviews
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discursive and responses not always directly related to the question being asked but 
respondents placed different emphases on particular aspects of the amalgamation 
process. What was important to one was less to others. It would be necessary to 
have an intermediate stage in the analysis where each respondent's contribution 
could be distilled down to the particular issues that the respondents associated with 
the amalgamation process. Many of these issues would be the same or only slightly 
nuanced from those of other respondents. If they could be seen against each other, 
it would then be possible to gain an overall perception of the totality of the reactions 
and a sense of the themes that were underpinning the issues being raised.
Once it was accepted that there would have to be a two-stage process of analysis, 
first to identify the issues and then the themes associated with the research 
questions, the need for rigorous referencing of the data became even more of an 
imperative. Knowledge of the conversations that had taken place with respondents 
showed that the shape apparently imposed on the conversations by the interview 
questions would not be robust enough to survive the process of analysis now being 
advocated. In practice, responses would inevitably become separated from their 
associated questions and it would be very difficult to resurrect that connection once 
the analysis was underway. It was also not possible in advance to predict the extent 
to which those connections would need to be resurrected. The only safe course of 
action was to have a system of cross-referencing which would allow for the possibility 
of it being required.
The final problem identified was the need to be able to readily access quotations from 
the respondents that could be incorporated in the text of the chapters produced from 
the analysis of the data. From experience of using quotations from literature in other 
academic work, it was considered most expeditious to isolate potentially useful 
quotations during the first stage of analysis. It would also be necessary to reference 
them correctly at the same time. Referencing in this way would ensure they were in 
a readily useable form once the text was being produced and that they would be 
cross-referenced in the analysis along with the issues and themes with which they 
were associated.
With both the objectives and the problems identified, the next step was to actually 
devise and then implement a method of analysis capable of satisfying both
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imperatives. Each interview was transcribed against the individual questions. This 
process was a lengthy one but it was extremely valuable. However, Gibbs also 
suggests that.
There are dangers when moving from the spoken context of an interview to 
the typed transcript, such as superficial coding, decontextualisation, missing 
what came before and after the respondent’s account, and missing what the 
larger conversation was about (Gibbs 2007: 11)
I countered these problems partly through the act of listening to the recording and 
mentally reconstructing the environment of the interview, and recording a verbal 
impression of the interview immediately after its conclusion (see also Gibbs 2007: 
11). The transcription process enabled me to re-engage with the conversation and 
the atmosphere in which it was conducted. Being removed from the actual interplay 
of the occasion meant I could more readily appreciate the issues that concerned 
each individual but also see those in the context of the whole group of interviews for 
that case study. I was gaining wider and deeper insights into each case study, which 
could only benefit the research, and for the analysis of the data aid the identification 
of the themes that were emerging.
Insofar as I had immediate access to documents, as was often the case for the 
UNISON interviews, and subsequently when other documents became available, I 
was able to crosscheck a certain amount of the interview data against other sources. 
Although this was an incomplete process for the MSF and UNIFI interviews, given 
either the absence or unavailability of documents, I considered that the more 
comprehensive and affirmative crosschecking of the UNISON interviews provided a 
good basis for accepting their credibility. This process of triangulation (Hammersley 
and Atkinson 1983: 198-200) also evidenced that the interview questions were 
enabling me to access data that was relevant to the issues I was concerned with in 
the amalgamation process, since it was being confirmed from other documentary 
sources.
With the transcription completed, the next part of the process of analysis was to 
identify, or ‘code’ (Gibbs 2007: 38-55), the issues that were being identified by each 
respondent. The process here was to bring together the issues for all the 
respondents in a single document for each case study. I set out a grid that mimicked 
the sequence of interview questions, with sections for the national, regional and local
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respondents. Each respondent's issues were then mapped against this grid from the 
same sequence of transcribed interview questions and cross-referenced with their 
initials. Whilst recording the issues, accompanying quotes from the interviewee were 
also recorded on the grid and correctly referenced. Inevitably, this process resulted 
in the same or similar issues being recorded but from different respondents and from 
the perspective of the three groups of informants.
Working from the identified issues it was then possible to isolate the themes that 
were informing and generating them and start to see them against the research 
questions. Within each substantive theme there were also found to be sub-themes, 
which would benefit from being separately identified when a narrative came to be 
written from the themes. Rather than linking the issues with their associated themes 
by copying them across in text form, I decided to use a referencing system to link the 
two. Similarly, the issues were referenced to their associated themes as the process 
of analysis proceeded. By adopting this approach, the themes analysis document 
was much reduced in bulk from what it would have been had the issues been 
included in text form. This reduction was important in enabling an overall 
appreciation of the shape and content of the themes to be apparent and provide a 
framework that could be set against the research questions (Gibbs 2007: 73-89). In 
addition by referencing the themes and issues to each other there would always be a 
readily accessible trail between them and usefully to the respondents' quotes when 
they might be included in the narrative of the case study. Identifying the themes also 
enabled a further stage of crosschecking against other documentary sources so that 
their validity could be confirmed. This process, accepting the restrictions on the 
documentary data indicated earlier, successfully validated the themes evident from 
the interview data and provided further confirmation of the integrity of the fieldwork.
Clearly, this approach to the problem of data analysis was very systematic. It could 
be argued that it appealed to the tidy mind of an ex-accountant! An assessment that 
may have some credibility but would not be sufficient to support the use of this form 
of analysis and accordingly, some reflection on its use and appropriateness is 
necessary.
Looking back to the primary objective of the exercise, that of providing a framework 
of key themes for each case study from which a written narrative could be produced,
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the method of analysis adopted appears to have satisfied that objective. With the 
analysis completed, there was a set of themes for each case study, which were 
amenable to the production of such a narrative. In addition, the process of analysis 
had ensured that all relevant responses and quotations from respondents had been 
captured and were readily located to the context in which they were given. The 
process ensured that the raw data was examined in a systematic way and reviewed 
at each stage of the analysis. The secondary objective of accessing all relevant 
responses in a form that enabled them to be tracked to their source has also been 
satisfied.
Were there any disadvantages and practical difficulties in using this method of data 
analysis? It cannot be denied that the process was a lengthy one and required a 
high level of concentration. Against that, it had the advantage of ensuring a scrutiny 
of the raw research material and that produced a real appreciation and deep 
knowledge of it. There always remained the danger that the process would see all 
responses as relevant however contradictory and irrelevant they actually were. The 
distillation of the raw material through issues and then to themes enabled those 
contradictions and irrelevances to become apparent and capable of being eliminated 
in the narrative. The referencing of the material was an intensive process and the 
extent to which it was necessary difficult to assess in advance of the narrative being 
produced. However, what can be said is that in its absence, the analysis would not 
be amenable to being sourced back to its context and raw data and a potentially 
valuable facility would not be available. Overall, it seems that the disadvantages and 
practical difficulties are more than outweighed by the benefits.
CONCLUSION
My intention in this chapter has been to take my research journey on to its next 
stage, the fieldwork. The methods I used, the rationale for those methods and my 
experience of using them 'in the fielcf. However, it is important to recognise that the 
research process is an integrated, dependent and responsive one. There is a 
continuing and dynamic process of primary and secondary research informing and 
responding to each other. 'Fieldwork' is not a standalone exercise but one 
organically grown from and responsive to all other aspects of the research project.
My personal history of trade union activity and experience, related research and 
continuing work as a course tutor on union training courses provided an important 
and relevant source for this research and I have needed to acknowledge the benefits 
and dangers of this history elsewhere in the thesis. Here I have seen the benefit of 
relating to the experience of amalgamation and trade union activity of informants from 
my own knowledge and experience. The potential barriers to accessing a particular 
social environment, which might be there for a researcher from the 'outside', have not 
been there for me. Being an 'insider* has provided me with benefits of access, affinity 
and understanding which have undoubtedly aided the responsiveness of my 
fieldwork interviews. However, my close association with the research subject 
heightened the need for me to use objective research methods and I have been 
intent to show how I sought to achieve this requirement.
My chosen research method was to investigate three case study trade union 
amalgamations and the experience of an individual local union organisation within 
each of the amalgamated unions. I decided to base these investigations on data 
collected from interviews with a number key informants. These individuals were to be 
representative of participants in the amalgamation process at local, regional and 
national levels of the unions, and were to include lay and employed union 
representatives and officials. In addition, documents and literature relevant to the 
amalgamations would also be collected and accessed. These would be utilised both 
for their intrinsic contribution to the research and to triangulate with the analysis of 
the interview data. These research methods were well-attested in the literature on 
qualitative research and enabled me to access my own experience as a positive 
contribution to the research.
There were a number of benefits that came from integrating my experience in the 
research. First, I used UNISON as one of the case study amalgamations. This 
enabled me to access my own detailed knowledge as a contribution to the data and 
in triangulating the data collected from other sources. With the other case studies my 
experience was a real benefit in establishing contacts with informants and facilitating 
the interviews, and again it was used to triangulate some of that data. My close 
affinity with the research subject meant I had to be continually conscious of the need 
for objectivity when applying it within the research. Nevertheless, I remain convinced 
that the results are richer because of its contribution.
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It has also been important to show the context and atmosphere in which my 
interviews took place. By setting the respondents in their particular social constructs, 
it becomes evident that the primary data collected is not just a straightforward 
response to interview questions but also a reflection of much wider influences on 
their experience and behaviour.
The research has shown two particular problems with the existing literature on trade 
union mergers. First, that the local context is noticeably absent from consideration 
and second, that merger is too often seen as a one-off national event rather than 
long-term process permeating all levels of union organisation. Then the literature on 
the workplace and branch level of union organisation has highlighted issues of the 
forms of unionism in different unions and the crucial role of leaders in mediating and 
influencing relationships between union members, leaders and full-time officials 
throughout the union. From this literature and my own previous knowledge and 
experience, I have been able to develop the set of research questions set out in the 
second section of the chapter. My interviews have sought to illuminate these 
concepts from the perspective of those actually experiencing them in a variety of 
workplaces, branches and trade unions but always in the context of an amalgamation 
involving the informants’ own union. Subsequent chapters will show how this data 
illuminates understanding of these concepts and makes a substantial contribution to 
a more complete appreciation of trade union amalgamations and, in particular, the 
presence of the local context within them.
97
Chapter 5
THE UNIONS IN CONTEXT
This chapter is concerned with the three unions and their local contexts: who they 
were, their history and background, the environment for their amalgamations. Brief 
histories are presented of the eight trade unions that participated in the 
amalgamations, and the three new unions that were the outcome. It is also important 
to set those descriptions in the environment where the participants engaged with their 
amalgamations.
Amalgamations do not emerge in a vacuum. Chapter 3 sought to set out the various 
theories on why mergers happen (in particular Waddington 1995; Undy 1993; 1999a, 
1999b; Undy et al 1981) but as suggested, for a full appreciation of the case studies 
they need to be set in the environment which encouraged, facilitated or frustrated 
them. Attention will also be given to the endogenous and exogenous circumstances 
of the individual unions and the interplay between those circumstances within each 
amalgamation case study. Here the formulation of 'form and character1 (Fryer 2000) 
in trade unions exemplified in Chapter 3, pages 50-51 will be utilised as an analytical 
tool to mark out the differences and synergies between the participants.
The MSF, UNISON and UNIFI amalgamations roughly occupy the 1990s. This was a 
period when the political and socio-economic convulsions of the 1980s and their 
impact on UK trade unions became embedded in the fabric of the UK. As Chaison 
remarked:
Declining membership, financial hardship, bargaining setbacks and political 
impotency forced the unions to explore new ways to recruit and represent 
workers. Not surprisingly, mergers were a top option (Chaison 1996. 79).
In the UK, there had also been a marked historical tendency toward seeing merger, 
whether as transfers of engagements or amalgamations, as a solution to such 
problems (Chaison 1996. 79). It follows that a reflection on the period provides a 
necessary context for these amalgamations.
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Nineteen seventy-nine had been the zenith of union membership and influence in the 
UK. However, the following two decades saw total union membership fall from some 
13 million in 1979 to just under 8 million in 2004 (Undy 2008: 24), and union density 
fall from 54% to 29% (Undy 2008: 33). The industrial and political influence of unions 
in 1979 was epitomised by the ‘W inter of Discontent’, but as Young recorded:
By the late 1980s, British unions would have been incapable of launching a 
winter of discontent of the kind that ushered Mrs Thatcher into power even if 
they had wanted to (Young 1989: 533).
Such an apparently dramatic decline in the fortunes of an institution once 
characterised as the ‘Fifth Estate’ (Undy 2008: 32), requires an explanation.
Undoubtedly, it is overly simplistic to see the decline solely in terms of the policies 
pursued by the Tory government following their victory in the 1979 election. 
Nevertheless, ‘Vanquishing Lucifer1 (Young 1989: 352-378) was a consistent theme 
of the Thatcher and Major administrations, producing no less than seven pieces of 
legislation directed at weakening union power and influence (Chaison 1996: 88; Undy 
2008: 26-27). These were supported by direct and more surreptitious interventions in 
industrial disputes, most obviously in the Coal Strike of 1984-85 (Young 1989: 367- 
378).
Alongside the political attack, unions were also challenged by cyclical and structural 
economic change (Chaison 1996: 80-84; Undy 2008: 23-26). There were recessions 
early in the 1980s and 1990s. The resulting unemployment had a disproportionate 
impact in manufacturing, a sector previously characterised by large plants with a high 
level of union organisation and membership. Economic recovery and a long-term re­
orientation of the UK economy largely manifested itself in an expansion of service 
industries and a requirement for more highly qualified employees. The employment 
patterns in these new and developing industries favoured smaller sites of 
employment, part-time jobs and a dramatic growth in female employment (Undy 
2008: 24-25). Particularly for unions which largely organised in the private sector 
(such as those involved in the MSF and UNIFI amalgamations) these changes had a 
debilitating impact on their membership levels.
Employment levels in the public sector remained at more stable levels through the 
period and even started to expand following the election of a Labour government in
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1997. However, the pattern of employment was heavily influenced by policies of the 
preceding Tory government for denationalisation, deregulation, privatisation and 
competitive tendering of public services (Chaison 1996: 89). These provided serious 
challenges in recruiting and organising members for public sector unions such as 
those involved with the UNISON amalgamation. Nevertheless union density in the 
public sector remained at a relatively high level of 59% in 2004, whereas in the 
private sector it had plummeted to 17% (Undy 2008: 25).
Finally, the period also experienced considerable change in employment practice 
generated by employers (Chaison 1996: 84-87; Undy 2008. 30-31). In both the 
private and public sectors there were wholesale moves away from national 
bargaining forums toward decentralised processes at individual plants and localities 
as employers sought more flexible responses to global competition in adverse 
economic conditions. Concomitant and complimentary to these developments were 
a growth in human resource management techniques directed at an individualisation 
of the employment relationship and a consequential diminution in the scope and 
relevance of collective bargaining. Both of these changes produced difficulties for 
unions entailing a need for revised responses and increased resources when 
membership levels were falling and fragmenting.
However, alongside any decline, unions retained an important and relevant position 
in many parts of British industry and this presence attests a continuing resilience and 
sense of purpose (Chaison 1996: 90-91). In the private sector, where unions had 
previously been recognised and collective bargaining practised these continued 
through the period and similar circumstances prevailed in the public sector. This is 
not to suggest that unions’ bargaining power, status and resources were not 
adversely affected by the difficulties of the period (Undy 2008: 32-39) but that 
predictions of their progressive demise were very misplaced (Chaison 1996: 90-91).
In the chapter, there is a section on each of the case study amalgamations. These 
sections set out the details of the amalgamation, and the history and ‘form and 
character’ of the participant unions. These features are located with reference to the 
environment surrounding the amalgamation. The intention is to provide a template 
for each amalgamation that will enable the underlying interplay of tensions and 
relationships set out in the succeeding chapters to be examined. Following these
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sections on the individual amalgamations there is an overview of the experience of 
amalgamation to help inform the following chapters.
MANUFACTURING SCIENCE AND FINANCE
MSF was founded in 1988 from an amalgamation of the Association of Scientific 
Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) and the Technical, Administrative and 
Supervisory Staffs (TASS). At the time, ASTMS membership was said to be about 
390,000 and TASS 260,000 (Carter 1991: 45). The total membership of 650,000 
made it the largest private sector white-collar union in the world (Carter 1991: 37) and 
a position as the sixth largest union in the TUC. Table 4 illustrates its history.
Table 3. History of MSF
PREVIOUS
UNIONS
YEAR
FOUNDED
PREVIOUS
UNIONS
AFFILIATION
TRADES
UNION
CONGRESS
(TUC)
LABOUR
PARTY
YEAR OF 
AMALGAMATION
AMALGAMATED
UNION
Association
of
Supervisory
Staff,
Executives
and
Technicians
(ASSET)
1968
Association of 
Scientific, 
Technical and 
Managerial 
Staffs
TUC
Labour Party
Association 
of Scientific 
Workers 
(AScW)
(ASTMS)
1988
Manufacturing 
Science and 
Finance 
(MSF)
Draughtsmen 
and Allied 
Technicians 
Association 
(DATA)
1970
Section
Amalgamated
Union of
Engineering
Workers
(AUEW)
1985
Independent
Technical,
Administrative
and
Supervisory
Staffs
(TASS)
TUC
Labour Party
Source: Carter (1991); Eaton & Gill (1983)
ASTMS had been founded in 1968 from the merger of The Association of
Supervisory Staff, Executives and Technicians and The Association of Scientific
Workers. Subsequently it had seen a period of rapid growth in membership under
the leadership of Clive Jenkins, its charismatic General Secretary (see Melling 2004
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for Jenkins’ leadership of ASTMS). Mainly, this expansion had been through the 
union positioning itself in new and expanding areas of employment, or in areas where 
union organisation was at a low level. It had also grown through a number of 
mergers with smaller specialist or employer-based unions (Eaton & Gill 1983: 123- 
132). However, the harsher economic and political climate of the 1980s had seen a 
tailing off in this growth. Membership started to fall and the aura of success, 
personified in the ebullient Clive Jenkins, began to tarnish. By now, ASTMS was 
organising scientific, technical and managerial employees in manufacturing, finance, 
universities and health.
Organisationally all members were placed in one of 900 branches. The boundaries 
of these branches were a mixture of geographic, including members from a number 
of different employers and workplaces, or (particularly in large manufacturing 
companies) single employer or workplace branches. The branches were represented 
on one of the 16 Divisional Councils and at the Annual Delegate Conference, whilst 
the National Executive Council largely comprised individuals elected by the whole 
membership. The heterogeneous nature of its membership spread over a number of 
different industries. Its rapid growth sometimes outstripped its organisational 
development and its constitution and rules, resulting in a loose organisation where 
branches and Divisional Councils had their own funds and a degree of autonomous 
control over their intra-union affairs (Carter 1991; Carter & Cooper 2002; Fairbrother 
2000a: 43).
TASS had been established in 1970 when its predecessor, Draughtsmen and Allied 
Technicians Association, had become the white-collar section of the loosely merged 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW). Never a harmonious merger, 
the fundamental and unresolved differences between TASS and the other sections of 
AUEW over the appointment (TASS) or election (AUEW) of full-time officials 
eventually led to TASS establishing itself as an independent union in 1985. Its 
growth through recruitment had been much slower than ASTMS and it had a much 
lower propensity to attract merger partners (Eaton & Gill 1983: 111-119). Its 
membership was also far more concentrated in the manufacturing sector, although 
those members held a wide range of occupations. If anything, this concentration had 
made it even more vulnerable than ASTMS to the wholesale job losses and tough
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political climate of the 1980s, which had particularly affected the old established 
engineering industries where the majority of TASS members were employed.
If the membership profile of TASS had many synergies with at least a significant 
section of ASTMS’s membership in engineering (Carter 1991: 40-42) its 
organisational profile could not have been more different. Superficially there was the 
same structure of local branches, Divisional Councils, Annual Representative Council 
(or Conference), Executive Committee and an equally dominant General Secretary in 
Ken Gill (see Taylor 1978: 225-228 for Gill’s leadership of TASS); but there the 
similarities ended. The 320 branches and 26 Divisional Councils had no funds of 
their own or any real level of autonomy over their activity within the union. The 165 
delegates to its Annual Representative Council were elected at Divisional 
Conferences where all branches were represented, but that was the closest most 
branch activists got to national activity. This small conference then selected most of 
the other lay representatives and national committees within TASS. These 
arrangements were in contrast to the 1,100 delegates to the ASTMS Annual 
Conference representing every branch in the union. This funnelling of representation 
through to the Representative Council enabled the Communist Party (CP) led Broad 
Left faction in TASS to control every aspect of the union's activity (Carter 1991; 
Parkin 1975). As Fairbrother subsequently remarked in looking back at the two 
constituents of MSF:
ASTMS had a tradition of organisation where the branches had considerable 
financial and political independence, whereas TASS branches were tightly 
circumscribed, the union organising on the basis of full-time officer leadership 
and control (Fairbrother 2000a: 43).
Carter (1991) provides a succinct history and description of the MSF amalgamation 
although an emphasis on the ASTMS side of the story (prompted by a reluctance to 
engage with the research from former TASS lay leaders and full-time officials (Carter 
interview 1997)) results in an occasionally skewed presentation. However, it is 
apparent that the political, economic and industrial environment of the 1980s had 
adversely affected the membership growth and organisational and financial stability 
of both ASTMS and TASS. Within ASTMS, the engineering section had seen its 
previously dominant position of influence whither as the union rapidly expanded into 
the financial and health sectors. Often working and bargaining alongside
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counterparts in TASS there was a commonality of interest between them and the 
possibility of a restoration of power and influence for a combined engineering 
membership within an amalgamated union. For both leaderships amalgamation 
would be a straightforward response to their mutual organisational, financial and 
membership problems, and would provide a platform for increasing their influence in 
the TUC and the Labour Party. To the outside world and the membership at large 
these 'old tensions inherent within trade unionism' (Carter 1991: 38) were dressed up 
as an exercise in creating a 'new* form of trade unionism.
The problem for the amalgamation was that 'new* was never adequately defined, either 
in terms of form ’ or in terms of ‘character* (Carter 1991: 37). In the impetus to secure 
the amalgamation, these more fundamental issues were largely brushed aside by the 
rhetoric of the leadership and particularly the two General Secretaries, Ken Gill of TASS 
and Clive Jenkins of ASTMS (MSF 1988b). The amalgamation was secured based on 
two separate divisions (Division 1, ASTMS and Division A, TASS) with equal 
representation on all policy-making forums and a future National Rules Conference 
when the 'form' of MSF would be agreed. In the meantime, the two old unions would 
continue to operate as almost separate entities under this enabling umbrella. However, 
there were inherent problems of both 'form' and 'character* in forging the amalgamated 
union under this arrangement. Immediately, the disparity between the 50/50 
representation and the almost 3:1 majority of ASTMS membership betrayed an 
apparent imbalance in internal power between the two divisions in favour of TASS. 
These statistics give an early indication of the genesis of the battle over 'form' that was 
to consume the energies of many lay leaders and full-time officials in the early years of 
MSF. Without any consideration of 'character1 the widely disparate 'forms' of the two old 
unions would have created considerable problems in producing a single 'form' 
acceptable to both. However, when married to the fundamental differences of 
'character* between the 'anarchic, diverse and de-centralised' ASTMS and the 
'democratic centralism' of TASS (MSF national full-time official interview 1999) the 
blood-letting of the subsequent battle for control between the two divisions was of 
little surprise. The confrontation is graphically illustrated by Carter (1991) and will not 
be rehearsed in detail here except to note that four years after the first unified 
National Executive meeting at the election of Roger Lyons as General Secretary 
Designate, Ken Gill (the incumbent General Secretary) stated that the vote had split 
along ASTMSTTASS lines (Carter 1991: 38).
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The interviews for the MSF case study were mainly conducted in 1999 some ten 
years after the formal amalgamation, yet the infighting of the early years was a 
reference point for all the respondents. In essence, it seems that those from TASS in 
Division A attempted to use their tightly controlled 50 per cent block vote to dominate 
MSF and create it as a mirror image of the 'form and character" of TASS. After some 
initial success with this tactic those from ASTMS in Division 1, together with some 
allies from Division A countered this approach. The superior organisation and 
numbers of this alliance eventually saw the outcome as a union very much in the 
’form and character* of ASTMS (Carter 1991; Carter and Poynter 2002; Fairbrother 
2000a: 46). Fairbrother commenting that,
A union which was bom out of a merger between two unions organised on the 
basis of very different traditions and practices has ended up affirming the 
importance of workplace organisation and sovereignty (Fairbrother 2000a: 46).
The local level of MSF was composed of formal branches and informal organisations 
where members worked. The boundaries of these two forms of local or workplace 
organisation could be coterminous but in large part rarely occurred and this was the 
situation for the workplace case study. Branches established in ASTMS and TASS 
simply transferred unchanged into MSF with no subsequent attempt made to 
rationalise what became an increasingly irrational and confusing structure. All 
members were also members of a branch but this membership often bore little 
relationship to where they were actually employed. The result was the development 
of informal workplace organisations for dealing with industrial relations issues with 
the employer. However, branches were the only local level of organisation 
recognised in the constitution and rules and, outside of direct elections for the 
General Secretary or the National Executive Committee, were the forum for 
democratic governance. This dichotomy between workplace and branch had a real 
influence over the presence of the local context in the MSF amalgamation.
The overriding characteristic of the MSF amalgamation was a battle for control of the 
amalgamated union. Ostensibly, this confrontation was between the CP-led Broad 
Left faction that had exercised hegemonic control over TASS and sought to extend 
its hegemony into MSF, and an alliance between those from ASTMS and TASS who 
resisted this policy. However, the contention was also between opposed forms of
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unionism, the ‘leader-led’ form of TASS and the ‘member-led’ form of ASTMS. The 
latter emerged as the dominant form in MSF. The procedure adopted for the 
amalgamation seemed to either, fail to acknowledge this divide or be manipulated to 
advantage the agenda of the Broad Left. Superficially, the location where members 
worked appeared to be a bystander in this confrontation but the extent to which its 
position in the amalgamation was influenced by the confrontation is an important 
issue.
UNISON
UNISON was formed in 1993 from the amalgamation of the Confederation of Health 
Service Employees (COHSE), the National and Local Government Officers 
Association (NALGO) and the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE). 
Immediately before the amalgamation COHSE claimed a membership of 190,000, 
NALGO 700,000 and NUPE 510,000 and the combined membership of 1.4 million 
made it the largest British trade union (Ironside and Seifert 2000). Table 3 illustrates 
its history.
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Table 4. History of UNISON
PREVIOUS
UNIONS
YEAR
FOUNDED
PREVIOUS
UNIONS
AFFILIATION
TRADES
UNION
CONGRESS
(TUC)
LABOUR
PARTY
YEAR OF 
AMALGAMATION
AMALGAMATED
UNION
Mental
Hospital
and
Institutional
Workers’
Union 1946
Confederation 
of Health 
Service 
Employees 
(COHSE)
TUC
Labour Party
1993 UNISON
Hospitals 
and Welfare 
Services 
Union
1905
National and 
Local
Government
Officers
Association
(NALGO)
(formerly
National
Association of
Local
Government
Officers)
TUC
Municipal
Employee’s
Association
(formerly
London
County
Council
Employees’
Protection
Society)
1908
National Union 
of Public 
Employees 
(NUPE) 
(formerly 
National Union 
of Corporation 
Workers)
TUC
Labour Party
Source: Esiton and Gil (1983); Terry (1996)
The history of COHSE until just before its amalgamation into UNISON is set out in 
Carpenter (1988). Briefly, it was formed in 1946 from the merger of the Mental and 
Institutional Workers' Union and the Hospitals and Welfare Services Union. 
Following the foundation of the NHS, it saw a rapid increase in its membership 
although this growth had largely halted in the 1980s with the development of 
competitive tendering and privatisation in the NHS. 70 per cent of its members were 
women although this proportion was not reflected in the gender profile of its lay and 
full-time official leadership. Within the NHS, it had a long history of rivalry and 
competition for members with the RCN and NUPE (Eaton and Gill 1983: 227-232). A
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core attribute of COHSE, which was heavily promoted in its rivalry with the RCN and 
NUPE, was as a specialist NHS union affiliated to the TUC and the Labour Party. 
This attribute also underpinned many of its aspirations in the negotiations to form 
UNISON (Fryer 2000).
COHSE's organisation was on familiar trade union lines. Members were also 
members of local branches (often based around individual hospitals, but including 
branches for managers and other specialist groups). Branches sent delegates to one 
of 13 Regional Councils and the Annual Delegate Conference, and there was a 
National Executive Committee directly elected by the members. As an exclusively 
NHS union much bargaining was carried out at national negotiating committees. This 
feature encouraged a centralised approach to the conduct of the union's affairs, 
although the development of local bonus schemes had also shown the need for 
workplace representatives to police their introduction and operation (Eaton and Gill 
1983: 227-232). Nevertheless, COHSE remained a centralised union where full-time 
officials were very influential in bargaining and internal affairs (Fairbrother 2000a: 54; 
Terry 1996).
NALGO's history is presented in three substantial volumes, Spoor (1967) for the 
period 1905-65, Newman (1982) covering 1965-80 and finally Ironside and Seifert
(2000) for 1979-93. The union was founded in 1905 as the National Association of 
Local Government Officers and subsequently changed its name (but not its acronym) 
in 1952 to reflect members employed by nationalised energy, water and transport 
industries, universities and the NHS, as local government services were reorganised 
after 1945. The post-war growth of public (and particularly local government) 
services and white-collar jobs saw NALGO's membership expand rapidly to some 
780,000, making it the largest white-collar union in the TUC. Although the harsher 
public sector climate of the 1980s had seen some retrenchment from this high in the 
1990s, its members had been largely unaffected by the threat of privatisation and 
competitive tendering which impacted on the membership levels of COHSE and, in 
particular, NUPE. Like COHSE, NALGO had a high proportion of women members 
at about 50 per cent but it had made efforts to enhance their presence and influence 
in the union's affairs. NALGO pioneered a policy of ‘self-organisation’ to address the 
issue and extending the policy to include other social groups such as black members. 
Unlike COHSE, NALGO recruited members over a wide range of occupations, pay
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levels and public sector employers, although the large majority of its members 
remained employed in local government. As a largely white-collar union, there was 
relatively limited competition for membership with COHSE and NUPE although 
competition had increased as the pressures on membership numbers had 
accelerated during the 1980s. NALGO only adopted a strike clause in 1961 and 
finally affiliated to the TUC in 1964:
Some 43 years, 12 conference debates and 6 membership ballots after it was 
first suggested (Eaton and Gill 1983: 237).
It never affiliated to the Labour Party. This history provided some evidence of an 
independent 'character* to the mass of trade union practice.
NALGO's members were organised into some 1200 branches based on single 
employers, which were all represented on one of 12 District (or regional) Councils 
and the Annual National Conference. There was also a National Executive Council 
directly elected by the membership. Branches had considerable autonomy over the 
provision of training, campaigning, affiliations and local industrial relations with 
relatively high levels of resources to support their activities. Perhaps reflecting its 
roots in local government the union also had a committee structure of lay 
representatives at District and National levels. It espoused the principle of the union 
being organised and led by its members, through their elected representatives at all 
levels of organisation. Full-time officials had a supportive rather than participative 
role in policy formation and national bargaining activity and those engaged in 
representation and negotiation on behalf of members were even appointed by lay 
interview panels. Historically most bargaining over pay and conditions was 
conducted at national level. However, these arrangements began to fragment during 
the 1980s complemented by a growing steward system in branches. This 
development further enhanced the autonomy and influence of NALGO branches. A 
cadre of articulate, educated lay leaders with insights into management practice on a 
par with that of full-time officials often populated these branches. These lay leaders 
were able to use the autonomy of branches to challenge the policies of full-time 
officials. Factionalism, in the form of Broad Left, Far Left and Moderate/Right Wing 
groups, was also a feature of NALGO that set it apart from COHSE and NUPE (Terry 
1996). Decentralisation and lay involvement were particular features of NALGO's 
character' that permeated the negotiations over amalgamation (Fairbrother 
2000a:54; Terry 1996).
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NUPE's earlier history is in two volumes by Craik (1955, 1968). The union had 
originated in 1908 as the National Union of Corporation Workers becoming NUPE in 
1928. Like COHSE and NALGO, it saw rapid growth in its membership with the post- 
1945 development of local government and NHS services to a maximum of some
700.000 members. However, it had suffered significantly greater deprivations on its 
membership from the mid-1980s with the introduction of government and employer 
policies for privatisation and competitive tendering, reducing membership to some
550.000 immediately prior to the amalgamation. Two-thirds of NUPE's members and 
about 50 per cent of its stewards were women. Many of these members worked part- 
time on low pay as cleaners, school meals staff and domestic staff in local 
government and the NHS (Eaton and Gill 1983: 242-250). Like NALGO, the union 
had started to make provision for greater involvement in its affairs by its women 
members. NUPE members were employed in many of the same workplaces as 
those of NALGO in local government, universities, water and the NHS. In the NHS, 
they also worked alongside members of COHSE although mainly in low paid manual 
jobs. The union also recruited smaller numbers of white-collar employees and there 
was some competition for members with NALGO but even more with COHSE where 
both unions were often recruiting from the same employee groups in the NHS. 
However, NUPE's relationship with NALGO was also coloured by NALGO's members 
being seen as the managers of NUPE members and the administrators of the policies 
of privatisation and competitive tendering that were adversely affecting them but with 
no equivalent impact on their own employment (Fryer 2000: 26; Personal experience 
1982-1992; Undy 1999: 453). NUPE was a longstanding affiliate of the TUC and the 
Labour Party and within both organisations had continuously championed the cause 
of low paid employees and the need for a statutory minimum wage. Since 1928, it 
also had a policy of promoting the creation of one union for all public employees 
(Eaton and Gill 1983: 242-250; Fryer 2000).
NUPE's local organisation was based on a network of 1600 branches usually based 
on individual employers or occupational groups within one employer. The union had 
also sought to more closely integrate its growing number of workplace stewards into 
the union's affairs by bringing them together in District Committees matching 
individual employers together with the secretaries of all branches organising in that 
employer. These District Committees then sent delegates to the Area Committee for
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each service (for example local government, health, etc) who were in turn 
represented on one of the 11 Divisional (or regional) Councils. There was also an 
Annual Divisional Conference where each District Committee was represented 
together with the Divisional Council. At national level, the National Conference with 
delegates from most branches met annually and there was an Executive Council 
directly elected by the membership. NUPE's full-time officials played a more active 
role in the internal affairs of the union than those in NALGO and regularly attended 
branch meetings in addition to their representation and negotiation work. Within 
NUPE, their relationship with lay representatives and leaders was seen as one of 
partnership although the union was characterised as 'officer (or leader) led' by those 
in NALGO espousing the principles of 'member-led' (Fairbrother 2000a:54, Terry 
1996).
The UNISON amalgamation in 1993 was the largest in British trade union history. It 
has been variously referred to and examined since its inception (for example Carter 
and Poynter 1999; Dempsey 2004; Fairbrother 2000a; Ironside & Seifert 2000; 
Waddington et a l 2005) but for fuller accounts the work either edited (2000a) or 
written (1996) by Terry is particularly insightful. Perhaps reflecting on the internal 
battles that consumed MSF immediately after its amalgamation; COHSE, NALGO 
and NUPE adopted an approach to their amalgamation of resolving issues of 
organisational structure before the formal amalgamation (Carter & Poynter 1999). 
The initial impetus for the amalgamation had been motions to the NALGO and NUPE 
Annual Conferences in 1988 followed in 1989 by COHSE's decision to join the talks 
(although on a twin-track basis which allowed for the possibility of continued 
independence) (Fryer 2000; Terry 2000b). None of the three unions was in financial 
difficulties and remained strong, well-organised unions despite the difficulties of 
membership losses and consequent reductions in resources suffered by COHSE and 
(particularly) NUPE from the imposition of privatisation and competitive tendering. 
There was no compelling rationale of survival as an impetus for the amalgamation 
(Fryer 2000). Rather the 'cold logic' (Ironside & Seifert 2000: 383) for the 
amalgamation was based on a single union enhancing independence from 
employers and the government, strengthening collective bargaining and a greater 
ability for campaigning and industrial action in support of its aims (Ironside & Seifert 
2000: 384-385). There was strong support for the amalgamation across all three 
unions despite such deep-seated divisions as:
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• The long and often bitter rivalry between COHSE and NUPE in the NHS,
• NALGO and NUPE crossing each other's picket lines and poaching each 
other's members in local government, and
• NUPE regarding NALGO members as being the ’bosses' and accusing them 
of implementing cuts affecting its members (Fryer 2000).
However, the earlier descriptions of each union would suggest a fundamental schism 
between the 'member-led' characterisation of NALGO and the 'leader-led' one of 
COHSE and NUPE. Although these labels were always simplistic, they did point to 
fundamental differences of opinion between the respective lay activists over the best 
way to run a union (Terry 2000b). As was shown by subsequent research carried out 
for UNISON (Ouroussoff 1993) they were also strongly held beliefs by the lay 
activists of each union about the 'culture' of the other two. Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
much of the ensuing negotiation between the unions revolved around devising a 
structure that could reconcile this divide (Fryer 2000, Terry 1996). NALGO stressed 
branch organisation and autonomy plus a strong centre for policy development and 
engagement with government, while COHSE and NUPE emphasised the latter but 
accepted the need for decentralisation to reflect moves away from national 
bargaining. As Terry described it:
[There was a search for] ‘controlled decentralisation' to rebalance the 
articulation between branch and centre to reflect new needs and pressures 
(Terry 2000b: 5).
The debate and negotiation over UNISON'S 'form and character1 continued unabated 
over a period of four years, four sets of Annual Conferences, one special NALGO 
Conference and three joint reports (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1990, 1991, 1992). As 
Fryer remarked:
Talk of matters to do with its 'character* in the merger discussions themselves 
was always bound to sound rather strange. It could all too easily appear 
somewhat vague or 'waffly', even exciting suspicion and being seen as 
potentially dangerous (Fryer 2000: 45).
When this danger was suspected, other partners resorted to questions of 
organisational 'form' to constrain and nullify any ulterior motive. NALGO largely set 
the agenda for the negotiations by asserting their 'bottom lines' of 'lay control and 
representation at all levels' and 'branch autonomy' (Fryer 2000, Terry 1996: 94-96).
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Against this, NUPE and to a lesser extent COHSE tried to restrict the NALGO 
practices of 'internal' campaigning, indiscipline and factionalism, of which they were 
highly critical.
The intense internal debate within NALGO over the amalgamation confirmed the 
concerns of COHSE and NUPE over these features of NALGO's 'character'. Thus, 
each of the Joint NEC Reports to the three Annual National Conferences was up for 
amendment at that of NALGO but had to accepted or rejected in full by COHSE and 
NUPE conferences (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 5-7). These reports were the 
result of a yearlong process of detailed negotiation and agreement. Thus, only one 
of the parties to the amalgamation could nullify or radically change their substance. 
Understandably, this ability did not sit well with the other two. However, they were 
unable to influence the 'form' of NALGO's conference, which allowed for such debate 
and amendment.
To compound this frustration they saw the debate in NALGO being largely 
orchestrated by well-organised factions. Two of these factions appeared to be acting 
in defiance of the recommendations of a National Executive Council elected by the 
NALGO membership, but itself riven by factionalism. These factions were allowed 
free-reign to campaign and organise throughout the union facilitated by the 
substantial resources allocated to branches and District Councils. Such perceived 
levels of factionalism, indiscipline and use of union resources to support open 
campaigning against national policy were anathema to COHSE and NUPE (Personal 
experience 1982-1992; Terry 1996: 90; Undy 1999: 454-457; Undy et ah 118-124).
Not only that, the NALGO process of amendment further extended national 
negotiations over the amalgamation as its conference's proposals had to be 
negotiated before further progress could be made. NALGO even had to have a 
Special National Conference in March 1992 to resolve its internal wrangling over the 
amalgamation, before the joint Final Report (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992) could be 
taken to the three penultimate National Conferences in 1992. Although never openly 
acknowledged, there is little doubt that the four-year period of pre-amalgamation 
negotiation was largely the result of the internal machinations of NALGO. However, 
even if COHSE and NUPE were intent on containing or curtailing such dissent and 
debate in UNISON, legislating for the change within the ‘form’ of the new union
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proved to be very problematic and inevitably provoked even more accentuated unrest 
and amendment from NALGO. One example of the high level of debate within 
NALGO was the NALGO Special National Conference in 1992. This event was 
unique to NALGO but despite it being held after nearly three years of intense 
negotiation over the amalgamation and called to debate a report only produced by 
the NALGO NEC (NALGO 1992a), that report still attracted 84 amendments and 2 
emergency motions (NALGO 1992b). In practice, the Final Report (COHSE-NALGO- 
NUPE 1992) attenuated or qualified most of COHSE and NUPE’s proposals to 
achieve a more disciplined approach to policy-making. The debate over this 
continued into UNISON.
The outcome was a 'form' of union organisation and operation that was closer to that 
of NALGO with considerable autonomy for large, well-resourced branches, branch- 
based Regional Councils and a large branch-based Annual Conference (Terry 1996). 
To counter the concerns of COHSE and NUPE that such a ‘form' would come to be 
dominated by the articulate, educated lay activists of NALGO and to provide 
mechanisms to reflect the heterogeneous membership of the new union in its 
democracy, concepts of Proportionality and Fair Representation were also 
introduced. Initially, Proportionality provided for the membership of the National 
Executive and delegates to the Annual Conference to be proportionate to the number 
of low paid women members in the union, but was intended for implementation at all 
levels of organisation in the union. Subsequently, this principle was to be extended 
to reflect pay levels and other categories of difference (Fair Representation). For 
COHSE and NUPE, since they had proportionately more women members than 
NALGO and overwhelmingly they were low paid, Proportionality provided a means of 
ensuring the continued presence of their lay activists at national level. It also 
instituted an innovative policy that developed NALGO's longstanding advocacy of 
equal rights and self-organisation. It appealed to all three unions (Terry 1996).
COHSE and NUPE were also concerned to ensure that their close relationship with 
the Labour Party was retained in UNISON. NALGO had always eschewed affiliation, 
historically from a position akin to that of Civil Service unions of its members having 
to work to elected local government councillors of all political persuasions. More 
recently, however, (at least for its lay leaders) the policy enabled the union to adopt 
policies more 'left-wing' than those of the Labour Party (Ironside & Seifert 2000: 4,
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61, 215-217). The pragmatic expedient of having two political funds solved what 
could have been a contentious issue of whether or not to affiliate the amalgamated 
union. There would be an Affiliated Fund for affiliation to the Labour Party and a 
General Fund for other political campaigning. A solution that enabled both traditions 
to be continued (Fryer 2000).
The establishment of Service Groups for each employment sector such as Health 
and Local Government satisfied the concern of COHSE to retain an identity for the 
specialist NHS union within the new union. These Groups had a high level of 
autonomy over their bargaining activity and continued a 'form' already present in 
NALGO.
However, despite these developments in 'form' there is a view that there was a ‘split’ 
between head office organisation and branches:
In practice [UNISON] retained much of an idealisation of the principles informing 
the NALGO membership during the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, there 
was a view that the only effective way to deal with the impact of restructuring 
was via relatively centralised forms of organisation and activity. In this respect, 
there was an attempt among the head office staff to affirm the full-time officer 
traditions associated with NUPE (Fairbrother 2000a: 61).
A significant development in UNISON following the amalgamation was the process of 
establishing UNISON branches throughout the union, as opposed to branches 
continuing unchanged from the predecessor unions. This process involved merging 
individual branches to create single 'employer-based* branches as envisaged in the 
Final Report of the amalgamation negotiations (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 27-28). 
Branches were to be the core element of UNISON’S structure with boundaries that 
were synonymous with those of individual employers and any others engaged in 
delivering services previously carried out by that individual employer but now 
privatised or contracted out. As such, they were also the principal forums through 
which negotiation and representation with that employer and its associates were to 
be organised. Within the union, they would also be the local manifestation of 
democratic governance and enjoy a relatively high level of resources to support 
autonomous action over a wide range of local activity. For most purposes, the 
process involved merging an existing NALGO 'employer-based' branch with one or
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more COHSE and NUPE employer-based, occupation-based or geographical-based 
branches. Geographical and other branches disappeared and their members were 
distributed amongst the new 'employer-based' branches in the same geographical 
area. The resources and autonomy of the new UNISON model were much closer to 
NALGO branches than COHSE and NUPE branches. Initially this process took place 
on a voluntary basis but following an Annual Delegate Conference decision in 1995 
was enforced on a national basis and was largely completed during 1996. The 
resulting UNISON branches vary markedly in membership numbers and exhibit a 
range of steward and representative organisation within a consistent model of branch 
organisation. It follows that the transition of local organisation from pre to post­
amalgamation in UNISON was a complex and potentially problematic process and 
these difficulties are strongly reflected by the fieldwork evidence.
During the course of the case study interviews, the Birmingham Branch of UNISON 
was suspended from operating as a branch. The ostensible issue was a concern by 
national full-time officials with factionalism in the branch (see chapter 7, pages 191- 
192). Birmingham is the largest single branch in UNISON with some 18,000 
members. It had been created from a merger of five former NUPE branches and a 
single former NALGO branch, with a long history of mutual antipathy and rivalry 
between them. The suspension involved national, regional and local levels of 
organisation and for the West Midlands Region, in particular, intensive activity by full­
time officials and numbers of lay leaders. Whilst the circumstances and outcome of 
the suspension is not a feature of the study, the event impinged on the responses of 
a number of interviewees.
It is possible to isolate issues that framed the environment of the amalgamation and 
its aftermath. The 'form and character1 of NALGO and COHSE/NUPE had marked 
differences for those shaping the amalgamation. Often characterised as 'member- 
led' for NALGO and 'officer-lecT for COHSE/NUPE, labels that were often gross over­
simplifications of 'character1 but nevertheless accepted as reality and zealously 
wielded to support positions in the negotiations by many of those influencing the 
amalgamation. How far those characterisations impinged on the emergent 'form and 
character' of UNISON is an important issue. COHSE, NALGO and NUPE sought to 
resolve questions of 'form', but much less those of 'character*, before the 
amalgamation and this decision also played a crucial role in setting the environment
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for the amalgamation and the stage for what followed. It is also apparent that 
factions played a role in the amalgamation, not between the participants but within 
NALGO. Further, the union’s membership was heterogeneous in ways that were 
potentially divisive. It appeared in a number of guises, mainly involving relations 
between better-educated and articulate white-collar members and blue-collar 
members, and between managers and managed when both groups were members. 
The introduction of policies of Proportionality and Fair Representation can be seen as 
a partial response to these divides. Such policies were unique to the UNISON 
amalgamation as was the post-amalgamation process of merging branches and 
these policies form further issues for the environment of the amalgamation.
THE UNION FOR THE FINANCE INDUSTRY
UNIFI was formed in 1999 from the amalgamation of the Banking Insurance and 
Finance Union (BIFU), the NatWest Staff Association (NWSA) and The Union for the 
Finance Industry (UNiFI). At the time of the amalgamation, BIFU claimed a 
membership of 110,000, NWSA 40,OCX) and UNiFI 40,000. The total membership of
190,000 made UNIFI the largest solely finance sector trade union in Britain and one 
of the largest worldwide (Morris et al 2001). Its history is illustrated in Table 5.
One point of terminology needs to be addressed, distinguishing between the use of 
UNiFI and UNIFI in the text. UNiFI was the result of a name change by the Barclays 
Bank Staff Association and was one of the three unions party to the amalgamation, 
whereas UNIFI was the name chosen for the amalgamated union. To avoid 
confusion between the two, UNiFI will henceforth appear as UNiFI (Barclays) and 
UNIFI as itself.
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Table 5. History of UNIFI
PREVIOUS
UNIONS
YEAR
FOUNDED
PREVIOUS
UNIONS
AFFILIATION
TRADES
UNION
CONGRESS
(TUC)
LABOUR
PARTY
YEAR OF 
AMALGAMATION
AMALGAMATED
UNION
Bank
Officers’
Guild
1946
Banking 
Insurance 
and Finance 
Union (BIFU)
TUC
Scottish
Bankers'
Association
(formerly 
National 
Union of 
Bank
Employees)
District Bank
Staff
Association 
and Ladies 
Guild
1969
NatWest
Staff
Association
(NWSA)
1999
Union for Finance
Industry
(UNIFI)
Westminster 
Bank Guild
1918
Union for
Finance
Industry
(UNiFI)
(formerly
Barclays
Bank Staff
Association)
TUC
Source: Eaton and Gill (1983); Morris and colleagues (2001)
BIFU could trace its history back to 1946 and the merger of the Bank Officers' Guild
and the Scottish Bankers' Association as The National Union of Bank Employees, the
subsequent name change reflecting a number of mergers with staff associations in
the insurance industry. It had seen a period of steady membership growth on the
back of expanding employment in the finance sector supported by aggressive
recruitment. Within the sector, BIFU portrayed itself as the only 'real union' being
independent of the employers, organising across the sector, with a strike clause,
employing specialist union officials and affiliated to the TUC. These features marked
it out from the staff associations (like NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays)) who historically
had been fostered by individual employers and had none of the other attributes
extolled by BIFU. This differentiation had established a long period of intense rivalry
between BIFU and the staff associations in which neither had ever been able to
secure a decisive victory and employers became adept at playing off the unions
against each other. Latterly, however, a decline in retail banking through high street
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branches, the development of call centres and internet facilities, and consequent 
changes in employment practices from secure 'jobs for life' to part-time and agency 
work had impacted on union recruitment and imposed new pressures on negotiation 
and representation of members (Morris et al 2001; Gall 2001).
Reflecting its 'real union’ status BIFU's 'form' was on ‘union’ lines with members 
organised in some 350 branches (mainly geographical but with some based on single 
employers or workplaces and occupations), 14 branch-based Regional Councils, a 
branch-based Annual Conference and an Executive Committee elected by the 
membership. The union was also a longstanding affiliate of the TUC but of no 
political party (Eaton and Gill 1983: 288-293). Negotiation with individual employers 
was dealt with through separate National Institution Committees and, even as 
national industry-wide bargaining disintegrated, the Executive Committee retained 
the final authority to approve all agreements. BIFU remained a quite centralised 
union (Morris et al 2001).
NWSA was formed in 1969 when the District and Westminster banks merged to 
become the National Westminster (NatWest) and their respective staff associations, 
The District Bank Staff Association and Ladies Guild and the Westminster Bank 
Guild, similarly merged. Historically NWSA, like the other staff associations, had a 
close affinity with and its resources largely provided by its associated employer, the 
NatWest Bank. Along with the other staff associations in the Clearing Banks Union 
and with BIFU, negotiations over pay and conditions were largely conducted on an 
industry-wide basis. However, with the 1986 deregulation of the finance industry this 
system disappeared, to be replaced by direct negotiation with individual employers. 
This harsher competitive climate encouraged employers to move away from industrial 
practices based on pluralism and paternalism and largely severed the consensual 
relationship with their respective staff associations. In response, they were soon 
adopting practices such as industrial action and employed union officials (Gall 2001; 
Morris et al 2001).
However, as a single employer union, NWSA never felt the need to change its 'form' 
to one closer to standard ‘union’ practice. There was an elected Executive 
Committee but then a system of area and regional representatives, loosely organised 
in Area Committees, to provide the link between local workplaces and the Executive
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Committee. This committee was also the focus for negotiation and representation 
with the employer. This structure made it possible to develop a close relationship 
between local and national within the union. Although some union officials were 
employed by NWSA there remained a considerable number of seconded employees 
from the NatWest Bank involved in negotiation and representation and it was only in 
1994 that a General Secretary from outside NatWest was selected (Morris et al 
2001).
UNiFI (Barclays) was first established in 1918, as the Barclays Bank Staff 
Association. Its trajectory as a staff association was similar to that of NWSA, as was 
its development after deregulation in 1986. The name change in 1995 also signified 
ambitions to recruit across the finance sector and, as a further indication of its 
progress into the trade union mainstream; it affiliated to the TUC in 1996. NWSA had 
developed similar recruitment ambitions but rejected a name change and remained 
unaffiliated to the TUC (although it did send a delegation to the TUC Congress).
The fullest account of the UNIFI amalgamation can be found in Morris and colleagues
(2001) in the context of wider changes in the finance industry. Gall (2001) also 
considers the main elements within an assessment of the development of industrial 
relations in the banking sector. In contrast, Sayce (1999) provides some useful 
insights on UNiFI (Barclays) from an insider perspective. Given the history of enmity 
and competition between BIFU and the staff associations an amalgamation between 
BIFU and two staff associations might seem a surprising development, yet 
circumstances combined in the late 1990s to make amalgamation logical and 
necessary. The dismembering of national cross-employer bargaining after 
deregulation in 1986 generated a new set of demands on unions to engage with 
individual employers in a far more difficult industrial relations environment (Gall 
2001). BIFU and either NWSA or UNiFI (Barclays) were both organising in relation to 
their respective major employers and the new situation increasingly encouraged them 
to see the benefits of working together on issues rather than allow the employer to 
divide them. Union memberships had also been adversely affected by the 
development of individualised employment contracts, performance pay systems, and 
a rapid growth in part-time working and use of agency employees in call centres and 
internet banking. When the demand for union services was rising rapidly, the 
resources to provide them were diminishing.
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Although BIFU had three times the membership than either NWSA or UNiFI 
(Barclays) its asset base was only at the same level and if anything its membership 
loss was at an even higher rate (Morris et al 2001). Therefore, resources and 
bargaining imperatives were both important drivers for amalgamation and the relative 
weakness of BIFU's membership and resources position created an equal balance of 
position between the three, despite the disparity in membership numbers. Yet 
internal changes of 'form and character1 in all three were also necessary before 
amalgamation could become a realistic objective. The changes in the profile of 
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) removed BIFU's difficulties with them not being 'real 
unions’, whilst NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays)’s wish for autonomous bargaining 
arrangements was potentially satisfied by BIFU dropping its previous demands for 
amalgamation to be on the basis of full integration into BIFU's structures. The final 
barrier to be removed was the presence of General Secretaries in all three who 
harboured personal antipathies and adherence to previous rivalries. Coincidentally 
all three individuals retired in the mid-1990s and their successors were all ready to 
move beyond the old enmities and seek a mutual solution to the difficulties facing 
their unions.
In 1997, formal amalgamation talks started between BIFU and NWSA but were soon 
joined by UNiFI (Barclays) (Sayce1999). The outcome was a 'form' that married 
elements of both BIFU and NWSA/UNiFI (Barclays). The autonomous company 
bargaining practised by NWSA/UNiFI (Barclays) was preserved alongside the 
existing structure of BIFU's branches, regions and annual conference (Morris et al 
2001). When put to ballot BIFU voted 96 per cent for amalgamation on a 37 per cent 
turnout, NWSA voted 91 per cent on a 43 per cent turnout and UNiFI (Barclays) 
voted 93 per cent on a 39 per cent turnout (Gall 2001). These were remarkably high 
majorities and turnouts for such ballots and provided strong evidence of the support 
of members for the new venture.
UNIFI's local level of organisation was largely based on geographical branches. 
However, as a union organising in the finance sector much of its negotiating activity 
was with large national financial institutions, conducted at a national level, and with 
considerable autonomy for each institution's National Company Committee. Local 
workplace activity was located in regional centres and local branches of these
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institutions and was mainly concerned with representation and immediate health and 
safety issues. The branch system was a legacy of BIFU, autonomous National 
Company Committees that of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays).
It would appear that issues of 'battles for control', 'rival factions' and 'heterogeneity1 
did not feature in the UNIFI amalgamation. It appeared to be a seamless and 
amicable transition from rivalry and competition to a new unity and strength. Yet this 
description does indicate clear differences of form and character* between BIFU and 
NWSA/UNiFI (Barclays) and the amalgamation did precipitate the loss of numbers of 
lay activists, particularly from NWSA/UNiFI (Barclays). How far these differences 
influenced the outcome of the amalgamation in terms of the 'form and character1 of 
UNIFI is a relevant issue to consider.
CONCLUSION
From this survey of the three unions, it can be seen that there is a certain commonality 
between them in the rationale for their amalgamations. Principally this rationale is 
located around an industrial logic conditioned by a conjunction of economic and/or 
political circumstances. In the early eighties, many members of ASTMS and TASS 
found themselves working in similar occupations, often for the same employer and 
subject to the depredations of a harsh economic climate. This environment generated 
major changes in production techniques and skill requirements accompanied by major 
restructuring and job losses, particularly in the manufacturing sector where many of 
their members were located. Later on those in COHSE, NALGO and NUPE found 
themselves in similar circumstances, often working for the same employers and under 
attack because of industrial change, largely generated by government-imposed policies. 
The depredations on COHSE and, particularly, NUPE members from government and 
employer led policies of competitive tendering for and contracting-out of work 
undertaken by these members were damaging to pay, conditions and jobs. NALGO 
members could easily see the attacks also moving in their direction. Later still in the 
1990s, despite being employed in the successful and expanding finance sector, 
members of BIFU, NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) found themselves working alongside 
each other in the same occupations and under attack from employer-generated 
changes. For all three groups of unions the threatening industrial environment was 
associated with an atmosphere of open political antipathy to trade union organisation
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from successive Conservative governments (Mcllroy 1991). A particularly damaging 
effect for them was seeing their membership base either stagnating or (for most) falling 
with resulting impacts on their resources, even more damaging when increased 
resources were necessary to defend members against the industrial attack. The logic 
of joining to present a larger, stronger and better-resourced resistance was 
inescapable.
However, it is apparent that the 'form and character1 of the partners to these 
amalgamations were often different to each other. In all three, these variations appear 
to have been recognised and even seen as a problem to be addressed if a successful 
amalgamation was to be achieved. The catch-all phrase 'new union' was often used to 
describe the edifice which would replace the 'old' and would, by definition, be 'different' 
and untainted by association with form and character1 from the past, with the prospect 
of an innovative and confident future. The vision of those who promoted these 
amalgamations should not be denigrated. As Fryer (2000) aptly set out in discussing 
the UNISON amalgamation these motives inescapably concern 'form' and 'character1 
and in the maelstrom of negotiation form ' is a far more tangible issue to argue and 
agree over. It also suits the predilections of individuals whose day-to-day experience 
revolves around similar activity of negotiation over pay and conditions with employers. 
'Character* all too easily descends into highly subjective labels for your own and other 
organisations, which bear little objective analysis but succinctly ascribe values that 
support your own beliefs about union practice. Thus for NALGO lay leaders their union 
= 'member-led' whereas COHSE/NUPE = 'leader-led', whilst for their COHSE/NUPE 
counterparts 'member-led' = undisciplined factions and disunity and 'leader-led' = 
mutually beneficial partnership with full-time officials. Similar labelling can be observed 
in the other amalgamations. The negotiations tended to be partial in their attempts to 
move beyond the 'old' despite the high and laudable ideals that often initially imbued the 
negotiators and those they represented. The observed result from this survey is that 
the amalgamated union bears a much closer resemblance to one of the participants 
than the others. Thus, for UNISON read NALGO, for MSF read ASTMS and for UNIFI 
read BIFU. Inevitably, this assessment is superficial and for UNIFI, the presence of 
National Company Committees with autonomous bargaining powers evidences a strong 
element of NWSA/UNiFI (Barclays).
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This concentration on 'form' presents a problem since the much more intangible but 
equally important concept of 'character* and its presence, change and transition in a 
process of amalgamation has not been addressed. What is also described as the 
'feel' or 'ethos' of a union has an equal status to 'form' for those involved in union 
activity. It is a difficult concept for a researcher to set down objectively and without 
the danger of making value judgements on its shape and ingredients in advance of 
the voice of informants being heard. Nevertheless, that it was present and 
constituted an influence in the process of amalgamation will become readily apparent 
and it is important to identify it when setting a context for the fieldwork.
However, underpinning this analysis are identifiable issues that characterise each of the 
case studies, although in different ways. First, the actual mechanics of the 
amalgamation process were distinct. In MSF, the formal amalgamation took place 
under an umbrella agreement that left ASTMS and TASS in two separate divisions until 
a common rulebook was eventually agreed after a period of acrimonious debate and 
infighting. In UNISON much of the debate over the amalgamation, and particularly the 
'form' of the new union, took place in the four years that preceded the formal 
amalgamation. Whilst in UNIFI any debate appears to have been very amicable and 
agreement easily reached once bargaining autonomy had been agreed.
Second, the role of leaders and factions within or between the participants coloured the 
negotiations and subsequent outcomes. Between the individual unions and their 
amalgamated successors the characterisations of ‘member-led’ and ‘leader-led’ 
encapsulate a distinctive role and influence for leaders, whether full-time officials or lay 
members. Factions were not present in UNIFI but were a strong feature of MSF and 
UNISON. However, whereas in UNISON they were a feature of internal debate in 
NALGO over the amalgamation, in MSF the factions were initially focused on the TASS 
Broad Left and then MSF for Labour (largely former ASTMS) as the early battle for 
control developed.
Third, the question of heterogeneity must be considered. Certainly, for UNISON and 
MSF the amalgamation brought together similar but disparate groups of members. To 
an extent, of course, heterogeneity already existed in some of the participants (NALGO 
and ASTMS, for example, recruited across a number of industries, occupations and pay 
levels) but heterogeneity was more easily accommodated when a union had grown
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organically and retained the tribal loyalty of its members. There was little evidence of 
this issue emerging as a problem in UNIFI, probably because the participants' members 
already worked together and no new element was put into the mix. However, within 
UNISON and MSF creating a form ’ that might grapple with the problem of 
heterogeneity became a persistent problem. Although it was barely tackled by MSF, 
UNISON did make a real attempt at creating a response with new policies of 
Proportionality and Fair Representation. These were designed to introduce 
mechanisms that ensured the presence of all sections of its heterogeneous 
membership in its structures, and ensure that particular groups did not come to 
dominate the union.
Fourth, there was a transition and development of local organisation in the three case 
studies. There were similarities of 'form' between the local levels of the three case 
studies. Branches were a common post-amalgamation feature, as was their place in 
the constitution and rules of the amalgamated union as the local level of collective 
democratic governance. However, only UNISON had an explicit policy of 
establishing branches on a common basis. Their boundaries were to be coterminous 
with those of individual employers (including employers associated with the principal 
employer). They would also have considerable resources allocated to them to 
facilitate local activity and substantial autonomy over bargaining and intra-union 
activity. Achieving this commonality meant a process of merging previously 
individual COHSE, NALGO and NUPE branches within a strict time-scale. Almost by 
default previously BIFU branches became the de facto branches in UNIFI but 
bargaining autonomy was firmly placed with National Company Committees and 
UNIFI continued the BIFU practice of a low level of branch resources. MSF branches 
did have a common level of resources allocated to them and a level of autonomy 
over their use. However, their boundaries were an array of geography, occupation 
and employers inherited from ASTMS, TASS and their predecessors, and local 
bargaining activity was increasingly located with stewards committees that had no 
formal place in the union’s structure.
Encapsulating all these facets of the amalgamations, we can see questions of 'form' 
becoming the focus of the negotiations over amalgamation in all three case studies. 
However, the actual or perceived ‘character’ of the individual unions informed the 
negotiations over ‘form’. For UNISON the debate over ‘form and character’ meant a
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prolonged period of pre-amalgamation negotiation and for one participant (NALGO) an 
equally extended and fractious period of intra-union debate. The negotiation resulted in 
an agreed 'form' being available at the point of formal amalgamation including policies 
of Proportionality and Fair Representation and the establishment of branches on a 
common basis. In contrast, the negotiation and fractious debate in MSF over 'form' 
took place after the formal amalgamation and resulted in a 'victory1 for that of ASTMS. 
Whereas for UNIFI negotiation and debate was at a much more amicable and 
accommodating level, resulting in the adoption of administrative and democratic 'form' 
from BIFU and bargaining 'form' from NWSA/UNiFI (Barclays).
Here, I have sought to describe the case study amalgamations, the economic, political 
and intra-union environment within which they developed and how they moved forward 
from the formal date of amalgamation. Literature concerned with the amalgamations 
themselves and the history and background of the participants have informed these 
descriptions. Finally, the common themes and issues have been drawn out and an 
overall appreciation of the subject accessed. This analysis leads into a consideration of 
the position of the local union organisation in a process of amalgamation or the role of 
leadership in mediating that position. How those resonate with the issues just 
illustrated, their relevance and influence on the progress of form and character1 through 
an amalgamation and placing all that in the environment of the individual amalgamation 
is the task of succeeding chapters. These chapters will employ a common format 
where each amalgamation is first considered through its pre-amalgamation context and 
that of its predecessor unions. Then there will be a section devoted to the actual 
process of amalgamation and finally, consideration will be given to the important post­
amalgamation period when the outcome of the negotiations and decisions for the 
amalgamation are fully implemented. Informing these sections will be the presence and 
influence of the issues identified in this conclusion within the analytical framework of 
‘form and character* and the ‘member-led/leader-led’ continuum.
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Chapter 6
MSF
A BATTLE FOR CONTROL
The MSF amalgamation occurred in 1988. It brought together two established and 
well-known unions, ASTMS and TASS. For MSF the argument will be that the 
principal effect of the amalgamation on local union organisation was to legitimate and 
consolidate a situation of joint working between ASTMS and TASS in many work 
locations. However, this development was only on a voluntary basis and the 
historical divisions between them continued in other work locations. The continued 
presence of union branches from the predecessor unions accentuated this pattern of 
joint working. Branches were mainly separate local organisations to organisations in 
work locations but were the only ones recognised in the structure of MSF. However, 
at regional and national levels, the amalgamation resulted in an organisation that was 
far more redolent of ASTMS than TASS.
Before embarking on the detailed analysis of the MSF amalgamation, I should 
indicate my personal experience of membership and activity in MSF. This 
experience started in 1997, eight years after the amalgamation, and, therefore, unlike 
the deep and lengthy experience I had of UNISON, the UNISON amalgamation and 
one of its predecessor unions, I have no direct personal experience of the MSF 
amalgamation or either of its predecessor unions.
Research on MSF is mainly restricted to that of Carter (1991) and there are a number 
of problems with relying on this study. First, it virtually ignores the presence of the 
local context in the amalgamation except as local lay leaders participating in debates 
on the amalgamation at regional and national levels. Second, it tends to concentrate 
its attention on the sharp divisions between ASTMS and TASS at national level and 
particularly at the National Conference. This aspect concerns the political and 
factional divide which characterised the period and the tactics adopted by both sides 
in what amounted to a battle for control of the union. The approach tends to
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marginalise other influences over the progress of the amalgamation such as the 
workplace and the recent histories of ASTMS and TASS. These influences produced 
their rival ‘member-led/leader-led’ forms of unionism and underpinned the policies 
and negotiating positions the two unions adopted during the amalgamation process. 
Third, it is also apparent that most of the fieldwork for Carter’s research was 
restricted to respondents from former ASTMS, individuals from former TASS being 
reluctant to participate in the research (Carter interview 1996). Inevitably, this 
partiality tends to skew the results toward a former ASTMS perspective and 
encourages a degree of caution over the validity of the research’s conclusions.
PRE-AMALGAMATION
The trajectories of ASTMS and TASS toward their amalgamation were quite different 
and produced models of ‘member-led/leader-led’ forms of unionism that informed 
their policies and attitudes toward the amalgamation. This history was not just 
concerned with their internal structures, management, leadership and ways of 
working, but also their previous experience of merger. If ASTMS could be described 
as being anarchic and loosely organised then TASS was tightly controlled and 
centralised. Elaborating on these labels establishes the position of the local union 
organisation in each union, sets the environment for the amalgamation, and 
anticipates the period of fractious infighting that characterised the early days of MSF.
ASTMS
The rapid growth of ASTMS through the 1970s was much associated with its 
dynamic General Secretary, Clive Jenkins. He had identified the growth of ‘white- 
collar’ work as providing fertile ground for trade union organisation and set ASTMS 
on the path to seeing itself as the pre-eminent white-collar union in the private sector 
(Melling 2004: 80-81). In addition to its own aggressive recruitment, Jenkins also 
fostered in ASTMS a merger policy with small white-collar unions and staff 
associations. This policy was often facilitated by the provision of autonomous status 
to merging unions (Undy et al 1981: 51-59, 154-155). Jenkins’ management of this 
rapidly growing organisation was often idiosyncratic and marked by internal rivalries 
between political factions (Melling 2004: 79, 84, 89-90) and between the national 
management and regional full-time officials (Melling 2004: 82-83). Melling 
commenting that.
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One of the ironies ... is that this scientific and managerial union remained an 
under-developed and idiosyncratic organisation, which benefited from a series 
of opportunistic initiatives and agreements. Always a brilliant entrepreneur, 
Jenkins remained a poor administrator and an erratic manager (Melling 2004:
91).
Attempts by Jenkins and the National Executive to rationalise this increasingly 
diverse structure were strongly resisted by alternative power bases in Divisional 
(regional) Councils and the autonomous groups, and the national union remained 
more of an umbrella organisation in the overall structure (Undy et al 1981: 117). If 
managerially weak and subject to open internal dissension, this loose structure 
allowed for a ‘formal democracy’ and open debate (Fairbrother 2000a: 43; see also 
Undy et al 1981: 53).
The position of branches and lay leaders outside the National Executive was a 
relatively influential one within this structure. ASTMS branches were directly funded 
by a retention from subscriptions and had a level of autonomy over local education 
and training for members and representatives, publicity, affiliations, funding 
campaigns and policy decisions in the wider union (Fairbrother 2000a. 43). They 
also had direct representation at the Annual Conference and at Divisional Councils. 
These forums were an important and influential level of organisation within ASTMS 
between the National Executive and the branch and were organised by lay leaders 
and branch delegates (Carter 1991: 51). Nevertheless, it is relevant to recognise 
that:
The most familiar unit of association among members remained the workplace 
group within the individual plant and among distinct grade of employees 
(Melling 2004: 76).
It was within workplace groups that most representational and negotiating activity 
with employers was carried out (Melling 2004: 75). In this environment, lay leaders 
could direct their activity to issues within the union itself, or within the workplace, or 
both. Some of these leaders increasingly concentrated their energies within the 
union as the harsh external environment impinged on their ability to achieve 
successes in the workplace (Carter 1991: 41). ASTMS had also increasingly sought 
to attract professional and managerial employees into membership by openly 
acknowledging their individualistic and supervisory status (Carter 1997: 16) and from 
those positions developed their union activity within the union rather than the
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workplace. The structure and membership characteristics of the union encouraged 
and facilitated an isolated and introverted autonomy based on a division between 
union branches and workplace groups, and individualistic lay leaders (Carter 1997: 
12).
TASS
If Jenkins’ leadership of ASTMS was ‘erratic’ (Melling 2004: 91), Ken Gill’s leadership 
of TASS was in complete contrast. He was appointed as General Secretary in 1973, 
as opposed to the election of Jenkins, and then:
Gill helped to turn TASS into a highly disciplined monolith under Communist 
domination (Taylor 1978: 227).
This process was facilitated by the appointment of cadre of young full-time officials, 
many of whom were Communists, and a reduction in both the size of the TASS 
Executive Committee and a change to the election procedure (Parkin 1975; Taylor 
1978: 227). The outcome was a shift from a membership based electoral process to 
a more easily manipulated electoral college. Under Gill’s leadership:
[The union remained] one of the most aggressive and uncompromising unions 
in the TUC (Taylor 1978: 227).
The membership growth of TASS had been less spectacular than for ASTMS (1964- 
1975: 94 per cent TASS, 346 per cent ASTMS (Smith 1987: 277)). Mainly this 
divergence was the result of TASS concentrating its recruitment and organising in 
engineering (Smith 1987: 277) and eschewing ASTMS’s initiatives in other industries 
and its expansionist merger policy.
Through the 1960’s and encouraged by the successes of the plant by plant organised 
Minimum Wage Campaign (MWC) the union:
Had a small number of full-time officials, a high degree of lay member 
participation and commitment to the linking of recruitment and politics to 
industrial action (Smith 1987: 287).
However, this environment changed in the 1970s with the domination of the union by 
Gill and the Communist Party (CP) led Broad Left, the failed amalgamation with the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), and subsequent development of merger as 
an aid to growth. The result was a distinctive organisational ‘form’, characterised as
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democratic centralism (Smith 1987: 271-292). A development described by Smith 
as:
A movement away from the working class militancy of the 1960s, to a ‘political’ 
strategy divorced from the activity of the membership. ... TASS, from having 
an integrated policy and practice, has moved closer to the ASTMS position 
where ‘political’ ideology was separated from the industrial activity of the 
membership (Smith 1987: 288).
The crucial difference between the two was the hegemonic control of the Broad Left 
in TASS against the relative anarchy of ASTMS.
TASS branches had no direct funding, little autonomy within the union and were 
heavily influenced and monitored by full-time officials (Fairbrother 2000a: 43, 44). 
Their ability and that of local lay leaders to influence union policy was tightly 
constrained by a structure of indirect representation which resulted in an Annual 
Conference of 165 delegates who effectively controlled the union and consolidated 
that by electing most other positions within the union (Fairbrother 2000a: 44). As 
Fairbrother remarked:
The dominance of the Broad Left political bloc meant there was little 
opportunity for dissent, debate or contestation over policy or practice 
(Fairbrother 2000a: 44).
This environment was the antithesis of the diverse and loose structure of ASTMS and 
TASS lay leaders were appreciably more homogenous in their working class and 
political backgrounds and narrow job range in the engineering industry than their 
counterparts in ASTMS.
In the workplace, negotiation and representational activity was conducted through 
workplace groups in similar fashion to ASTMS (ex-TASS local lay leaders interviews 
1999) and where both unions were represented often took place on a joint basis (see 
Smith 1987: 267-292 for a description of TASS in the workplace). An ex-TASS local 
lay leader confirmed that:
When we came to terms and conditions, we had a committee, which we called 
the Staff Trade Union Council. ... So we always worked together (ex-TASS 
local lay leader interview 2000).
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Away from the branch in the workplace, TASS members had a very similar 
relationship with their union as ASTMS members. An ex-TASS local lay leader 
commenting that:
The average member really doesn’t want to know much about the wider union 
in my experience. The only time they want you is when they’re in trouble or 
they want information (ex-TASS local lay leader interview 1999).
The hegemony of the Broad Left was of little interest or knowledge to most members. 
As reflected by an ex-TASS local lay leader remarking that:
People see the union role as more of an association that negotiates part of 
their life than a labour movement and/or a political body (ex-TASS local lay 
leader interview 2000).
Member-led or Leader-led
The position of branch and workplace organisation, and lay leaders and full-time 
officials in ASTMS espoused a ‘member-led’ form of unionism. In ASTMS these 
principles were in the context of branches and overlain with elements of individualism 
and elitism. However, workplace groups that had no formal recognition in the 
structures of the union conducted most representational and bargaining activity in the 
workplace. In the workplace, a similar practice of negotiation and representation also 
applied to TASS, but the Broad Left dragooned branches into an apparently 
disciplined and seamless unity through its leadership and the structures of TASS. 
These characteristics had closer associations with the homogenous and unified 
leader-led’ form of unionism, but with the crucial difference of the presence of an all- 
powerful controlling faction.
The synergies of industry, job characteristics and political bias (both ASTMS and 
TASS were affiliated to the Labour Party and ‘on the left’ (Carter 1991: 40-44)), which 
gave the appearance of a logical and potentially powerful alliance to the MSF 
amalgamation, concealed deep and potentially destructive divisions. Within ASTMS, 
the workplace, in the guise of the branch, was imbued with qualities of autonomy and 
as the platform for lay leaders representing the views of members in the higher 
echelons of the union. However, alongside the branch, workplace groups (often with 
the same lay leaders) together with full-time officials engaged in most of the union’s 
activity with employers, but could only access and influence the internal structures of 
the union through branches. For TASS, the Broad Left portrayed the workplace and
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branch as synonymous with the union as a whole, even though union activity in the 
workplace was actually much closer to that of ASTMS. There was a seamless 
progression from the member through all the structures of the union, which through 
the discipline and coherence of its activity took account of members’ views without 
the need for extensive internal debate. The presence of a Broad Left faction 
orchestrated this process and reflected the ability of that faction to ensure the union 
acted within those parameters. Here lay the crux of the division, between a politically 
motivated, highly disciplined and controlling faction in TASS, which saw workplaces 
and branches as the outer reaches of its hegemony, and a fractious and erratically 
managed organisation in ASTMS where workplaces and branches had a high level of 
autonomy and an independent presence in the union. The forms of unionism of 
ASTMS and TASS were the result of spectacular growth and idiosyncratic leadership 
for ASTMS and the relatively recent ascendance into control of a single political 
faction for TASS. How this divide played out for the presence of local union 
organisation in the amalgamation is the subject of the next section.
AMALGAMATION
There was a period of negotiation between ASTMS and TASS to reach agreement 
for the formal amalgamation. This was influenced by:
• The particular procedure chosen for the amalgamation.
• The different negotiating positions or objectives of ASTMS and TASS for the
amalgamation.
• The presence of ‘the workplace’ as an issue in the negotiations for the 
amalgamation.
• The role of leaders at local, regional and national levels in the process of 
amalgamation.
• The role of factions in the process of amalgamation.
• The presence of ‘the workplace’ in the outcome of the negotiations for the
amalgamation.
• The process by which local union organisations progressed from ASTMS and 
TASS into MSF.
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Objectives
From the outset, ‘politics’ were at the centre of considerations for an amalgamation 
between ASTMS and TASS. This manifested itself in issues such as who controlled 
the union, where its ‘character1 lay in relation to conceptions of ‘proper’ trade 
unionism and political positions to the ‘right’ or ‘left’.
In ASTMS, the 1985 National Engineering Consultative Conference pressed for a 
merger with TASS (Carter 1991: 40). This initiative was not just on the rational 
grounds of the obvious synergies between the two unions’ large memberships in 
engineering but also on questions concerning the ‘character’ of ASTMS. The 
engineering section had seen its previous dominance in the union whittled away as 
successive mergers had established a powerful rival position for the insurance 
section. The engineers also considered that the union’s development had seen its 
‘character1 shifted to the ‘right’ and away from what they saw as ‘proper1 trade 
unionism. A merger with TASS would re-establish the position of engineering as the 
leading group within a merged union and bring its ‘character1 back to their vision of a 
trade union (Carter 1991: 41). The ASTMS national lay leadership also favoured the 
merger although the General Secretary, Clive Jenkins, remained ambivalent about 
the proposal, perhaps fearful of a threat to or diminution of his powerful position in 
ASTMS from the equally powerful TASS General Secretary, Ken Gill (Carter 1991: 
40-44).
Such concerns were probably well founded. National trade union leaders would have 
been well aware of the hegemony of the CP-led Broad Left in TASS and Gill was 
clearly an important figure in that domination and control (Taylor 1978: 225-228). Not 
only that, the collapse of the AUEW Federation was mainly due to the refusal of 
TASS to modify any of its policies and procedures toward their equivalents in the 
AEU (Parkin 1975; Taylor 1978: 225-228). This refusal coincided with ‘the right’ 
regaining control in the AEU and the TASS Broad Left’s assessment that any 
prospective advance of CP leadership and control in the Federation was 
unachievable (Smith 1987: 285-286). In a merger with ASTMS they could be 
expected to adopt similar tactics and, maybe, with better prospects of success. An 
ex-TASS full-time official confirmed TASS’s view that:
ASTMS came in and although they’d got a lot more numbers, the viewpoint of 
TASS was that if we can tie up the rulebook, we tie up the union. There might
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be a lot more of them but they’re nothing compared to us, we’ve got a 
machine, a very powerful machine, and they had. ... I think the plan of action 
was to shape it, well I don’t think, I know it was, shape it as we want it. Let’s 
create it into a giant TASS (ex-TASS regional full-time official interview 1999).
Procedure for amalgamation
The form of amalgamation agreed between ASTMS and TASS was a familiar pattern 
for amalgamations between relatively equal partners where a new rulebook and 
structure would be the result (Waddington et al 2005: 3-5). There was a brief outline 
agreement meeting the minimum legal requirements for a trade union amalgamation 
leading to a ballot of each union’s membership for approval of the amalgamation. If 
agreed both unions would enter the amalgamated union unchanged but with an 
additional layer of structure to deal with matters concerning the amalgamated union. 
There would then be a period of negotiation between the parties to agree a new 
rulebook and structure for the amalgamated union, which, once approved by the 
amalgamated union’s Annual Conference, would result in a unified structure and the 
ending of the initial division into two sections. This procedure was new territory for 
both ASTMS and TASS. Their recent mergers had been transfers of engagements 
with much smaller staff associations and unions, whilst TASS had previously been a 
completely separate section within the AUEW Federation (Melling 2004, Smith 
1987:256-297).
The advantage of this particular form of amalgamation was that it ‘locked-in’ the 
parties at the outset of the amalgamation process. TASS had left the AUEW 
Federation after a period of dispute with the other members and this procedure was 
seen as an advantage to those in ASTMS who wanted to ensure that TASS would 
not take similar action in MSF. These concerns were confirmed by an ex-ASTMS 
local lay leader, who commented that:
We knew a bit of the background from the AUEW and the problems they were 
having with TASS. They were always falling out, and it was quite a shock 
when we had this merger between ASTMS and TASS (ex-ASTMS local lay 
leader interview 1999).
The disadvantage was that the outcome of the amalgamation in terms of the rulebook 
and structure of the amalgamated union would be unknown until it was too late for 
either party to leave if they were dissatisfied with the result. If those visions were
135
diametrically opposite, as has just been demonstrated with ASTMS and TASS, the 
post-amalgamation period was always likely to be one of intense and potentially 
destructive infighting. The agreement for the amalgamation was that it would be:
On the basis of parity and equal representation on all interim decision-making 
bodies (Carter 1991: 44).
This agreement was despite the numerically larger membership of ASTMS and 
effectively set the stage for the ensuing confrontation.
The local context
Lay leaders in ASTMS outside of the National Executive had two positions in relation 
to branch organisation that they were intent on retaining in MSF. First, that all 
branches should be represented at the Annual Conference and second, that 
branches should continue to retain a proportion of subscriptions for their own use 
(Carter 1991: 45). These ‘bottom-lines’, or the Cardiff Principles (Carter 1991: 50), 
sought to retain a ‘form and character’ where debate and dissent with the national 
leadership’s policies was predicated on a ‘bottom-up’ basis. This aspiration was 
despite the imperfect connection between many branches and the workplace groups 
where most bargaining and representational activity took place and the facility for 
individuals disconnected from workplace group activity to engage with intra-union 
affairs. In relation to the amalgamation, a former ASTMS local lay leader 
encapsulated this approach when remarking that:
Clive had a hell of a job pushing [the merger] through our Conference. He had 
much more of a job on his hands than Ken Gill. As far as Ken Gill was 
concerned ... it was cut and dried and they were all for it. ... That’s why 
[ASTMS] had so many conferences on the merger (ex-ASTMS local lay leader 
interview 1999).
These conferences and the role played by semi-autonomous branches were 
anathema to TASS who saw the workplace as simply the furthermost extension of an 
integrated union. In such a ‘form and character’, debate and dissent at large 
conferences were unnecessary since integrated communication within the union 
allowed for all voices to be heard and dissent could not arise when all parts of the 
union were aware of and supported its policies. In addition, there was always the 
danger of ‘renegade’ voices at a large conference portraying indiscipline within the 
union and weakening its position with employers and government. In this
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construction, branches also had no need of funding separate from the wider union. 
All expenditure should be centrally controlled and directed toward a common 
purpose. An ex-TASS full-time official described TASS in this way:
TASS were a machine. The CP was very influential at the top; they’d got an 
organisation called The Broad Left. I believe the decisions were taken at the 
very top, at the CP. They were fed then into the Executive, who were not 
appointed, but they were all the right people if you know what I mean. Then 
they were fed down to Conference. You didn’t go to Conference unless you 
were in The Broad Left. The whole union was The Broad Left. There were 
people who didn’t believe in the philosophy of it who had to go along with it; 
else they’d never get anywhere. We’ve had ridiculous situations where people 
have gone to Conference, voted against the wishes of the Broad Left and 
been threatened with being sent home or told you’ll never come again. You’d 
got a union that was completely controlled through its Executive, but really by 
somebody else (ex-TASS regional full-time official interview 1999).
Three characteristics of TASS are apparent from this description. First, TASS was 
characterised by the hegemonic control exercised by the Broad Left, an organisation 
directed by the CP. Effectively a political party exercised control over TASS by 
subverting its internal government. Second, there was nascent internal opposition to 
this dominance but to gain any influence in TASS meant engaging with the 
controlling faction. Third, the Broad Left partly maintained its control by its ability to 
manipulate the representative structures and exclude any opposition.
Leaders
It seemed to lay leaders outside of the ASTMS National Executive that.
Integration of two radically different structures would necessitate one or the 
other organisation to abandon current practice (Carter 1991: 45).
However, the Executive appeared unwilling to promote the ASTMS structure as part 
of the price in reaching agreement with TASS for the amalgamation (Carter 1991: 
45). The amalgamation was to be achieved at any price and to raise questions over 
future structures was characterised as attempting to defeat the whole enterprise. An 
ex-ASTMS local lay leader commented that:
The unions had various meetings chaired by Clive Jenkins and Ken Gill and it 
all seemed inevitable that the merger was going to go through, regardless of
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what the lay representatives thought about it (ex-ASTMS local lay leader 
interview 1999).
The one pre-condition that the ASTMS Annual Conference set down was that:
[The MSF Special Rules Conference] shall be constructed to allow each 
ASTMS branch direct representation (Carter 1991: 47).
The somewhat grudging TASS response to this condition was to concede a 
conference of 400 delegates from each union, making the TASS delegation over 
twice the size of the TASS Annual Conference but half the actual number of 
branches for ASTMS (Carter 1991: 49). The increase in size called into question the 
ability of the Broad Left to control the makeup of the TASS delegation and its voting 
patterns and this concern may well have influenced their reluctant agreement to the 
increased numbers (Carter 1991: 49).
These differences were a reflection of the presence and influence of lay leaders and 
full-time officials in the unions. Branches in ASTMS were directly represented at 
Divisional Councils and Annual Conference. These forums provided vehicles for a 
number of articulate, well-educated lay leaders to engage in argument over policy 
with the national leadership (Carter 1991: 51). How far the activities of some of these 
individuals was a real reflection of the views of branch members, or more an 
individualistic approach based on the greater attractions of activity within the union 
against an alienation from the rigours of a harsh industrial climate, is a moot 
question. An ex-ASTMS full-time official considered that:
There’s almost two separate unions in any union. There is the union of the 
‘activists’ that go through the branches, regional councils, national executives 
and, to some extent, full-time officials, and there’s the people on the shop- 
floor. Very often you get the motives of the people on the lay activist side of it 
is quite different from the motives of the people on the shop-floor. The motive 
of the people on the shop-floor is I want to get the best terms and conditions of 
employment out of my employer. The motive of these guys is really a political 
motive, maybe with a small ‘p’, and sometimes this sort of thing goes on and 
fights on. Really, this other side, this sort of industrial side, is totally unaware 
of it (ex-ASTMS regional full-time official interview 1999).
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The implication of these comments is that lay leaders may not properly represent the 
aspirations of union members. They are more concerned with the internal debates of 
the union than promoting the pay and conditions of members with employers. 
Carter's analysis of the MSF amalgamation suggests that for some ASTMS lay 
leaders their concern over the negotiating position of the ASTMS Executive was as 
much related to their personal positions of influence within the structures of ASTMS, 
as reflecting the concerns of ASTMS members over the amalgamation (Carter 1991). 
However, this pessimistic view of lay leaders’ representative role needs to be 
contrasted with other work which affirms the importance of that role for the majority of 
lay leaders (see Undy et al 1981: 38-41 on union government; Tannenbaum 1968b 
on control and leadership; van de Vail 1970: 102-108, 152-179 on leader 
representation).
Whatever the motives of lay leaders, the structures of ASTMS allowed the voice of 
branches to be present at influential levels within the union. Retaining that facility 
became a prime objective in the amalgamation for branches and their lay leaders. 
The TASS structure, based on a system of indirect representation where delegates 
through to District Conferences and Annual Conference were channelled through 
successive lower levels of structure, enabled the Broad Left to control the election 
process and ensure its supporters retained an absolute majority (Fairbrother 2000a: 
44). Opening up the structures, as in the ASTMS model, would seriously undermine 
that control and strike at the heart of the cohesive, disciplined model of trade 
unionism espoused by TASS.
The role of full-time officials at regional level was similarly divided between ASTMS 
and TASS. Full-time officials in ASTMS fulfilled much more of an advisory and 
supportive role over policy formation and had virtually no leadership role in branches, 
Divisional Councils and Annual Conference. An ex-ASTMS full-time official saw their 
different roles in ASTMS and TASS as:
Before the merger, there were quite a lot of officials who were very much 
involved in the democratic structure in TASS and they were often branch 
secretaries themselves. I think the ASTMS officials were there as an advisor, 
a supporter, an encourager in terms of workplace organisations. Essentially, 
the decisions were taken by the members. ... That’s probably more so in
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MSF than it was, even in ASTMS, certainly changed from the TASS point of 
view (ex-ASTMS national full-time official interview 1999).
However, in TASS their role was closely intertwined with activity at all levels of the 
structure and, being appointed through the presence and influence of the Broad Left, 
they played an influential role in promoting and implementing Broad Left policies 
within the union (Fairbrother 2000a: 44). Partly this role was facilitated by the much 
higher proportion of full-time officials to members at 1:2500 in TASS as against 
1:4500 in ASTMS (Fairbrother 2000a: 44) but also between the tightly controlled 
model of TASS and the diverse and argumentative model of ASTMS. The same full­
time official commented further that:
TASS had a very clear idea of how the union should function, democratic 
centralism. ASTMS was always a bit anarchic. It was about not having any 
centralised structure at all, decentralised in many ways (ex-ASTMS national 
full-time official interview 1999).
The national lay and full-time official leadership conducted the negotiations over the 
MSF amalgamation (Carter 1991). In addition, they also had the prime role in 
consulting with members and other levels of organisation within their own unions and 
feeding the results back into the negotiations. Their ability to influence the 
amalgamation process was very evident, as these comments of an ex-ASTMS local 
lay leader confirm:
Clive was a very influential person you know. He didn’t answer a lot of what 
people were saying. The officers more or less had to fall in line with him. 
They were sort of percolating propaganda to the Regional Councils. He had a 
meeting of the Regional Council Chairmen and Secretaries. He worked on the 
right people and that was it (ex-ASTMS local lay leader interview 1999).
However, there remained the problem of the frequent friction between the national 
leadership and local and Divisional lay leadership that had been a longstanding 
feature of ASTMS’s ‘form and character1, an ex-TASS full-time official observing that:
I believe with ASTMS, it was a completely different philosophy [to TASS]. I 
never went to their Conference but I believe that they used to see it as the 
annual arse-kicking contest, to kick the Executive. Anything that Jenkins and 
the Executive proposed, well they’d kick against that (ex-TASS regional full­
time official interview 1999).
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This outsider description sees the ASTMS Conference as irrationally disputatious. 
Within ASTMS, it was maintained that the atmosphere of argument and debate 
evidenced the ability of the wider union to question and challenge the policies of the 
General Secretary and the National Executive (ex-ASTMS full-time official and local 
lay leader interviews 1999). This ability soon surfaced, as the concerns of some lay 
leaders in ASTMS over the dangers of merging with a highly centralised union, 
dominated by an all-powerful Broad Left faction, appeared to be of little concern to 
the national leadership engaged in the negotiations (Carter 1991: 44-47). The 
ASTMS national leadership were not ‘free agents’ in the negotiations but subject to 
influence and criticism from leaders representing concerns at regional and local level 
(Carter 1991: 44-47).
Factions
The TASS national leadership had no such constraints, the Broad Left machine was 
able to stifle any dissent by ensuring the ‘correct’ delegates were elected to the 
District and Annual Conferences and the National Executive, and then portrayed a 
picture of total unity and agreement over the amalgamation (Carter 1991: 44). This 
practice was exampled by the criticism levied at the ASTMS National Executive by 
visiting TASS leaders at the 1987 ASTMS Annual Conference for their, ‘failing to 
control the Conference’ (Carter 1991: 47) by allowing motions critical of aspects of 
the amalgamation to be openly debated. In TASS, the rules and structure of the 
union enabled a faction like the Broad Left to control the presence and influence of 
the local level in the wider union (Carter 1991: 44). However, the portrayal of unity 
could conceal levels of concern, which only became apparent once the grip of the 
Broad Left loosened in the early days of MSF.
Factions were not just a feature of TASS; ASTMS too had experience of their 
presence and influence (Undy et al 1981: 117-118). However, factions in ASTMS 
were much more diverse, based on industrial and workplace groupings as well as 
political affinities (Undy et al 1981: 118). Coupled with the open representative 
structure of ASTMS, they were unable to exercise any overriding influence and 
control in the union.
Factions had very different roles and influence in the amalgamation process and had 
particular impacts on the presence of the workplace and branches in the process.
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For the Broad Left in TASS the objective was the retention of their absolute control of 
the organisation (ex-ASTMS, ex-TASS regional full-time official interviews 1999). 
Within a tightly centralised and disciplined structure, this objective meant the 
subjugation of workplaces and branches as potential sources of rival opinion and 
leadership (Carter 1991: 44). Groups in ASTMS were concerned to promote the 
presence of branches throughout the structures of the new union. As a result, 
groupings within ASTMS coalesced into loose associations of branch and regional 
lay leaders (Carter 1991: 44-47).
Agreement and the local context
ASTMS and TASS arrived at the point of their amalgamation in 1988 with none of 
these divisions over the ‘form and character1 of their new union resolved, least of all 
over the position of ‘the workplace’. ASTMS’s ‘bottom lines’ of branch representation 
at regional level and at Annual Conference and the continuation of separate funding 
for regional councils and branches were barely acknowledged by TASS. In contrast, 
the TASS leadership saw both positions as establishing alternative power bases and 
sources of dissent and indiscipline against their vision of a disciplined unity facilitated 
through a highly centralised organisation, a vision that effectively replicated and 
extended that of TASS. TASS being under the control of a faction that had no place 
in the rules and structure of the union was not the issue. It was the self-evident 
advantages of this ‘form and character1 that was important. The TASS response to 
the issues raised in the ASTMS Cardiff Principles was limited. First, the TASS 
leadership acknowledged that separate funding for former ASTMS branches in MSF 
might be acceptable, but on no wider basis (Carter 1991. 50). Second, in response 
to the demand by ASTMS for full branch representation, TASS agreed to larger 
representation for both former unions1 delegations at the Special Rules Conference 
to decide the rulebook and structure for MSF (Carter 1991: 47-49). Meanwhile those 
in ASTMS who raised issues of branch autonomy and branch representation 
remained concerned that their National Executive was either failing to advance these 
concerns with TASS or were naive of TASS’s ‘real’ agenda for the ‘form and 
character’ of MSF (Carter 1991: 44-47).
Formally, the result was that ASTMS formed Division 1 and TASS Division A in MSF. 
There was a joint National Executive and parity of representation for the two 
divisions. All other structures, including full-time officials, remained entirely separate
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pending the decisions of the 1988 Special Rules Conference (MSF 1988a, 1988b; 
Carter 1991: 50). For workplaces and branches, the amalgamation agreement 
meant transferring into MSF in unchanged form and with no joint agreements or 
policies in place over their development in the amalgamated union.
POST-AMALGAMATION 
Battle for control
With no agreement in advance of the creation of MSF, the development of local union 
organisation in the amalgamated union was unpredictable. Those coming from 
ASTMS held to a belief in branch autonomy and an organisation where the voice of 
branches was heard and acted on at regional and national levels. However, they 
were faced with an organisation in the TASS division which adhered to centralised 
control as the most prized attribute of a union and which was intent on shaping MSF 
to that vision. The scene was set for an internecine battle over whether MSF would 
be ‘member-led’ or ‘leader-led’.
The ASTMS ‘bottom lines’ over branch autonomy, separate funding and branch 
representation in the structures of the union were enshrined in the Cardiff Principles 
(Carter 1991: 50). With a degree of naivety, the ASTMS side of the MSF Joint 
National Executive anticipated an effective resolution by incorporating them in the 
new rulebook, to be proposed to the Special Rules Conference. However, the 
orchestrated bloc vote of the TASS side, in conditions of parity of representation, only 
required a single vote, an abstention or an absence from the ASTMS side for the 
TASS position to be adopted in the rulebook. Unsurprisingly none of the Principles 
found their way into the recommendations to the Special Rules Conference (Carter 
1991: 50). All that was evident were proposals for a weakening of the influence of 
regions and branches by turning them into administrative units, enhanced by the 
creation of larger branches with full-time officials acting as branch secretaries, a 
similar enlargement of regions and a reduction of the number of delegates to the 
Annual Conference (Carter 1991: 52).
Resisting the TASS style rulebook which emerged from the Joint National Executive 
was the only option if the Cardiff Principles and the ‘form and character* of ASTMS as 
it related to Divisional Councils and branches were to be preserved in MSF. The
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immediate result was some 2,500 amendments to the rulebook from former ASTMS 
Divisional Councils and branches against about 100 from former TASS (MSF 1988d). 
As Carter remarked:
The primary explanation for this disparity rested with the difference in 
structures and traditions of leadership [between ASTMS and TASS] (Carter 
1991: 53).
The scene was set for confrontation over the two conceptions of trade unionism.
The initial skirmishes at the Special Rules Conference reaffirmed the strength of the 
TASS division bloc vote. However, this action emboldened lay leaders in the ASTMS 
division to adopt similar tactics and, with the defection of some TASS division 
delegates, votes in favour of separate funding for all Regional Councils and branches 
were won (MSF 1988c, 1988d). Commenting on the situation at the first conference 
an ex-TASS full-time official remarked that:
At the first joint Conference, ASTMS were all over the place. They were voting 
different ways and doing what you do in a conference, what you’re supposed 
to do in a conference. ... They were meeting a block of hands that were all 
voting the same way. But I think that ASTMS got to find out very, very quickly 
that unless we play this same game we’re just going to end up [losing] (ex- 
TASS regional full-time official interview 1999).
The defections indicated that the hegemony of the Broad Left had its limitations and 
in part relied on the centralised structure of TASS. Representation at the Special 
Rules Conference was open to wider sections of branch delegates, as had been 
reluctantly conceded by TASS, and this situation fatally weakened the ability of the 
Broad Left to control the membership of the TASS delegation and the discipline of its 
voting patterns. The defections also showed that the Cardiff Principles had an 
appeal for certain sections of the former TASS lay leadership reflecting nascent 
concerns over the lack of debate inside TASS, its centralised leadership and the 
‘machine politics’ of the Broad Left (ex-TASS regional full-time official interview 
1999). An ex-ASTMS local lay leader saw this divide in the ex-TASS delegation as: 
The craft unions within TASS didn’t seem to be able to make any headway. 
They weren’t able to get much from the National Executive. Everything they 
wanted to do, the craft unions, they were overruled, with the predominance of 
the staff within TASS. ... When we went to Conference, there was a ganging 
up to make sure that resolutions you wanted were passed. There was a better
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relationship certainly amongst the craft foremen and the shop-floor people, 
[between the former ASTMS and the former craft section of TASS] (ex-ASTMS 
local lay leader interview 1999).
The craft section of TASS had originated from mergers with smaller craft unions in 
the 1980s (Smith 1987: 287). However, the hegemony of the Broad Left had 
prevented any influence from them within TASS and they became increasingly 
marginalised. An ex-TASS full-time official remarked that:
We used to joke as Metal Mechanics, well why don’t they just send us a sheet 
and tell us what we’ve got to vote on (ex-TASS regional full-time official 
interview 1999).
Within MSF, they found an affinity with the ASTMS section that could challenge the 
dominance of the Broad Left and foster the creation of a semi-autonomous Craft 
Section (ex-ASTMS local lay leader interview 1999).
With this victory, the ASTMS delegation and its new allies had every expectation of 
also winning the vote on branch representation at the Annual Conference but legal 
advice was announced to the effect that such a vote would be against the Instrument 
of Transfer (Carter 1991: 54). It was clear to many that this advice was as much a 
political manoeuvre as legal opinion. Earlier defeats had already motivated some 
leaders in the TASS division to question the continuation of the amalgamation and 
leaders in the ASTMS division began to counsel a tactical retreat until a time when 
TASS would find it impossible to leave (Carter 1991: 54).
Nevertheless, the overall outcome of the Conference was re-affirmation of the 
‘member-led’ form of unionism captured by the Cardiff Principles. For workplaces 
and branches, MSF was inexorably moving in the direction of the ASTMS principles 
of branch autonomy, separate funding and wide branch representation at regional 
and national levels (MSF 1989a, 1989b). These principles carried with them issues 
of ‘character’ to facilitate debate and dissent and a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the 
development of policy. An ex-TASS full-time official, who applauded these principles, 
maintained that:
I think the pyramid’s the right way up. TASS was everything I thought a trade 
union shouldn’t be. It should have been [the members] driving the policy
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rather than it being driven from the top. I think we’ve got it just right inside 
MSF (ex-TASS regional full-time official interview 1999).
Subsequently the 1989 Annual Conference decided that branches with over 600 
members should have an automatic right to representation at the Conference moving 
toward the Cardiff Principle for all branches to be represented. This stance also 
favoured the former ASTMS branches, which were generally larger than branches 
from former TASS (Carter 1991: 61).
Leaders, both lay and full-time officials, played a pivotal role in the post­
amalgamation period. The different relationships of full-time officials as employees of 
the union and lay leaders as elected representatives applied to MSF, except in one 
respect. The close affinity between full-time officials in TASS and the Broad Left 
faction that effectively controlled and directed the union’s activities was distinct in its 
political reference. It seemed that many of these individuals were employed, not just 
based on their skills and competence to bargain and represent the interests of 
members, but also their political allegiance and loyalty to the Broad Left. An ex- 
ASTMS full-time official saw the relationship in these terms:
[In TASS] the decisions were taken centrally. ... That system would set the 
policies of the union and the full-time officials were then employed to 
promulgate those policies amongst the members (ex-ASTMS regional full-time 
official interview 1999).
With their proportionally greater presence in TASS as compared with their 
equivalents in ASTMS (Fairbrother 2000a. 44) these full-time officials were able to 
wield political (Broad Left) leadership throughout the structures of TASS.
Post-amalgamation local union organisation
The post-amalgamation decisions in MSF re-affirmed an ASTMS ‘form and character’ 
of local union organisation in relation to the presence and influence of branches at 
Regional Councils and Annual Conference. However, it did little to complement this 
situation at local level. There was no framework or agreements:
• To establish branches based on common boundaries such as geographical 
area, single employers and/or workplaces.
• To merge existing branches based on these or any other common boundaries.
• To have a common framework of branch practice.
• To have a common structure of branch and workplace organisation.
146
Although there was some acknowledgement of the desirability of achieving a 
coherent model of local union organisation that had a clear place in the structures of 
the union there had been only faltering progress on a voluntary basis toward such an 
objective. An ex-TASS full-time official described the difficulties in advancing such an 
objective as:
Where we could get the two unions to immediately come together at 
workplace we did. That meant instead of two different bargaining units with 
the employer we were able to bargain as one unit on behalf of the new union, 
MSF, and that obviously strengthened our position with the employer. In some 
areas that took a longer time to do and people still bargain separately as 
ASTMS and TASS. ... It’s a question of learning to trust each other and I 
know it’s took ten years and we still haven’t got that. But there were big 
political differences between the two unions. ... There are still some areas 
where we’ve been unable to [bring groups together] because activists have 
been steeped in the political dogma that’s existed for the last ten years. ... I 
think it’s starting to get a bit better. One would hope after ten years, it would 
actually have resolved itself. But it’s starting to get a bit better (ex-TASS 
regional full-time official interview 1999).
This description highlights three issues for the local level that arose from the 
amalgamation. First, that merging previously ASTMS and TASS workplace groups 
produced benefits in bargaining strength. Second, that the continuing internal divide 
within MSF, stemming from the initial confrontation over control of the union, 
frustrated some mergers of workplace groups. Third, that familiarity with the 
amalgamation was progressively weakening the historic divisions and bringing 
workplace groups together. The overall assessment was that the benefits in 
bargaining strength progressively encouraged many workplace groups to merge. 
However, former ASTMS and TASS branches were mostly peripheral to the 
bargaining activity of workplace groups. With no policy directive toward merger and 
no obvious benefit from merger, many branches continued in unchanged form.
It did appear that a combination of the debilitating effect of the early infighting and a 
stifling of debate in order to avoid any return to it (Carter 1997: 14, 16), militated 
against any definite decisions being taken on fundamental issues concerning 
branches and workplace organisation. The result at local level was that the division
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between union activity in branches and with employers in workplaces, already 
evident before the amalgamation, became even more accentuated (Carter & Poynter 
1999: 509; Fairbrother 2000a: 115). An ex-ASTMS full-time official commented that: 
What the branch is seen as is not an industrial force but an administration 
force. But it equally has tagged on to it a sort of political, union political that is, 
sort of role (ex-ASTMS regional full-time official interview 1999).
The bargaining and representational autonomy of workplace groups continued in 
MSF, as described by an ex-TASS local lay leader:
[The merger] didn't make any changes because, as I say, the number of 
people who wanted to be stewards has always been small. As long as we 
covered the areas, it doesn't really matter if it was an old ASTMS rep or it was 
an old TASS rep. ... We'd always got together for the Joint Trade Unions, so 
as a staff area we'd always acted together (ex-TASS local lay leader interview 
1999).
Effectively the amalgamation consolidated and legitimised an extant situation for 
bargaining and representational activity. Branch autonomy complemented by 
independent funding also continued (Fairbrother 2000a: 45), as confirmed by an ex- 
ASTMS lay leader commenting that:
There hasn’t been any change whatsoever as far as that’s concerned. As far 
as the merger is concerned, there’s been no sort of change at all (ex-ASTMS 
local lay leader interview 1999).
Thus, the branches in the amalgamated union became the site for playing out the 
divisions encapsulated by the amalgamation.
The MSF workplace
As described in Chapter 5 the MSF workplace study was located on a large tyre 
manufacturer in the West Midlands. Before the amalgamation, both ASTMS and 
TASS had roughly equivalent memberships in the plant and the previous boundaries 
between their occupations and membership of one or the other union were 
increasingly breaking down. The employer had also gone through a long period of 
restructuring and massive technological change, which had visited intensive periods 
of job change and job losses on both ASTMS and TASS members. Against this 
background, the two unions had developed a joint position for bargaining, 
representation and recruitment in the plant involving lay leaders from both unions. 
Alongside the workplace, ASTMS had a branch that was based on the workplace
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whereas the equivalent TASS branch covered a geographical area that included a 
number of other TASS organised workplaces. At the time of the study, some eleven 
years after the MSF amalgamation, this structure remained essentially the same.
An ex-TASS branch secretary commented that.
When the merger came along it consolidated something at national level that 
was already happening with us at local level. But we had the peculiarity that 
you were all members of one union on the same site but you were still 
polarised into these two branches (ex-TASS local lay leader interview 1999).
For bargaining activity, the amalgamation had removed any remaining encumbrances 
to joint working between the former ASTMS and TASS workplace groups. It had 
produced a more effective voice with the employer and a merged MSF workplace 
group with a considerable level of autonomy over its bargaining position (ex-TASS 
local lay leader interview 1999). However, there had been no equivalent merging of 
the former ASTMS and TASS branches. In effect the decision from the 
amalgamation not to rationalise workplace and branch organisation on a common 
basis had resulted in a well organised and effective ‘MSF’ workplace group and two 
branches from the former unions, neither of which had any close connection with 
industrial relations activity in the workplace.
It was apparent that for this workplace, rationalising the structures of the workplace 
group on a single MSF basis was not only a sensible simplification of what was 
already a high level of joint working but also a necessity in the context of grappling 
with continuing issues of industrial change and job losses being instigated by the 
employer. An ex-TASS lay leader remarked that:
We seem to go through restructuring every two or three years. Through all 
this process there's been constant change, the jobs we did became more the 
same. TASS would cross areas that were solely ASTMS; the areas of 
influence became blurred. Basically, we changed and evolved coincidental 
with the union's change and evolvement (ex-TASS local lay leader interview 
1999).
This rationalisation was a process handled by lay leaders in the workplace and 
achieved through a history of mutual respect and joint working, and the imperative of 
confronting the employer with a single voice. Job change and retirement eased any
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possible competition for leadership positions. An ex-TASS lay leader described the 
process as:
Outside of the branch activity, we worked together on the site and it worked 
very well. In some large departments, you'd have an ASTMS rep and a TASS 
rep but the company only wanted to talk to one. We got round that eventually 
by people leaving. Really, it was natural wastage, a senior rep would leave 
and you wouldn't replace him. It was fairly amicable over the years. Came out 
right in the end (ex-TASS local lay leader interview 1999).
However, without either the imperative of facing up to the employer or any national 
decision within the union over rationalising branch structures, the two branches from 
the partner unions continued to operate with little change from their previous practice. 
The same ex-TASS lay leader went on to describe the situation for the branches:
We became members of one union but the peculiarity ... was that we were still 
in two different branches. ASTMS had a site branch so all the branch 
members worked [there], whereas TASS was an open branch for all members 
within a certain geographical area. There was no way that they were going to 
agree to merge with us and become part of an open branch and we didn't 
really want to merge with them because we didn't agree with the way their 
finances were run (ex-TASS local lay leader interview 1999).
In MSF, only recognised branches had their own funds and had representation at 
Regional Council and Annual Conference. However, in practice there was a growing 
gap between the unified workplace group and the separate branches. The distancing 
of lay activity within the union from that experienced in the workplace was becoming 
a problem. Local lay leaders were extolling the benefits of a single voice with the 
employer and the autonomy of action they had through the single workplace group, 
whilst recognising the problem of influencing policy within MSF in a situation where 
two individual branches were recognised in the rulebook. The same ex-TASS lay 
leader described these difficulties as:
Workplace organisation could be improved by bringing together the branches 
because they are two separate groups of members even though they work 
together. It would give members a sense of being one group and that would 
improve the workplace organisation (ex-TASS local lay leader interview 1999).
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Full-time officials at national and regional level also recognised the problem. An 
explanation for it, advanced by an ex-ASTMS national full-time official, was that the 
initial division into two sections led to a concentration on issues of internal democracy 
and representation in the early formative period, whilst structures in workplaces were 
allowed to develop of their own volition. This official commented that:
The structures went apart, democratic and workplace organisation. I think it is 
largely the result of decisions taken and the concentration on political issues 
and the democratic part of the structure. The industrial structures were part of 
the industrial work and left to develop themselves (ex-ASTMS national full­
time official interview 1999).
At the workplace, via the workplace group and the two branches, MSF was shaped 
as a ‘member-led’ union for negotiation and a disembodied branch for representation 
within the union. In this way, a ‘member-led’ basis for representation was laid, to be 
formally realised some time in the future.
The Wider Union
The role played by full-time officials in the post-amalgamation period, particularly at 
regional level, certainly appeared to encompass on occasion some direct 
involvement in the political infighting. As an ex-ASTMS full-time official asserted:
To put it simply we outplayed them (ex-ASTMS regional full-time official 
interview 1999).
With workplaces and branches, it was mainly one of encouraging joint working and 
even merging workplace groups and branches, but always on a voluntary basis. An 
ex-TASS full-time official describing their role commented that:
There’s been plenty of circulars saying branches should merge but there’s 
always that little sentence that says but it must be with the permission of both 
branches. There’s never been a drive from the top, a decision that’s been 
taken at the Executive and you’re going to do it. Never had that sort of 
philosophy (ex-TASS regional full-time official interview 1999).
They recognised the haphazard nature of this arrangement. The deep-seated 
antagonism in some workplaces spilled over from the partner unions, consolidated by 
the early infighting. As a result, there was little willingness to adopt a common policy 
toward all workplaces and branches. Nevertheless, they were certainly of the view 
that the outcome for workplaces and branches of the early post-amalgamation period 
was a situation where autonomy of action in workplaces and a presence and facility
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for raising issues and entering debate over them were present. These features were 
far more redolent of the ‘member-led’ unionism of ASTMS than TASS. An ex- 
ASTMS full-time official confirmed a position where:
[Workplace organisations] are more independent. To an extent, of course, 
[workplace organisations] in ASTMS was quite independent but TASS was 
certainly not so independent and they’ve sort of adopted the independent type 
role (ex-ASTMS national full-time official interview 1999).
In MSF, a section of lay leaders and full-time officials engaged in an internecine 
struggle for control of the new union, a struggle mainly played out at regional and 
national level. Meanwhile at local level, union activity continued much as before the 
amalgamation, although with a strengthening of the workplace industrial groups. 
Here some lay leaders took the initiative of using the amalgamation to rationalise an 
existing situation of joint working in workplaces on to a single MSF basis. However, 
without the imperative of utilising the benefit of a larger single voice with employers 
and the absence of any agreed policy in the union on the rationalisation of local union 
organisation, branches remained much as they were before the amalgamation. The 
inevitable result was an incoherent structure of local union organisation that mostly 
worked well with employers but produced a variable and sometimes fragile presence 
in the wider union.
Lay leaders had to grapple with the fact of the amalgamation in the context of their 
workplaces. How they dealt with the problem was conditioned by two factors: the 
framework for local union organisation agreed between the partners to the 
amalgamation and the emergent form of unionism of the new union. The form of 
unionism of MSF came to be ‘member-led’ where local autonomy, debate, and 
dissent from local level became increasingly prominent features. Lay leaders were 
able to use the ‘form and character1 coming from the amalgamation, alongside its 
creation of a single voice, to forge a stronger bargaining relationship with the 
employer. However, within the union there remained a dissonance in representation.
One local lay leader remarked in relation to the operation of their workplace group in 
MSF that:
You get the feeling that we’re controlling what’s going on here rather than 
we’re being controlled (ex-TASS local lay leader interview 2000).
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This remark expresses a level of autonomy that is far more a reflection of the 
‘member-led’ unionism of ASTMS than that of TASS. Bureaucratic tendencies that 
could lead to leadership dominance at the expense of member self-activity (Hyman 
1979, 1989, 2001) were evident in ASTMS and TASS. The ‘leader-led’ hegemony of 
the Broad Left in TASS showed this tendency in its extreme form. However, in 
ASTMS, bureaucratic tendencies were frustrated by the ability of lay leaders to work 
through branch and regional levels and question and dispute the policy of the 
national leadership. In MSF, the ‘member-led’ form of unionism eventually 
predominated.
CONCLUSION
What is the picture we have of the MSF amalgamation? Straightforwardly there were 
two large ‘white-collar’ unions, both with a strong presence in engineering and 
frequently organising in the same workplaces and the same employers, affiliated to 
the TUC and the Labour Party. In their policies and political standpoints, both were 
on the left’. Both had ‘big’ figures as General Secretary, Clive Jenkins in ASTMS 
and Ken Gill in TASS. The prospects for amalgamation were promising, especially 
as the leadership question was resolved by the early retirement of Jenkins soon after 
the amalgamation (Carter 1991: 55; MSF 1988e).
The outcome of the amalgamation was for the form of unionism of MSF to be much 
closer to the ‘member-led’ unionism of ASTMS and this result provided MSF 
branches with an appreciably greater presence and influence than would have been 
the case within the ‘leader-led’ unionism of TASS. As Fairbrother maintained:
An ASTMS model more or less prevailed, combining two features of branch 
organisation. First, ASTMS activists were able to retain control over branches, 
keeping full-time officials at a distance. ... Second, branch autonomy and 
sovereignty was retained vis-£-vis the centre, focused on independent regional 
and branch funding (Fairbrother 2000a: 45).
To appreciate how it was that the local level influenced and was influenced by an 
apparently national directed process, the amalgamation process and all the 
influences on it need to be drawn together and seen in the context of ‘form and 
character’. Those influences were:
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• The process by which local union organisation transferred from the partner 
unions into MSF.
• The presence of agreements and policies from the amalgamation that 
impinged on local union organisation in the amalgamated union.
• The presence and influence of leaders and factions in the amalgamation 
process.
• The format of the amalgamation process chosen by the partner unions.
Despite the stark divide between their forms of unionism, and the presence of a 
dominant faction intent on extending its dominance into the amalgamated union, the 
partners to the MSF amalgamation decided to amalgamate as two divisions with 
parity of representation. Attempting to reconcile these differences within the 
amalgamated union almost inevitably resulted in a bitter confrontation. It also meant 
that the position of the local level in the amalgamated union would be a product of 
that confrontation but that the altercation would frustrate its detailed consideration.
Leaders and factions in MSF were intent on using rival constructions of forms of 
unionism to legitimate their respective positions in a confrontation that was 
essentially concerned with control of the union. Control, for the TASS Broad Left, 
meant a highly centralised ‘form’, for leaders in ASTMS it was closely related to the 
concept of ‘lay control’. Leaders and factions in MSF consciously organised 
themselves and confronted each other based on individual concepts of ‘form and 
character’, even if this activity was partially a camouflage for control of the union. It 
was a ‘member-led’ model that prevailed, one that favoured autonomy for and 
representation of the local level. This result is partly testimony to the organising 
abilities of leaders and factions promoting that model, partly the difficulty of 
maintaining a position of hegemony once a highly centralised organisation starts to 
disintegrate, but also the relative attraction of that model to others once they were 
liberated from the dominance of a relatively small controlling faction.
The outcome of the infighting would have a direct impact on branch and workplace 
organisation. Had the outcome been the agenda of TASS, the Cardiff Principles 
would have been jettisoned in favour of highly centralised control orchestrated 
through the Broad Left faction. However, the ASTMS model prevailed and, with its 
emphasis on ‘branch autonomy and representation’, limited the former TASS
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approach. However, the failure to make any agreements or develop new policies 
with regard to the organisation of the union in workplaces and branches allowed for 
their somewhat haphazard and incoherent development subsequent to the 
amalgamation. Even before the amalgamation, organisation in workplaces was 
developing around industrial relations issues, often involving lay leaders in the 
workplace working jointly with those from ASTMS or TASS. Branches became 
increasingly separated from this activity. In ASTMS, their involvement in internal 
ASTMS issues increased at Divisional Councils and Annual Conference and they 
became vehicles for the activity of some individualistic lay leaders disenchanted with 
the industrial struggle. In TASS, they became increasingly subservient to the 
hegemony of the Broad Left. With much energy and attention being directed at the 
national battle for control in the early days of MSF, this model of workplace and 
branch organisation continued to develop. However, once the argument was largely 
settled in favour of the ASTMS position, the development was in an environment of 
autonomy of action, representation (for branches) in the wider union and a facility for 
promoting and debating issues of concern to the local level.
The ‘member-led’ unionism of MSF and the position of local union organisation within 
it is a largely divided and incoherent one in the context of the whole union. Yet there 
is the ultimate emergence of what is mostly the form of unionism of one partner to the 
amalgamation (ASTMS). The features of this form are closely concerned with 
autonomous action at local level and an influential presence in the wider union. This 
outcome suggests the attributes of the ‘member-led’ form of unionism favours its 
emergence in a situation of amalgamation. This suggestion will be further explored in 
the following chapter on UNISON.
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Chapter 7
UNISON
ONE UNION FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The theme that becomes apparent in this chapter is that from a disparate set of 
models for local organisation in the unions participating in the UNISON amalgamation 
a single model emerged in UNISON and that model was similar to one of the 
predecessor unions. It will be argued that this result was an outcome of the process 
of amalgamation and the various influences on it.
It is important to note that the local case study only had members from NALGO and 
NUPE whereas the UNISON amalgamation also included COHSE. Although COHSE 
was much smaller than NALGO or NUPE and only organised in the NHS, COHSE 
was a full and equal partner in the amalgamation (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 5). 
However, the 'form and character* of COHSE and its local organisation was very 
similar to that of NUPE and in the discussions over the amalgamation the two unions 
usually worked in tandem (Terry 1996). It seemed permissible, therefore, to use a 
case study that excluded one of the participants and draw implications from it across 
the whole process of amalgamation.
PRE-AMALGAMATION
Prior to the start of negotiations over the UNISON amalgamation COHSE, NALGO 
and NUPE had all experienced a period of change in the organisation of their 
activities at a local level and the relationship the local union organisation had with 
full-time officials and the leadership at regional and national levels. Partly, these 
adjustments arose from changes in the bargaining environment where localised 
bargaining became much more prevalent than national agreements. Partly, it was 
the development of local steward systems as a response to this change and the need 
to promote closer connection between members and their union representatives 
(Terry 1996: 89-90).
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NALGO
For NALGO these developments were built on longstanding principles of branch 
autonomy and an arms-length relationship with full-time officials. Table 6 illustrates 
the wide range of activities and powers enjoyed by NALGO branches, enabled by the 
rules and structure of the union and the considerable level of funding provided from 
member subscriptions. Localised bargaining increased the range and significance of 
branch activity and the growth of steward organisation introduced to union activity a 
new cadre of articulate, educated and (on occasion) politically motivated individuals 
(Fairbrother 2000a: 56-58). These new activists were soon using the changed 
environment to challenge the established leadership at regional and national level for 
leadership positions and over policy (Fairbrother 2000a: 57, Terry 1996: 90; Personal 
experience 1982-93). NALGO also largely stood aloof from the 'Winter of Discontent' 
in 1978-79 and its membership was relatively unaffected by the ravages of 
privatisation and competitive tendering imposed by the incoming Conservative 
government. It was also unaffiliated to the Labour Party and often saw its policies, 
promoted by its radical local stewards, as being to the 'left' of party thinking. As such, 
it saw little need to re-assess its policies on local union organisation and branch 
autonomy (Terry 1996: 93).
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Table 6. UNISON branches.
UNISON NALGO COHSE
NUPE
Single employer based Yes Yes No
Steward based Yes Yes Yes
Specialist Officers
(Treasurer, Equality, Education, Publicity, etc)
Yes Yes No
Branch Committee Yes Yes Yes
Annual Branch Meeting Yes Yes No
Commission payments No No Yes (NUPE) 
No (COHSE)
Branch rules Yes Yes No
Agreement to visit by full-time official Yes Yes No
Retired members as Branch Officers No No Yes
Central collection subscriptions Yes No Yes
Branch funding from subscriptions 22% 25% 17% (NUPE) 
15%
(COHSE)
Branch strike fund levies Yes Yes No
Branch affiliations Yes Yes No
Branch donations Yes Yes No
Motions and amendments to Annual 
Conference
Yes Yes Yes
Branch education Yes Yes No
Branch publicity Yes Yes No
Branch employees Yes Yes No
Source: COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1991, 1992; Evans 1993; UNISON 1995a.
The bureaucratic tendencies and tension between the local and other organisational 
levels set out by Hyman (1979, 1989, 2001), are exemplified by NALGO. Yet the 
inherent dangers of a distancing from members associated with the development of 
an elite cadre of local lay leaders, and sclerosis and disunity in union policy and 
direction from contention between the local, regional and national levels, were not 
experienced in NALGO. The first was dismissed as misunderstanding of the close 
and supportive relationship between members and leaders at a local level and the 
second seen as evidencing the ability of members and local union organisations to 
exercise control within the union. For NALGO, its ‘form and character* accorded with 
the ‘member-led’ form of unionism (Fairbrother 2000a).
COHSE and NUPE
In contrast, table 6 shows the narrower range of activities of COHSE and NUPE 
branches. They had appreciably lower levels of autonomy, and funding was either 
directed at individual branch officers by way of commission payments related to
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branch membership numbers (NUPE) or by a small payment to branch funds 
(COHSE) (Evans 1993). The relationship between branches, full-time officials and 
the wider leadership was also much closer, with officials regularly attending branch 
meetings to provide advice and support (a comparatively rare occurrence in NALGO) 
(Fairbrother 2000a: 58-61). However, the growth of local bargaining (particularly over 
issues like bonus schemes) and recognition of the need to improve communication 
and involvement with members encouraged both unions to develop steward systems 
(Fairbrother 2000a: 58-61; Terry 1996: 89-90). Industrial action in the public sector 
around the 'Winter of Discontent' was largely led by COHSE and NUPE and 
supported through the increased numbers of local stewards. However, the relative 
failure to secure substantial improvements and the accelerating programme of 
privatisation and competitive tendering directly affecting COHSE and NUPE 
memberships that followed the 1979 election victory of the Conservatives, led to a re­
assessment of local union organisation. A perceived need for greater discipline in 
the prosecution of industrial action and policies geared to the re-election of the 
Labour Party (to which both were affiliated) encouraged the re-assertion of the 
predominance of a centralised leadership and of full-time officials (Fairbrother 2000a: 
60; Terry 1996: 93).
The close-knit relationships within COHSE and NUPE appeared to deny the dangers 
coming from bureaucratisation and the concomitant tensions between leaders and 
members and the different levels of organisation set out by Hyman (1979, 1989, 
2001). Their ‘form and character1 placed them as ‘leader-led1 on the ‘member- 
led/leader-led1 continuum (Fairbrother 2000a) but that was seen as a necessity in the 
pursuance of their policy objectives.
Member-led or Leader-led
Thus the three unions arrived at the amalgamation negotiations with very different 
versions of the 'form and character* of local union organisation and how they saw it 
developing into UNISON. If anything NALGO's espousal of 'branch autonomy' and 
'lay control' had been enhanced through its development in the 1980s. Whereas the 
equivalent experience of COHSE and NUPE moved their thinking in the opposite 
direction. The substance of the next section is the working through of these two 
visions in the amalgamation negotiations.
159
AMALGAMATION
The approach adopted by COHSE, NALGO and NUPE to the negotiations over their 
amalgamation was at odds with that usually seen in amalgamations of major trade 
unions. Leaving aside 'transfers of engagement' mergers when one union (invariably 
much smaller) accepts the rules and structure of the larger, most amalgamations take 
the form of an 'umbrella' organisation which leaves the amalgamating unions' 
organisations intact pending a period of internal negotiation leading to the formulation 
of a new rulebook and structure (Undy 1993: 4-5). The clear advantage of such a 
process is that it 'locks-in' the parties to the amalgamation and provides an 
imperative to reach an agreed settlement of differences between them. The 
disadvantage, and this problem has been seen in the context of the MSF 
amalgamation, is that the internal negotiation can be a fractious, divisive and 
debilitating period when the main purpose of the amalgamation is lost amid 
squabbles and battles for control (see Chapter 6).
Objectives
The Final Report on the amalgamation of the COHSE, NALGO and NUPE National 
Executives to the 1992 Annual Conferences, maintained that:
The exciting prospect of forming a New Union would only be possible if there 
was widespread consultation among those who were affected. This meant 
establishing wide ranging consultative and educational arrangements both 
within each of the existing unions and jointly (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE: 1992: 5- 
6).
An insider perspective would suggest that, at least for NALGO, an additional 
consideration was that agreement would not be reached on any basis acceptable to 
the NALGO Annual Conference without detailed consideration of its provisions, 
including the opportunity for amending them (Personal experience 1988-92), and that 
NALGO's national leadership were well aware of this constraint (Terry 1996: 100).
Whatever the motivation, the ensuing three years of negotiation included three joint 
reports to Annual Conferences (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1990, 1991, 1992) and a 
NALGO report to a NALGO Special Conference (NALGO 1992) that all allowed many 
opportunities for two visions of union organisation to be debated and argued. This 
process encompassed compromise and trade-offs to achieve final agreement and
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any of the parties could have withdrawn if the price was regarded by them as too 
high. However, the overall ambition kept everyone at the negotiating table.
At the outset of the discussions, the NALGO National Executive laid down two 
'bottom lines' for NALGO's participation, which permeated much of the subsequent 
negotiations. These ‘bottom lines’ were confirmed in Composite Motion D at the 
1990 NALGO Annual Conference, proposed by the NEC and most of the NALGO 
District Councils (NUPE 1990). According to the motion agreed by the NEC these 
bottom lines’ were in a list of 'the areas of greatest concern to NALGO members and 
branch activists' (Terry 1996: 94) but soon assumed an iconic status, 'branch 
autonomy and finance’ and 'lay control at all levels' (Fryer 2000: 34; Personal 
experience 1988-92; Terry 1996: 94). COHSE and NUPE wanted to know what was 
meant by these constructions and were particularly concerned over the second since 
they envisaged a shared responsibility between lay leaders and full-time officials 
(Terry 1996: 94).
NALGO's response set out three aspects of 'branch autonomy and finance'. First, 
the union proposed that branches collected member subscriptions directly from the 
employer who deducted subscriptions from pay, retained their portion and then 
remitted the balance to national level. This proposition was the opposite of the 
COHSE and NUPE system where subscriptions were paid by the employer to the 
union nationally. For NALGO’s lay leaders their system allowed the use of branch 
funds without the sanction of national level and full-time officials for purposes such as 
expenses, publicity, employing administrators, donations, affiliations and 
campaigning. Second, the union advocated that 'branch autonomy' be translated into 
an 'arm's-length' relationship with full-time officials, who, for example, only visited 
branches or engaged in local negotiation and representation by invitation of the 
branch. Again, this relationship was entirely different to the situation with COHSE 
and NUPE, where full-time officials had an intimate relationship with branches based 
on frequent visits and active engagement in negotiation and representation. The 
third strand of 'branch autonomy' was the ability to adopt and campaign for policies 
opposed to those of the national union and use branch funds for this purpose. This 
proposition was also anathema to COHSE and NUPE who saw in it inherent risks of 
indiscipline, an incoherent policy position with a hostile Conservative government,
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and a failure to provide support to the Labour Party and the TUC (Personal 
experience 1988-92; Terry 1996: 95).
For NALGO, 'lay control at all levels' was also a distinctive concept. As democratic 
organisations with directly elected National Executives and Annual Conferences 
composed of lay members, all trade unions can be characterised as 'lay controlled'. 
NALGO could also point to its District Council officers as elected lay positions, as 
were the majority of its members on national Whitley Councils. However, the concept 
had much deeper connotations for NALGO lay leaders than those evident in the 
'form' of the union. For them it signified that lay leaders had the lead role in all 
aspects of the union's activity including bargaining, policymaking, campaigning, and 
even the appointment of full-time officials with a negotiation and representation role 
(Personal experience 1988-92; Terry 1996: 95-96). As Terry remarked:
Lay control was not just something to negotiate about it was a factor that 
would influence the success or failure of the enterprise itself (Terry 1996: 100). 
COHSE and NUPE subscribed to the generalised notion of 'lay control' in the context 
of a democratic organisation, but saw a role for full-time officials which was not 
subservient to that of lay leaders but complementary and shared (Personal 
experience 1988-92; Terry 1996: 95-96). The issue encapsulated the 'member-led' 
and 'leader-led' labels (Fairbrother 2000a) attaching to the unions illustrated in 
Chapter 5 (see also Terry 1996: 95).
Both of NALGO's 'bottom lines' contained detailed questions of 'form' but even more 
importantly they encapsulated the 'character* of NALGO as it was perceived by the 
union's lay leaders and the local level was an inextricable element of that process. 
'Branch autonomy' was the local manifestation of 'lay control', and 'lay control' 
throughout the union was based on 'branch autonomy'. There was a seamless 
synergy between the two that captured the 'character* of the union (Personal 
experience 1988-92).
Essentially COHSE and NUPE had three 'bottom lines', all concerned with questions 
of 'character*. The first ‘bottom line’ was the relationship between full-time officials 
and lay leaders, which they saw as one of 'partnership' rather than leadership by one 
of the other. Second, the unions focused on the relationship between the union and 
its members, which they wanted to establish as one concentrated on the needs and
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aspirations of members or 'member-centred' rather than a perceived over-influence 
by union activists. Third, they saw a need to configure the amalgamated union as a 
disciplined and coherent force in bargaining and opposition to the Conservative 
government (Fryer 2000: 33; Terry 1996: 93-96). Elements in NALGO saw 
'partnership' and 'member-centred' as implied critiques of 'lay control', ‘partnership’ 
demoting the supremacy of lay members in decision-making and ‘member-centred’ 
suggesting that lay activists were not representative of members real interests 
(Personal experience 1988-92). Both had potential relevance for NALGO 
conceptions of branch autonomy, lay control and the relationship lay leaders had with 
full-time officials, and laid the foundations for ongoing debates through the following 
negotiations (Fryer 2000: 33).
In these negotiations:
NALGO tended to set the agenda to which the others responded (Terry 1996:
96) (see also Waddington et al 2005: 163-164).
COHSE and NUPE's 'bottom lines' were concerned with the 'character1 of the new 
union whereas NALGO’s harked back to a conception of its own 'form and character1. 
My personal experience of NALGO (1982-93) confirms that 'branch autonomy' and 
'lay control' were deeply embedded elements of NALGO's 'character1 for most of its 
lay leaders. In relation to debates over national policy, this ‘character1 manifested 
itself in particular ways. The growth of a more radical group of branch lay activists 
through the 1980s saw them utilising these concepts in opposition to the more 
conservative policies of the NEC and full-time officials, and was particularly apparent 
in debates at Annual Conference and District Councils (Fairbrother 2000a: 56). An 
example of the internal dissension this opposition could cause was the debates over 
the representation of disadvantaged groups within the union (Ironside & Seifert 2000: 
210-213). More moderate branch lay activists were also not immune to mounting 
similar opposition when they objected to NEC policy, an example being their 
mobilisation of support for a Special Conference in 1984 in opposition to financial 
support by NALGO for the National Union of Mineworkers in the 1984-85 Miners' 
Strike (Ironside & Seifert 2000: 171-173).
163
Procedure for amalgamation
Standing Order 16(b) for the NALGO Annual Conference (NALGO 1993: 57) 
provided for the amendment of NEC reports and this provision provided the 
opportunity for branches to amend reports on the progress of the amalgamation 
discussions, despite them being agreed jointly by the three NEC’s (COHSE-NALGO- 
NUPE 1992: 5-7). It is also apparent that NALGO's national negotiators over the 
amalgamation were very conscious of the possibility of such amendments and the 
need to satisfy the agenda of branch activists (ex-NALGO national full-time official 
interview 1999). In practice, many of these amendments were concerned with the 
preservation of 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control' (Personal experience 1988-92). 
The same considerations permeated the deliberations of the NEC who were 
receiving regular updates on the negotiations and reporting those back to District 
Councils and branches between Annual Conferences (Personal experience 1988- 
92). In addition, certain branches and lay leaders were involved with factions within 
NALGO and these factions had a considerable influence over the debates at Annual 
Conference (Personal experience 1988-92). Their agenda was also often concerned 
with 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control'. Thus, in NALGO the local union 
organisation had a variety of forums and routes by which its voice could be heard in 
the amalgamation debate. When this facility was added to the general acceptance of 
the principles of 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control' their continued prevalence in the 
amalgamation talks becomes a reflection of widely held beliefs in a particular vision 
of trade union 'character1.
The situation in COHSE and NUPE was very different. For them the notion of any 
divided view between the local level, full-time officials and the national leadership 
went against their vision of a single union where all its elements worked together for 
the benefit of members. In that vision 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control' were 
irrelevant, dangerously divisive and provided opportunities for subversive elements to 
sow discord in the union (Payne 1994). In the same vein, under Rule 11 of COHSE 
and Standing Order 13 of NUPE, the joint NEC reports on the amalgamation were 
not amended at the COHSE and NUPE Annual Conferences (COHSE-NALGO- 
NUPE 1992: 5-7). Their main concern was NALGO's apparent intent to frustrate 
progress by continually reinforcing their 'bottom lines' with the amendments agreed at 
its Annual Conferences (NUPE 1992; Personal experience 1988-92). As a UNISON 
national official remarked:
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There seemed to be much less debate in [COHSE and NUPE] on what was in 
the Final Report and there were certainly some misconceptions about what 
things meant and particularly about whether or not [branches] would have to 
merge (ex-NALGO national full-time official interview 1999).
The local level', as an entity imbued with qualities of 'branch autonomy' and 'lay 
control', was not a concern of COHSE and NUPE. Its presence in their internal 
deliberations over the amalgamation and in negotiation with NALGO was subsumed 
in their promotion of a united, politically sensitive and disciplined union where all its 
elements were interdependent and mutually supportive.
The local context
Chapter 3 described the crucial role of leaders in the life of the local level and 
relations between the local union organisation and the wider union. As the 
individuals who were present in the forums where the amalgamation was discussed 
and agreements reached, their influence on the presence of the local level in that 
process was vital (Personal experience 1988-92). Leaders at regional and national 
levels played their part in this process but we must first give attention to local leaders 
since they had the closest connection with the local level and the greatest interest in 
seeing it have a prominent position in the talks. In NALGO, there was a widely held 
adherence to attributes of 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control', and the branch as the 
bedrock for these features within the union. Branch leaders were resolute in seeing 
that these features were kept at the forefront of the amalgamation discussions and 
they had a series of forums where their voice could be heard. At District Councils, 
Annual Conference and in the National Executive they were forthright in promoting 
the ideals of the NALGO branch through the formal processes of debate, motions 
and amendments. Complementing these procedures were the informal, and often 
even more influential, processes of private discussions and working through internal 
factions (Personal experience 1988-92). These activities could involve the same 
individuals, their role being characterised by a regional official as:
A number of regional and national generals, the activists who were involved on 
a broader level than their workplace would have had significant input (ex- 
NUPE regional full-time official interview 1999).
Being present in this way enabled a consistent message to be delivered and one that 
could be claimed as rooted in the experience of the local level.
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The situation in COHSE and NUPE was different. As illustrated earlier there was a 
different conception of the local level as an element of the whole union and there 
seemed little need to promote its interests as simultaneously separate and 
complementary to an essentially inclusive concept of trade union 'form and 
character1. Local lay leaders had no agenda to promote ideals specifically attached 
to the local level as an organisational entity. Their intimate relationship with full-time 
officials and national leaders encouraged an environment where dissent and division 
was against the 'character* and interests of the union and contributed to their 
leadership positions becoming individualised. Some in NALGO saw this relationship 
as subservience to the agenda of full-time officials and national leaders, described by 
a former NALGO regional full-time official in this way:
My perception was that COHSE and NUPE had a much more centralised, 
demand and control structure and stuff coming down, whereas NALGO was 
less that and more going up (ex-NALGO regional full-time official interview 
1999).
However, this remark betrays a misunderstanding of the relationship and a somewhat 
patronising attitude toward lay leaders with a generally low level of educational 
achievement, mostly engaged in low paid manual work. As Terry remarks:
[COHSE and NUPE] practice, enshrined in rule, gave full-time officials the 
right to attend branch meetings; NUPE negotiators in particular made it clear 
that they expected staff to attend; this was a mark of officer accountability and 
hence good unionism. ... The NUPE concept of the 'active partnership' 
between lay and employed officials ... provided a better service to members 
than might be provided by lay officials alone (Terry 1996: 97).
A result of the individualisation of their personal positions as local lay leaders was 
that their positions in the union became the main concern of some lay leaders. This 
concern had ramifications within the negotiations and even more in the post­
amalgamation period (Payne 1996).
Leaders
The leadership role of regional full-time officials in all three unions was mainly 
directed at promoting the advantages of the amalgamation at a local level and 
providing a two-way link for consultation over the amalgamation proposals between 
the national leadership and the local level. However, the different environment for 
the discussions in NALGO meant that their regional full-time officials were more
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conscious of a need to relate the consultation process to the prospective position of 
branches in the amalgamation and to be sensitive to their concerns (Payne 1996; 
Personal experience 1988-92; ex-NALGO regional full-time official interview 1999). 
Regional full-time officials in COHSE and NUPE had a similar role except that it was 
often orientated to the position of individual local leaders rather than questions of 
organisation at the local level (Payne 1996; Personal experience 1988-92; ex- 
NALGO, ex-NUPE regional full-time official interviews 1999).
Full-time officials and lay leaders at national level had the main role in the ongoing 
negotiations between the three unions (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 5-7, Fryer 
2000; Ironside & Seifert 2000: 311). Not only were they concerned with the detail of 
the amalgamation agreement but also with the consultation process in the wider 
unions and the joint reports to each union's Annual Conferences (COHSE-NALGO- 
NUPE 1992: 5-7). Clearly, they were in a prime position to exercise considerable 
influence over the amalgamation process. The initial impetus for the amalgamation 
had come from national level, as had the first skirmishes over NALGO's 'bottom lines' 
and COHSE and NUPE's alternative vision for the amalgamated union (Terry 1996: 
94-95, Fryer 2000). However, for the NALGO side of the joint negotiating team this 
position of influence was tempered from the outset by their need to secure the 
agreement of the NALGO Annual Conference as each joint report was produced. 
They had to respond to the proposed amendments to the reports and then argue for 
the revisions within the negotiation team (Personal experience 1988-92; ex-NALGO 
national full-time official interview 1999; Waddington et al 2005. 163-164). For the 
COHSE and NUPE sides any misgivings at their Annual Conferences were satisfied 
with verbal assurances, since the reports could not be amended and had to be 
accepted en bloc (ex-NALGO national full-time official interview 1999). The 
constraint on the NALGO negotiators required them to pay particular attention to the 
position of the branch in the amalgamation since it was branches, either individually 
or collectively through District (regional) Councils and organised factions who 
exercised considerable influence at the Annual Conference. Without a similar 
constraint on those from COHSE and NUPE there was the distinct possibility of 
NALGO branches exercising a disproportionate influence over the outcome of the 
amalgamation negotiations (Personal experience 1988-92; ex-NALGO national full­
time official interview 1999; Waddington e ta !2005: 163-164).
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Factions
Mention has already been made of NALGO branches and lay leaders being 
associated with organised factions within the union and a national full-time official 
remarked on the eventual decision of the 1992 NALGO Annual Conference to 
proceed with amalgamation, that:
It would not have happened without [the Broad Left] (ex-NALGO national full­
time official interview 1999).
Clearly the Broad Left and other factions had a real influence in the NALGO debates 
over the amalgamation (Terry 1996: 90) and it is necessary to explore in more detail 
their presence and role in the process.
Factions as an influential and ongoing feature of NALGO's internal operation can be 
traced back to the formation of the NALGO Action Group (NAG) in the late 1960s 
(Undy et al 1981: 237-238). The partial successes of NAG over bargaining policy, 
industrial action and in elections of its supporters to leadership positions (including 
the NEC) were enhanced by a wider influence over policy and militancy completely 
out of proportion to its actual membership. NAG had also shown that an organised 
group could use the constitution, rules and standing orders of the union to achieve 
policy positions against the normal ascendancy of the General Secretary and NEC 
(Undy et al 1981: 237-238). NAG developed into a wider group incorporating 
elements from the Communist Party, Labour Party and others on 'the Left', generally 
referred to as the Broad Left (Personal experience 1982-93). Meanwhile adherents 
of the Socialist Workers Party and Militant came together in a much looser and 
frequently divided group rather dismissively titled by the Broad Left and others as ‘the 
Trots’ (after their espoused allegiance to the writing and policies of Leon Trotsky) 
(Personal experience 1982-93). Conservative Party and other right wing elements 
also made faltering attempts at establishing factions but their relative failure to 
achieve any level of organisation and co-ordinated activity rendered them peripheral 
as influential groups (Personal experience 1982-93). Some District Councils also 
operated in a similar fashion to these factions. The Scottish District in particular, and 
on occasion the North West and North Wales and Metropolitan (London) Districts 
achieved a high level of discipline in co-ordinated voting patterns at Annual 
Conference and elections to national lay leadership positions, mostly in co-operation 
with the Broad Left (Personal experience 1982-93). This factional organisation
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worked through local lay leaders and those individuals influenced policy and election 
positions in branches and District Councils (Personal experience 1982-93).
To appreciate how these factions exercised their influence at Annual Conference it is 
necessary to describe the make-up and layout of the conference. One delegate, with 
additional delegates proportionate to its membership, represented each of the 1200 
NALGO branches at the conference. These provisions resulted in the conference 
having around 2000 delegates and necessitated accommodating them in a very large 
conference hall. Each of the 12 Districts had two delegates to the conference. 
These individuals were seated together and were able to communicate freely on 
policy and voting positions. In such a large gathering; co-ordinating speakers, votes, 
and use of the standing orders was the only effective way of enhancing the possibility 
of securing voting majorities in crucial debates, particularly in opposition to the 
position of the NEC or other organised positions (Personal experience 1982-93). 
Over a number of conferences, factions and certain Districts became skilled at such 
organisation of the conference 'floor1 (Personal experience 1982-93) (see Minkin 
1978: 207-242 for equivalent arrangements at the Labour Party Conference).
These skills became crucial in the debates on the amalgamation at the 1992 Special 
Conference of NALGO. There, an 'unholy' alliance of ‘the Trots’ and some Right 
Wing elements opposed the final recommendations for the amalgamation agreement, 
based on NALGO's 'bottom lines' of 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control' not being fully 
met (Personal experience 1988-92). It was only through the superior organisation of 
the Broad Left and selected Districts that this opposition was defeated. This defeat 
came from a position that the agreement achieved a compromise that met most of 
NALGO's objectives and that the greater importance of securing the amalgamation 
outweighed any outstanding reservations (Personal experience 1988-92).
The importance of this highly influential factional organisation for the position of the 
branch in the amalgamation was that all the factions saw 'branch autonomy' and 'lay 
control' as vital elements of any amalgamation agreement (Personal experience 
1988-92). The difference between the rival groups was over the degree of 
compromise that was acceptable in achieving that objective in the context of a 
negotiated agreement (Personal experience 1988-92). It was also essential to the 
position of branches that the factions could only operate effectively through the co­
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ordinated voting of branch delegates; that the position of branches was uppermost in 
the policy position of all factions; and that factional organisation at Annual and 
Special Conferences was eventually a pre-requisite for securing the position of the 
branch in the amalgamation.
Agreement and the local context
The amalgamation agreement that was eventually hammered out between COHSE, 
NALGO and NUPE was set out in the Final Report of the three National Executive 
Committee’s that was submitted to the 1992 Annual Conferences (COHSE-NALGO- 
NUPE 1992). Chapter 6 of this Report sets out the main elements that relate to 
branch organisation and Chapter 12 sets out those on branch resources and the 
collection of subscriptions. Briefly, these sections proposed:
• Branch boundaries based on individual employers.
• A steward-based organisation.
• A 'common' core' structure comprising:
An annual membership meeting.
A branch committee.
Branch officers - Secretary, Chairperson, Treasurer, Equalities.
• Guidelines for good branch practice.
• Rules to 'underpin the 'partnership' between branches and employed officials' 
(COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 28).
• Reimbursement of activists' expenses, including continuation of the NUPE 
system of 'commission' payments for a transitional period.
• Administrative support.
• Rules for the accountability of lay leaders to members and for members to 
raise grievances against the activities of lay leaders.
• Limited voting rights for retired members and to act as branch officers.
• Pre-amalgamation levels of branch funding to continue for existing branches.
• Merged branches to have funding no less than that previously provided.
• Central collection of subscriptions.
Table 6 sets these and certain post-amalgamation provisions against those existing 
in NALGO, and COHSE and NUPE. As Terry commented:
The model for branch organisation was very close to that existing within 
NALGO. Branches in the new union would be relatively large, well off and well
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resourced, and with considerable scope for local activity (Terry 1996: 100) 
(also see Waddington et al 2005: 168).
The aspects of the agreement that caused concern for branches were how far 
continuity with past practices would be maintained. This concern can be seen most 
clearly in the issue of branch finances. For NUPE there was the prospect of a radical 
change, from direct payments of 'commission' to local lay leaders to a system of 
payments to branches. This arrangement was very much the NALGO system of 
providing finances at local level for administration, publicity and training costs, 
including reimbursement of expenses incurred by stewards and lay branch officers. 
The problem for NUPE was a substantial loss of income for a number of lay leaders, 
which subsequently persuaded some to drop out of activity (ex-NUPE regional full­
time official interview 1999). For NALGO there was a complete change in the 
method of providing finances to branches. From one where subscription income was 
collected from employers by branches, out of which branch finance was retained 
before the balance was remitted to national level, to one where subscription income 
would be paid by employers directly to national level who then made separate 
payments to branches. This change was the subject of much debate within NALGO. 
Many lay leaders saw it as national level attempting to introduce a vehicle for 
controlling branch activity by controlling their funds. Many claimed that it represented 
a naked attack on the cherished NALGO principles of branch autonomy and lay 
control (Personal experience 1988-92; Terry 1996: 97-98). These concerns were 
never completely assuaged. To counter them the Final Report (COHSE-NALGO- 
NUPE 1992) contained the following provisions:
• A transitional period before introduction of the new system,
• A branch 'float' to ease over the transition, and most importantly
• A lay appeals committee independent of the National Executive to adjudicate 
on disputes over the operation of the system (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 
64-65).
These arrangements were eventually sufficient to secure the agreement of NALGO's 
1992 Special and Annual Conferences (Personal experience 1988-92; Terry 1996: 
97-98).
However, aside from these issues and as is evident from the comparisons in table 6, 
it was the NALGO 'form' which largely resulted from the amalgamation agreement. A
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'form' that went hand in hand with the 'character* of NALGO branches. The NALGO 
'bottom lines' of 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control' had largely been maintained in 
the amalgamation agreements relevant to the branch. As Waddington and 
colleagues (2005) remarked on the objectives of NALGO and NUPE for the 
character’ of UNISON:
Issues defined as comprising the character of the new union are not 
independent of the form adopted for the new union (Waddington et al 2005: 
165).
Post-amalgamation policies
However, the COHSE and NUPE agenda of a partnership between full-time officials 
and lay leaders and the need for the amalgamated union to be disciplined and united 
in bargaining and opposition to the Conservative government had also been 
incorporated into the agreements (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992; Terry 1996: 93-96). 
These objectives were more evident as a set of distinct policies for implementation in 
the new union than explicit issues of 'form'. Nevertheless, they also potentially 
impinged on the local union organisation. Three were particularly relevant:
• Member-Centred.
• Partnership Working.
• Proportionality and Fair Representation.
Member-Centred, and Partnership Working, were based on creating:
New kinds of relationship between the union's officials and its lay members, 
based on 'partnership', and to shift influence from the minority of union 
'activists' to the membership at large (Fryer 2000: 33).
They found their way into the Final Report in various guises. 'Member-Centred' 
appeared as:
• A Key Characteristic: 'the new union ... should be open and accessible to all 
members, not just activists' and 'its structure should be built from the 
membership upwards and the whole approach would be member-centred' 
(COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 11).
• An Aim: 'To promote and establish a member-centred union and to carry out 
and fulfil the decisions made by members in a spirit of unity and 
accountability1 (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 82).
'Partnership Working' appeared as:
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• A Key Value: 'Partnership; in which members, activists, representatives, 
officers and all staff join together in the service of the union and its agreed 
policies' (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 14).
• An Aim: 'To encourage solidarity and an effective working partnership between 
members, activists, representatives, officers and all staff in the service of the 
Union and its agreed policies' (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 82).
To the dispassionate observer these proposals might appear as laudable policies in 
tune with core trade union values of the unity and involvement of all sections of the 
union in its work and purpose (TUC 2006: 5). However, for COHSE and NUPE they 
also encapsulated their vision of an integrated and seamless relationship between 
members, lay leaders and full-time officials, where identification was with the whole 
union rather than any section of it (Fryer 2000: 39). NALGO, however, saw within 
them the potential for questioning the presence of their cherished values of 'branch 
autonomy' and 'lay control' and a thinly veiled attack on 'the activist' and the 
operation of factions (Personal experience 1988-92). Member-Centred appeared to 
deny the leadership role of members and role of 'activists' representing that within the 
union. Partnership Working also seemed to deny that control was the prerogative of 
lay members and their leaders and elevated full-time officials to a position of 
equivalence. Both policies suggested that autonomous branches and factions 
constituted alternative power bases that had no place in a union based on a 
contiguous unity through its structures, membership and full-time officials.
Proportionality and Fair Representation have already been expounded in Chapter 5 
as a policy intended to address issues of equal opportunities and heterogeneity in the 
new union (Terry 1996: 101-107; Waddington et al 2005: 168). Like Member- 
Centred and Partnership Working it made a number of appearances in the Final 
Report:
• Fair Representation: ‘In the New Union, all structures, systems of 
representation, organisation, provision of services and policies should provide 
for fair representation in the following ways:
- Fair and balanced representation from each of the three partner unions in
all initial arrangements and throughout any interim or transitional periods.
- Fair and balanced representation of the membership of the union as a
whole. This includes fair representation for women and men; black and
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white members; lesbians, gay and heterosexual members; members of all 
abilities and disabilities.
- Fair and balanced representation of members, both part-time and full-time; 
in manual and non-manual work; in different occupations and at various 
levels of authority, status, pay and position.
- Fair and balanced representation of members with different skills, 
qualifications and levels of supervisory or managerial responsibility’ 
(COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 19).
• Proportionality for women: The New Union should reflect the fact that two- 
thirds of the members will be women. ... It should aim to move towards 
proportional representation for women’ (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 19-20).
• An Aim: To promote fair representation in all the Union's structures for 
women, members of all grades, black members, members with disabilities and 
lesbians and gay men’ (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 82).
The aim of achieving Proportionality and Fair Representation 'in all the Union's 
structures' clearly included branches. Whilst legislating for the policy at national level 
was readily agreed and set out in the Final Report (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992. 37, 
46, 52-53), progressing it at regional and local level was left as more of an aspiration. 
To legislate for the introduction of such a policy in branches was even more 
problematic in the context of NALGO's principle of 'branch autonomy' (Terry 1996: 
103). The fight for equal opportunities in employment and in the union was a 
longstanding one in NALGO and within the union had seen the development of self­
organised groups as one response (Terry 1996: 102). Proportionality and Fair 
Representation had wide support as a principle but any suggestion of instructing 
branches over the issue was bound to offend branch autonomy. Waddington and 
colleagues (2005) confirmed that.
Adoption of the principles of fair representation and proportionality was 
relatively straightforward. More complicated were debates concerning the 
groups to which the principles should apply and the application of the 
principles (Waddington et al 2005: 168).
Set against NALGO's 'bottom lines', all three policies had inherent problems for their 
implementation in UNISON. Member-Centred and Partnership Working were seen 
as the antithesis of 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control’ or simply a coded attack on 
the supposed 'unrepresentativeness' of lay activists and factions. Support for the
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principles represented by Proportionality and Fair Representation could not be 
allowed to translate into a directive that undermined branch autonomy.
UNISON branches
The final influence on the presence of the branch in the UNISON amalgamation 
coming from the arrangements that were agreed prior to the formal amalgamation 
was over the migration of branches from each of the individual unions into UNISON. 
Whilst the 'form' of UNISON branches was set out in Chapter 6 of the Final Report 
(COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 25-32) and has been examined earlier in this section, 
the situation at Vesting Day on 1st July 1993 was of a conglomeration of branches 
moving from the three old unions into UNISON. There was no expectation that the 
'form' set out in Chapter 6 (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 25-32) would be present on 
that day; a period of transition would be necessary.
Chapter 6 in the Final Report laid down a Common Core of an Annual Membership 
Meeting, Branch Committee and Branch Officers that all branches had to adopt from 
Vesting Day (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 25-26). These features were familiar to 
former NALGO branches, but much less to those from COHSE and NUPE (Personal 
experience 1988-92). For the future there was to be a Flexible Framework (COHSE- 
NALGO-NUPE 1992: 27-31), but one constrained by the following provisions:
• Guidelines on good practice (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 27).
• Employer and employment based branches but with a constraint that 'a
completely permissive approach to branch structure is not advocated. There
are many compelling reasons why employer level branches should be the
norm' (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 27).
• Oversight by Regional Committees through powers delegated to them by the 
National Executive (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 28).
• 'Clear rules ... to underpin the 'partnership' between branches and the 
employed officials of the New Union' (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 28).
• Reimbursement of activists' expenses set out in the guidelines on good 
practice and protection of the current system of 'commission' payments to 
NUPE office holders for a transitional period (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 
28-29).
• Guidelines on the accountability of lay officers to lay members and procedures 
for the pursuit of grievances (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 29).
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• A recommendation that 'branches should start establishing 'shadow' New 
Union branches' (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 30).
• Limited eligibility for retired members to stand for branch officer positions 
(COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 31).
Again, there was little in the framework that went against either existing practice or 
structure of current NALGO branches apart from the envisaged rules on 'partnership' 
(Personal experience 1988-92). However, for COHSE and NUPE branches there 
was the prospect of radical changes particularly over issues like 'guidelines', 
employer-based structures, reimbursement of expenses and the loss of 'commission', 
and the eligibility of retired members to be branch officers. Compounding this 
discrepancy were the 'verbal' assurances that it appeared had been given within 
NUPE that their arrangements would continue in UNISON unless branches agreed 
otherwise (ex-NALGO national full-time official interview 1999; Personal experience 
1988-92).
The major change for NALGO branches was the change from local to central 
collection of subscriptions described earlier and set out in Chapter 12 of the Final 
Report (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 64-65). However, for the immediate 
changeover period the change was to be ameliorated by a transitional period up to 1s* 
January 1996 when the existing systems would continue unchanged (COHSE- 
NALGO-NUPE 1992: 65). Chapter 12 also set out that the current levels of branch 
resources would continue unchanged into UNISON and that:
At the time of integration, the level of funding and resource provision to an 
integrated branch will be no less than the total previously made to the merging 
branches (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 63).
Since the level of resources made directly to NALGO branches was considerably in 
excess of that made to either COHSE or NUPE branches, even when 'commission' to 
individual lay leaders was taken into account, merged branches were likely to have 
lower resources than those of NALGO (UNISON 1995a).
The transition process set up a situation where existing branches from the three 
predecessor unions could migrate into UNISON with little change to their practice, 
structures and resources. However, the Final Report was clear that the basis on 
which that took place was a temporary one. Although not completely explicit, the 
implication was for a rapid transition into UNISON branches and the 'form' of these
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branches was far closer to that of NALGO than either COHSE or NUPE. The next 
section will explore how that transition actually played out.
POST-AMALGAMATION
A UNISON regional full-time official remarked that:
Following the merger, the workerist inclinations of COHSE and NUPE came to 
the fore and the assumption of branch autonomy from NALGO also came to 
the fore. This created a kind of tension, which was based partly on reality, 
partly on perceptions and a huge distrust on both sides (ex-NUPE regional full­
time official interview 1999).
It seems clear from this comment and others that reflected a similar view (Payne 
1994, 1996; Personal experience 1993-95) that despite the investment of time, 
commitment and energy that went into the pre-amalgamation period and the 
amalgamation agreement, the early years of branch organisation in UNISON were 
likely to be difficult. In this section, the agreements and policies that came from the 
amalgamation will be examined in the circumstances of their implementation during 
this period. A period which largely influenced the 'form and character1 of UNISON 
branches as they appear today.
Post-amalgamation branches
The negotiations over the amalgamation produced a package for a model of branch 
organisation in UNISON that was very close to that in NALGO (Terry 1996: 100). 
This model was overlain with policies of Member-Centred, Partnership Working and 
Proportionality and Fair Representation. These policies partly reflected COHSE and 
NUPE's concerns for moving UNISON away from criticised NALGO practices of 
'activist leadership' and factionalism through the Member-Centred policy, and away 
from the principles 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control' through the Partnership 
Working policy (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992, Terry 1996). Whilst Proportionality 
and Fair Representation built on all three unions' agendas for equal rights and in 
NALGO, self-organisation, but could also ensure the continued presence of COHSE 
and NUPE's low paid and female membership in leadership positions (COHSE- 
NALGO-NUPE 1992; Terry 1996). These policies were more concerned with 
questions of 'character1 than 'form' and, apart from arrangements for proportional 
representation of women at national level, appeared as aspirations rather than
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agreements on 'form' in the Final Report (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992). However, 
the Final Report was much more explicit about achieving a model branch 
organisation in UNISON and clearly envisaged changes involving: the merging of 
existing branches, branch resources and the collection of subscriptions, and the 
issue of guidelines on the operation of UNISON branches (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 
1992).
Apart from the change from local to central collection of subscriptions for former- 
NALGO branches, which was incorporated into the Instrument of Amalgamation and 
UNISON'S rulebook (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 65), the new NEC was given the 
responsibility for implementing the branch model set out in the Final Report (COHSE- 
NALGO-NUPE 1992). A Code of Good Branch Practice (UNISON 2003) brought 
together the guidelines variously referred to in the Final Report and will be reviewed 
shortly in the section concerned with implementation of the model. However, 
implementing those parts of the model that involved merging branches and branch 
resources was much more problematic (Personal experience 1993-95, ex-NALGO 
national full-time official interview 1999; UNISON 1996).
Branches had migrated into UNISON unchanged. A tiny number merged at or soon 
after Vesting Day but the large majority did not attempt to change their situation 
(UNISON 1996). Despite the claimed benefits of creating a single united voice with 
the employer there were in practice a set of disincentives from the amalgamation or 
local circumstances that prevented voluntary moves to achieve the model of branch 
organisation envisaged by the amalgamation.
• Dealing with personal power and position.
• Fear of take-over.
• Fear of loss of members and loss of activists.
• Fear of loss of commission and honoraria.
• Fear of having to represent other grades of staff.
• Political problems with both a big P and a small p.
• Loss of facility time as the employer rationalised on a new merged branch.
• Some branches resisting central collection of subscriptions (UNISON 1996). 
There was an end date of 1s* January 1996 for the change to central collection of 
subscriptions and the system of commission payments to former-NUPE branch 
officers, but introducing a common branch funding system and creating model
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UNISON branches had no such time limit. The Flexible Framework (COHSE- 
NALGO-NUPE 1992: 27-31) was clearly making only small inroads into achieving the 
objective. Those few branches which had merged and were complying with the 
model found that the funding provisions in the Final Report penalised their resources 
when compared to the unmerged situation, compounding this hesitancy over branch 
merger (UNISON 1995a: 31-33).
Branch mergers
Within the UNISON NEC, amongst those associated with the former NALGO Broad 
Left, there was also a developing view that unless branches merged on the basis 
outlined in the Final Report, UNISON would be stillborn as an integrated union and 
develop in many locations as more of an umbrella organisation (Personal experience 
1993-95). Since effective local union organisation was the foundation of the whole 
union (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992: 25-32) that had to be functioning on a UNISON 
basis for the whole edifice to achieve its objectives (Personal experience 1993-95). 
There was an awareness of the slow progress with branches merging (UNISON 
1996) and the deep-seated problems between individual branches and local lay 
leaders in many of the largest concentrations of membership. The considered view 
was that the Flexible Framework and voluntary initiative set out in the Final Report 
(COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992. 27-31) was unlikely to achieve a common UNISON 
branch structure in the near future (Personal experience 1993-95). Compulsion to 
merge was the only viable option. A successful motion to the 1994 Annual 
Conference on Funding of UNISON Branches (UNISON 1995a: 31-32) raised 
concerns over disparate funding of branches when branch mergers had only 
occurred on a piecemeal basis and asked for a comprehensive review of branch 
funding on the basis of completing all outstanding branch mergers within a strict 
timescale. The motion provided the opportunity to produce a NEC report and 
recommendations to the 1995 Annual Conference setting out a common basis for 
branch funding but one that was only achievable based on a strict timetable for 
completing the branch merger programme (UNISON 1995a). Whilst there was a 
well-argued case for making the application of common funding dependent on the 
completion of branch mergers, those on the NEC looking to consolidate the UNISON 
model of branch organisation throughout the union could also see the report 
achieving their objectives (Personal experience 1993-95).
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The NEC report on Branch Funding to the 1995 Annual Conference (UNISON 1995a) 
made a number of recommendations that collectively endorsed the model of branch 
organisation set out in the Final Report and established a timetable for its 
achievement. The principal recommendations were:
• A common system of branch funding to apply in full from 1st January 1998.
• A wide range of activities, costs and expenses to be met from branch funds.
• All branches to merge no later than 1st January 1997.
• All existing arrangements for remission, commission and expenses payments 
from national level in respect of branch expenditure to cease with effect from 
1st January 1997.
• Each UNISON branch to submit an Annual Return in respect of branch income 
and expenditure.
• Penalties for failure to submit the Return.
• Merged branches entitled to create branch levies for purposes approved by 
the National Executive (UNISON 1995a: 3-7).
In effect, with the approval of these recommendations the 1995 Annual Conference 
endorsed a system of branch funding, purposes for which it could be used, a 
requirement for an Annual Return and a facility for branch levies that all mirrored the 
funding and practice of former NALGO branches. In addition, the system of funding 
and reimbursing expenses used in COHSE and NUPE would cease. The report 
argued that these changes would only be possible, in the context of the finances of 
the whole union, if ail branches were merged on the same timescale (UNISON 
1995a: 25-26). Those merged branches would be employer-based with large 
memberships, considerable resources and a large level of autonomy, a model 
familiar to those from former NALGO (Terry 1996: 100). Within a short two years of 
Vesting Day the UNISON Annual Conference had adopted an essentially NALGO 
'form' of branch organisation and consigned the branches of COHSE and NUPE to 
history.
Approving motions at Annual Conference is one thing, implementing them in 
branches quite another. Faced with the resistance and issues illustrated earlier 
alongside the decisions of Annual Conference, strategies had to be developed at 
national and regional level to ensure implementation was completed within the laid 
down timetable (UNISON 1996). In essence, implementation involved national co­
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ordination of the process with regions responsible for dealing with individual branch 
mergers.
Some lay leaders in unmerged former COHSE and NUPE branches had already 
seen the issue of the Code of Good Practice (UNISON 2003) as indicating a NALGO 
take-over. The Code contained sections providing for such issues as:
• Communication with full-time officials.
• Dealing with members.
• Achieving proportionality and fair representation.
• Organising at local level.
• Branch structures.
• Branch officers.
• Branch administration and finance.
• Branch rulebook.
These provisions represented a bureaucracy at the local level unknown in COHSE 
and NUPE. Their branches had simply relied on the union rulebook to govern their 
affairs. Now, within the first year of UNISON, they were being expected to comply 
with a booklet of 101 pages that laid down every aspect of their branches’ operation 
(Personal experience 1993-95). Although not mandatory, it was a NALGO take-over 
when most were still operating as pre-amalgamation COHSE and NUPE branches. 
For former NALGO branches attuned to branch rulebooks, committee structures, 
officer groups and responsibility for a considerable level of administration and 
finance, the Code merely translated their existing practice into UNISON terms.
The Code also contained recommendations for the application of the policies on 
Proportionality and Fair Representation and Partnership Working within branches 
and promoted the policy of UNISON as a Member-Centred union (UNISON 2003). 
However, there was no absolute requirement on branches to implement these 
measures in circumstances where finding individuals of any definition to take on 
leadership roles at local level was already becoming difficult (UNISON 2003).
However, the decisions on central collection of subscriptions (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 
1992) and branch mergers and branch funding (UNISON 1995a) were mandatory. 
There remained some resistance to the introduction of central collection within former 
NALGO branches (UNISON 1996; ex-NALGO national full-time official interview
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1999). However, the intense debate over the issue within NALGO prior to the 
amalgamation did seem to have exhausted the protagonists and the cocktail of 
safeguards built into the amalgamation agreement satisfied most of their concerns 
(Terry 1996: 97-98; Personal experience 1988-92). It was a fait accompli and had to 
be accommodated in a context that clearly favoured the NALGO model of branch 
organisation (Terry 1996: 100). The decisions on branch mergers and branch 
funding at the 1995 Annual Conference (UNISON 1995a) only went to confirm the 
dominance of this model in UNISON. In essence, therefore, implementing these 
decisions was non-controversial for former NALGO branches. For numbers of former 
COHSE and NUPE branches, however, merging branches and radical changes to 
branch funding confirmed the concerns already aroused from the introduction of the 
Code of Good Branch Practice (Payne 1996; Personal experience 1993-95; UNISON 
1996; ex-NALGO national full-time official, ex-NUPE regional full-time official, ex- 
NALGO and ex-NUPE local lay officer interviews 1999). In a number of large local 
authorities, particularly those in metropolitan areas, this perception of take-over was 
in the context of a long history of rivalry, distrust and mutual antipathy between a 
single employer-based NALGO branch and one or more NUPE branches (Payne 
1996; Personal experience 1993-95, UNISON 1996; ex-NALGO national full-time 
official, ex-NUPE regional full-time official, ex-NALGO and ex-NUPE local lay officer 
interviews 1999).
Some saw real advantages for local union organisation in the change, not as a 
specifically ‘NALGO’ model but for its intrinsic benefits. Those from COHSE and 
NUPE would find the greater resources and autonomy available in the model 
considerably enhanced their ability to provide a better service for their members and 
that:
Would be a revelation to people who’d run their office out of their back room 
(ex-NALGO national full-time official interview 1999).
There was an overall benefit for local organisation from extending the advantages of 
well-organised and well-resourced former NALGO branches into UNISON. As 
expressed by a regional full-time official commenting that:
There was a streak of organisation that ran through NALGO, which was a 
really welcome addition to UNISON because by and large ... COHSE and 
NUPE were a mess organisationally (ex-NUPE regional full-time official 
interview 1999).
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The whole post-amalgamation process of taking what sometimes appeared as 
aspirations for UNISON’S ‘character’ and piecemeal elements of a complete package 
for branch organisation from the Final Report (COHSE-NALGO-NUPE 1992) to 
implementation in local union organisations was mediated through the presence and 
activity of leaders at local, regional and national level. The role and influence of 
these individuals had different emphases but were often interrelated and 
interdependent. Lay leaders were present at all three levels of organisation and 
some individuals combined roles in all of these levels. Full-time officials in leadership 
positions were present at regional and national levels. It is important to recognise 
that full-time officials and lay leaders have different relationships with the union and 
their role and influence is partly conditioned by these relationships. As employees, 
full-time officials are subject to the usual constraints of the employment relationship 
(Kelly & Heery 1994). Whatever their role and influence in the development of policy 
and agreements on the amalgamation once decisions had been taken their role 
became one of implementing those decisions and was particularly the case with 
seeking to ensure the success of the amalgamation and the process of merging 
branches. For lay leaders implementing Annual Conference decisions, such as that 
on branch mergers and funding, had to be completed through the crucible of informal 
and formal local democracy (Undy et al 1981: 38-41). When that often involved lay 
leaders in a number of branches from the former unions the tensions between 
conference decisions, personal positions, inter-branch rivalry and internal branch 
organisation, became an all too ready source of obstruction and manipulation. 
Implementation would involve detailed and difficult negotiation against the backdrop 
of a strict timescale imposed by conference decision.
The UNISON branch
These processes of change were played out at the local level. The local UNISON 
case initially presented all the characteristics of a problematic branch merger (Payne 
1996). There were four former NUPE branches and one much larger former NALGO 
branch, a history of rivalry and hostility between the branches, separate negotiating 
forums with the employer, the presence of powerful lay leaders in each branch and 
personal antipathy between certain of these individuals (Payne 1996). However, by 
the time of the interviews for the case study the merger of these branches had been
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completed and the lay leaders were able to reflect on their own and other leaders’ 
roles and influence in the process and the outcome which had been achieved.
For all these leaders the merger of their branches to create a single employer-based 
UNISON branch had been a difficult and at times traumatic experience (ex-NALGO, 
ex-NUPE local lay officer interviews 1999). However, despite this recent history, they 
all had positive views of the benefits gained from the newly merged branch (ex- 
NALGO, ex-NUPE local lay officer interviews 1999). Former NUPE leaders identified 
an increase in bargaining strength through the presence of a single large voice and 
the employer no longer being able to patronise the small former NUPE branches (ex- 
NUPE local lay leader interviews 1999). For former NALGO lay leaders it was more 
a question of former NUPE gaining the benefits already enjoyed by NALGO, one 
seeing it as:
A higher profile in joining a bigger organisation (ex-NALGO local lay leader 
interview 1999).
Two results of the branch merger were particularly noticeable. First, there was the 
continued presence of lay leaders from the former individual branches and second, a 
continuation of organisational forms from the former NALGO branch. Continuing the 
presence of lay leaders from the former branches was seen by former NALGO lay 
leaders as enabling the merger to take place, by assuring these powerful individuals 
of a continued role in the merged branch and securing their support and participation 
in the merger (ex-NALGO local lay leader interview 1999). It also gave reassurance 
to members over the merger that their lay leaders would continue to have an 
important role in the new branch (ex-NALGO local lay leader interview 1999). This 
outcome is reflected in a former NALGO lay leader remarking that:
Generally, we went out of our way to accommodate those people in the hope 
that we would be seen to be inclusive and that would reflect back through 
them to the membership, who would see that their former senior officers had 
been accommodated in the new organisation (ex-NALGO local lay leader 
interview 1999).
The same lay leader went on to comment that:
What NALGO had built itself into lent itself nicely to take on board these other 
unions, form UNISON and give them the benefit of the strong NALGO 
structure. ... [Former NUPE stewards had] taken on board the NALGO way
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of doing things. There were now stewards committees in all areas and regular 
JNCs reporting to the Branch Committee. Very much ... the NALGO model ... 
[They have] recognised they are part of a bigger organisation with the benefits 
that brings especially in terms of communication and they have been well on 
board in their trade union activity (ex-NALGO local lay leader interview 1999). 
These somewhat patronising remarks toward former NUPE branches and their lay 
leaders suggest that for former NALGO local lay leaders it was not the merger as 
such which had led to the benefits, but the continued presence and expansion of an 
essentially NALGO model of branch organisation.
Former NUPE local lay leaders saw the virtual disappearance of their organisational 
forms and, at least for some lay leaders, the danger of a diminished presence for 
former NUPE low paid manual workers in the new branch. As one former NUPE lay 
leader commented:
I was concerned that manual workers would lose their identity and status 
underneath the branch merger. They would probably be swallowed up by the 
APT&C staff (ex-NUPE local lay leader interview 1999).
The policy on Fair Representation was often appropriated in these interviews as a 
justification for the continued presence of former NUPE lay leaders, thus ensuring the 
voice of manual workers continued to be heard in the new branch. The difficulties for 
former NUPE lay leaders can be seen in the difficulty of reconciling the role and 
status of a former NUPE lay leader in the merged branch with that individual’s own 
aspirations. Partly the situation can be seen as a straightforward power struggle but 
at another level, it also reflected the loss of those organisational forms that had 
provided this lay leader with their role and status. As another former NUPE lay 
leader commented:
He could not take in that we were merged; he still wanted to run his own little 
area as though he was running it before (ex-NUPE local lay leader interview 
1999).
Significantly, the situation was ultimately resolved through a decision of the Branch 
Committee that the branch structure had to incorporate all sections of the branch. 
Following this decision, the lay leader resigned from their branch officer position and 
subsequently took early retirement (ex-NUPE local lay leader interview 1999).
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Within this maelstrom of accommodating individual lay leaders, merging branches 
and implementing new processes for branch funding and the collection of 
subscriptions, the other policies coming from the amalgamation were sidelined. As 
will be discussed later, UNISON was transformed into a ‘member-led’ union at the 
first Annual Conference (Fryer 2000: 37; Terry 1996: 108). However symbolic the 
leader-led’ and ‘member-led’ labels were of particular concepts of union organisation 
and the relative influence and control exercised by members, lay leaders and full-time 
officials, their relevance to local union activity was little acknowledged (Payne 1996; 
ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE local lay leader interviews 1999). The close interaction 
between members and local lay leaders in the case study branch provided a synergy 
between it being 'centred on' or 'led by' members; they were synonymous. A former 
NUPE lay leader encapsulated the relationship in this way.
Everybody thinks they are part of the union. Before they were just thinking, 
well I pay my subs, so what, because I have had to. Now, they pay it because 
they want to. ...They are involved because we send them information and 
they are involved because it allows them to talk to us (ex-NUPE local lay 
leader interview 1999).
Partnership Working between lay leaders and full-time officials also seemed to have 
little connection with the local relationship between them. This dimension was much 
more conditioned by the skills and personality of individuals than any notions of 
change in the modalities of the relationship (Payne 1996; ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE local 
lay leader interviews 1999). Equally, Proportionality and Fair Representation had 
little purchase on branch organisation. Fair Representation was utilised to justify the 
continued presence of former NUPE lay leaders as representative of the voice of 
manual members and Proportionality was portrayed as the increased presence of 
female lay leaders (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE local lay leader interviews 1999). 
However, there had been no progress toward a systematic implementation of the 
policies within the branch. This failure is not to suggest any incidence of outright 
hostility to these policies. It was more that their relevance to the local level was 
either limited in the context of relationships between members, local lay leaders and 
full-time officials or impractical when set against the limited numbers of members 
prepared to take on leadership roles (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE local lay leader 
interviews 1999).
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The activity of local lay leaders was mainly concentrated at a local level. As one lay 
leader remarked over the requirement for branches to merge, the view of the national 
leadership over any difficulties experienced by branches in the process appeared to 
be:
That it had got to happen, so get there and if you can get there in as good a 
shape as you can manage, then god bless (ex-NALGO local lay leader 
interview 1999).
Once the requirement for branch mergers was visited on branches, the involvement 
and influence of local lay leaders became deep and ongoing. Now the amalgamation 
was a ‘real’ event affecting ‘real’ people. For the case study branch, the only 
involvement in the process from the wider union was from the regional full-time 
official and that role was largely one of cajoling the different branches and individuals 
into accepting and then shaping the merger (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE local lay leader 
interviews 1999). National lay leaders and full-time officials were seen as completely 
absent from the process (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE local lay leader interviews 1999). It 
was up to local lay leaders to engineer the merger and see the formation of a 
successful UNISON branch.
It did appear that it was the ‘form and character5 of the former NALGO branch 
organisation which was dominant in the merged branch. However, its benefits of 
bargaining strength, resources and strong organisation appealed to those from 
former NUPE despite any residual problems of under-representation and 
influence of manual worker members. The other dominant feature of the branch 
was the continued presence of lay leaders previously present in NALGO and 
NUPE. Although there had been some loss of lay representatives from both 
previous unions following the merger, most of those active at a senior level 
continued. It seemed that these lay leaders were ready to work within new 
UNISON policies or work with those from the other union to implement them. 
Without that level of co-operation, it seems doubtful that the merger could have 
been a success, providing evidence of the crucial contribution made by lay 
leaders to union activity at local level.
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The wider union
In the wider union, the UNISON NEC reported in 1995 that:
There is a serious risk of under-representation of certain key groups in 
UNISON. These are particularly:
a) Manual workers generally
b) Male manual workers in particular
c) Women, especially in representative positions
d) Black workers (UNISON 1995b: 43)
In terms of membership of the predecessor unions, the first two groups were 
concentrated in COHSE and NUPE and, whilst all the unions had a majority 
female membership, those in COHSE and NUPE were predominately low-paid 
and often occupied part-time jobs. Proportionality and Fair Representation had 
been partly designed to secure representation for these groups and this report 
illustrated the difficulty in promoting that objective throughout the union. National 
and regional full-time officials both regretted that the amalgamation and the 
merging of branches had resulted in a loss of COHSE and NUPE local lay leaders 
(UNISON 1995b). Their view was that this outcome was partly attributable to 
branches in UNISON being much closer to the NALGO model and alienating 
some former COHSE and NUPE local lay leaders. These leaders either did not 
agree with the changes or found it difficult to deal with the associated increase in 
bureaucracy (ex-NALGO national full-time official, ex-NALGO and ex-NUPE 
regional full-time official interviews 1999).
The role and influence of national and regional full-time officials in the post­
amalgamation period in relation to the branch was particularly focused on 
achieving implementation of the amalgamation agreements and the subsequent 
Annual Conference decision on branch mergers and branch funding (UNISON 
1996). National full-time officials were mainly concerned with setting the 
framework for this process and monitoring its achievement (UNISON 1996). It fell 
to regional full-time officials to work with individual groups of branches in 
achieving this objective.
A particular problem for regional full-time officials was resistance from some long­
standing lay leaders who saw the policies in the amalgamation agreement, and 
particularly that for branch mergers, adversely affecting their positions and power
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(ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE regional full-time official interviews 1999). Dealing with 
that and the personal animosities between individuals in the context of the policy 
on branch mergers had been difficult (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE regional full-time 
official interviews 1999). In practice, they had largely been overcome through 
growing familiarity or the departure of individual lay leaders (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE 
regional full-time official interviews 1999). They also took the view that there was 
a degree of inflexibility endemic to branch organisation that was resistant to 
change (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE regional full-time official interviews 1999). Since 
the model of branch organisation was largely a NALGO one this resistance 
tended to be concentrated on former COHSE and NUPE branches and their lay 
leaders (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE regional full-time official interviews 1999). 
Accommodating these individuals in lay leadership positions within the new 
merged branches was an effective strategy for ameliorating some of this 
resistance (ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE regional full-time official interviews 1999).
Overall, national and regional full-time officials took a straightforward view of 
implementing the amalgamation within branches. For them the problems associated 
with the branch merger process came down to personality clashes, loss of lay 
leadership positions and power struggles. 'Getting the job done' took precedence 
over any underlying issues in the amalgamation. Achieving that imperative might 
involve dealing with a range of post-amalgamation administrative problems, ensuring 
branch mergers were completed, seeking to maintain lay leaders and representatives 
at a local level or working on everyday issues of negotiation and representation. 
UNISON was a reality; the 'job in hand' was to make it work. Their responses 
reflected an environment of practical problems and the imperative of finding solutions 
to them, whether associated with the amalgamation or ongoing issues of industrial 
relations.
What was the 'form and character* of UNISON branches after implementation of the 
agreements and policies from the amalgamation and the subsequent decisions which 
they generated? 'Form' was the dominant point of negotiation in reaching the 
amalgamation agreement (Fryer 2000: 33-34), and for branch organisation the 
agreement resulted in a model far more redolent of NALGO than either COHSE or 
NUPE (Terry 1996: 100). The subsequent decisions on the Code of Good Branch 
Practice (UNISON 2003), a timetable for branch mergers and a common method of
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branch funding (UNISON 1995a) confirmed and implemented that 'form'. However, 
implicit in that 'form' was the 'character1 of branch organisation, epitomised by the 
principles of 'branch autonomy' and 'lay control' heavily promoted by former NALGO 
as their 'bottom lines' in the negotiations over the amalgamation (Personal 
experience 1988-92; Terry 1996: 94-97). In UNISON, this outcome produced: 
Participative and relatively autonomous branch forms of organisation, 
supported by full-time officials but not controlled by such officials (Fairbrother 
2000a: 61).
Both the 'form' and 'character* of NALGO branch organisation, one that was heavily 
redolent of the ‘member-led’ form of unionism (Fairbrother 2000a), had been 
relatively successfully replicated in UNISON.
Waddington and colleagues (2005) remarked that:
Tension between centralisation and decentralisation was central to the merger 
negotiations [and] continued long after the settlement of the merger agreement 
(Waddington e ta !2005: 213, 214).
They went on to comment further that:
The tension between leadership and activists was marked in the UNISON 
merger process. This tension, however, was not between leaders and 
activists of one union, but between leaders of NUPE and activists from 
NALGO (Waddington et al 2005: 227).
Setting these remarks against the preceding description of the UNISON 
amalgamation it can be seen that centralisation and decentralisation translate as 
leader-led’ and ‘member-led’ forms of unionism (Fairbrother 2000a) confirming the 
centrality of that debate in the amalgamation, whilst the tension between leaders of 
NUPE and activists from NALGO places NUPE as ‘leader-led’ and NALGO as 
member-led’. The evidence suggests that a ‘member-led’ form of unionism came to 
predominate in UNISON. This form was more redolent of NALGO than NUPE and, 
by inference, COHSE. The tensions arising from bureaucratic tendencies identified 
by Hyman (1979, 1989, 2001), those between leaders and members and between 
local, regional and national levels of organisation, are more conducive to a ‘leader- 
led’ form where leaders at all levels are consolidated in positions of power at the 
expense of member self-activity. In UNISON, it seems that despite the presence of 
bureaucratic practice in all three of the predecessor unions, the presence of a 
resilient ‘member-led’ form of unionism in one outweighed those malign influences.
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Two events subsequent to the amalgamation illustrate how 'form and character1 in 
terms of branch autonomy and lay control, and a ‘member-led’ form of unionism, 
continued to resonate with other interpretations in the form of Member-Centred and 
Partnership in the formative years of UNISON. First was the rule change at the first 
UNISON Annual Conference in 1994 when the description of UNISON as 'member- 
centred' was changed to 'member-led' (Fryer 2000: 37; Terry 1996: 108). Requiring 
a two-thirds majority to succeed, this change had to garner support from across the 
constituent parts of the union. It could not be said to be a solely former NALGO 
issue, even though they were the prime movers in the campaign for the change 
(Fryer 2000: 37, Personal experience 1993-95). As Fryer remarked:
This apparently simple, even innocuous and almost self-evident shift of 
vocabulary in a trade union, touched deep into the intended identity and 
character of UNISON. ... It added up to a notable change of philosophy and 
orientation (Fryer 2000: 37).
For branches, and particularly those who continued to be dominated by former 
NALGO lay leaders, the change appeared to cement in the rules of the union 
principles of lay control and by extension branch autonomy, and a ‘member-led’ 
form of unionism.
Such perceptions fed directly into the second event, that of the National Executive 
suspending the Birmingham Branch and taking disciplinary action against 
individual local leaders in 1998 and 1999 (Birmingham UNISON Branch 1999; 
Carter & Poynter 1999: 505-506; Rogers 1998, ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE regional 
full-time official and local lay leader interviews 1999). The ostensible issues 
around these events was the presence and influence of members of the Socialist 
Workers Party (SWP) in local lay leadership positions and the activities of the 
Campaign for a Fighting and Democratic Union (CFDU), a faction largely 
organised by the Socialist Party (see UNISON 1997 for a report to the UNISON 
NEC on the CFDU) (Birmingham UNISON Branch 1999; Carter & Poynter 1999: 
505-506; Rogers 1998; ex-NALGO, ex-NUPE regional full-time official and local 
lay leader interviews 1999). All were accused of infiltrating branches, and 
subverting and openly organising opposition to union policy (Birmingham UNISON 
Branch 1999; Carter & Poynter 1999: 505-506; Rogers 1998; ex-NALGO, ex- 
NUPE regional full-time official and local lay leader interviews 1999). Whether
191
credible or upheld such activities were anathema to those from former COHSE 
and NUPE whereas they were endemic in parts of former NALGO. However, the 
action taken also had a much wider relevance to the principles and now union rule 
of UNISON being a 'member-led' union. In this construction, it was up to the 
membership to elect its leaders. Individual candidates were eligible for election 
whatever their membership of particular political parties or factions and the 
national leadership should not take action against them because of that 
membership. The former NALGO principles of branch autonomy and lay control, 
now enshrined in the UNISON rulebook as a 'member-led' union, established 
those parameters and an ex-NALGO local lay leader encapsulated this 'character1 
as:
Within those [union rules], they should be allowed to do what they do to the 
best of their ability and not be constrained by other agendas. In this case, the 
views of the NEC. That's the name of the game isn't it, in UNISON. It's 
member-led and the membership, in my view, should have the paramount 
decision, not the NEC trying to stop them being active in whichever area they 
want to be (ex-NALGO local lay leader interview 1999).
Thus, ‘member-led’ also implied a continuation of some of the factionalism of the 
past.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 5 showed that the period of debate, negotiation and agreement leading to 
the formal amalgamation of UNISON often revolved around questions of 'form'. 
Those on 'character* proved to be appreciably more thorny to approach and all too 
easily degenerated into coded language and labels such as 'member-led' and 'officer 
or leader-led' unions, 'indiscipline', 'factional conduct' and 'branch autonomy'. Most of 
this activity appeared to take place at the level of the NEC, Annual Conference and 
the national negotiating team for the amalgamation, and suggested a top-down 
process. The result was that the local level grappled with imposed policies from the 
amalgamation over which they had no influence and which may have had little 
relevance to their experience of union activity.
Yet the pre-amalgamation debates and the post-amalgamation experience of the 
local union organisation suggest that the working through of amalgamation at their
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level benefited their operation and favoured the ’member-led’ unionism of one 
predecessor union (NALGO) over the other two. To understand this apparent 
dichotomy between a top-down process producing results sought from the bottom-up 
it is necessary to draw together the amalgamation process within a framework of 
'form and character*. In this way the amalgamation, the role of leaders and the 
emergent policies from the amalgamation in relation to the local level can be seen as 
an integrated reflection of the ‘member-led/leader-led’ unionism of the predecessor 
unions. How these influences played out can be illuminated by utilising the 
mechanics of the amalgamation process, the presence of leaders and factions, the 
heterogeneity of membership, the agreed policies for the amalgamation, and the 
migration of local union organisation.
Taking these issues in reverse order enables this discussion to concentrate on the 
local level. The branch merger process and establishing of branch funding 
arrangements can be seen as a seamless progression through the pre-amalgamation 
negotiations, post-amalgamation decisions on implementation and their introduction 
at local level. Pre-amalgamation the debates over branch funding were as much 
concerned with 'character1 in the preservation of NALGO ideas of 'branch autonomy' 
and 'lay control' (or ‘member-led’) as they were with the 'form' of its future operation. 
Whilst the commitment to branch boundaries based on single employers again 
cemented an essentially NALGO 'form' it also pre-figured large, well-resourced 
branches with high levels of autonomy. Although there was to be a transitional 
period when the pre-amalgamation arrangements would continue unchanged, the 
inevitable consequence of these agreements was the post-amalgamation process of 
branch merger on 'forms' analogous to those of NALGO. This outcome was despite 
any loose assurances given to former COHSE and NUPE branches that the 
transitional period, and post-amalgamation decisions on implementation, would 
protect their positions. These assurances were partly responsible for the majority of 
the difficulties with implementation being concerned with reconciling local lay leaders 
from COHSE and NUPE to the change. Meanwhile, former NALGO lay leaders 
experienced an organisationally straightforward transition.
Although much promoted in the pre-amalgamation period as innovative policies 
marking out UNISON as distinct from its predecessors, Member-Centred, Partnership 
Working, and Proportionality and Fair Representation were curious amalgams of
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'form' and 'character* which largely withered in the context of branch activity. 
Member-Centred and Partnership, were laudable concepts to sign up to: Who could 
object to seeing members as the focus of the union's activity and working alongside 
others committed to the same objectives and principles as you? All too easily, 
however, that aspiration fell foul of the ‘member-led/leader-led’ debate. Some lay 
leaders in NALGO saw the proposals as thinly veiled attempts to wrest control away 
from those seen by COHSE, and particularly NUPE, as undisciplined members of 
political factions who were unrepresentative of the membership. Inevitably, these 
constructions were caricatures but were strongly held beliefs by those on either side 
of the debate. The responses of lay leaders showed divided opinion over the relative 
failure to progress these policies. Full-time officials at national and regional level 
regretted the failure and placed the difficulties mainly with ex-NALGO lay leaders. 
These policies had little resonance at local level where the relationship between lay 
leaders and members were already very close and that with full-time officials far more 
conditioned by the personal attributes of individuals than any policy directive.
Proportionality and Fair Representation also had twin personalities. The stated 
principle appealed to most, that countering the problems of integrating a 
heterogeneous membership in the life of the union ('character') could in part be 
achieved by mechanisms ('form') ensuring the proportionate representation within the 
union of the various sections of members. However, the policy could also be seen, 
and was openly acknowledged by some, as a bulwark against domination of UNISON 
by the well-educated, articulate and (occasionally) politically motivated lay leaders of 
NALGO. To be achieved by ensuring the presence of low paid and predominately 
female lay leaders from COHSE and NUPE at the various levels of organisation. The 
implication was that without this presence there was a danger of the NALGO 
'member-led' form of unionism becoming the de facto writ of UNISON. However, 
implementation of the policy was a top-down process, first affecting elections to the 
National Executive and delegates to Annual Conference, then membership of 
Regional Committees, but hardly impinging on representative and lay leadership 
positions at local level. Those at national and regional levels saw the policy as an 
important building block for a different model of unionism. However, at the local level 
the pragmatic demands of securing the branch merger had overtaken it. Formal 
implementation had largely been ignored, and the responses of those from former
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NUPE betrayed an attitude more concerned with countering the presence of those 
from former NALGO than the innate principles of the policy.
The presence and influence of factions was a feature of the amalgamation for former 
NALGO lay leaders, although largely confined to NALGO's internal debate. Their 
presence at local level appeared patchy, non-existent at the case study but the 
progenitor of the suspension of the Birmingham Branch. Nevertheless, that 
suspension evidenced in microcosm the wider incidence of the debate over branch 
autonomy within a ‘member-led’ union and the continued presence of a 'character' 
more associated with NALGO than COHSE or NUPE. Certainly, the responses from 
former NALGO lay leaders at all levels implied support for ‘branch autonomy’ 
(particularly from local lay leaders) and ‘lay control’. The presence of factions can be 
code for the presence of a NALGO 'member-led' unionism that encouraged and 
facilitated internal dissent and debate and decentralised government, and provided 
the resources for autonomous branch activity. Whilst these features were evident 
within the formal structures of NALGO, it also allowed the development of informal 
forms of organisation, most evident as organised factions. Their influence in 
NALGO's internal debate over the amalgamation and NALGO's negotiating stance 
with the other unions was a pointer to the agreements and policies that created 
UNISON.
The long pre-amalgamation gestation of UNISON was a decision taken at national 
level. However, its long-term effect for local level can be seen as allowing for 
extended debates and eventual agreements and policies largely concerned with 
questions of 'form', 'form' which contained an implicit acceptance of a largely NALGO 
form of unionism. A form that centred on a high level of branch autonomy, strong 
branch organisation and resources to facilitate those practices, and a cadre of lay 
leaders to ensure its operation. These practices had been replicated in UNISON. 
The implication is that whatever the actual level of involvement local lay leaders had 
in the pre-amalgamation period, these parameters of 'form and character1 about 
branch operation were the ones being promoted by NALGO and which largely 
transferred into UNISON.
This chapter has concentrated on UNISON and the presence of the branch in 
UNISON. By considering the position of the branch from perspectives at national,
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regional and local levels, a more integrated and mutually dependent picture of the 
presence of the local level in the process of amalgamation has become apparent. 
Embedding the analysis within a framework of 'form and character' and ‘member- 
led/leader-led’ forms of unionism has enabled this connectivity to become apparent 
and has also facilitated tracing the progress of the local level through the 
amalgamation and seeing it as an integral part of the process, both reflecting and 
influencing its outcome.
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Chapter 8
UNIFI
A UNION FOR THE FINANCE INDUSTRY
The UNIFI amalgamation took place in 1999, eleven years after that of MSF and six 
after that of UNISON. In contrast to the internecine confrontation of the early years of 
MSF and the intense debate over the terms of the amalgamation within and between 
the partner unions to UNISON, an appearance of amicable agreement between the 
parties marked the UNIFI amalgamation. Given the history of mutual animosity and 
rivalry between the unions involved in the amalgamation, such an outcome might 
seem remarkable. This chapter will unpick the underlying tensions that were 
successfully overcome in the amalgamation process and show how that was 
achieved.
The unions involved in the amalgamation were very different to each other. NWSA 
and UNiFI (Barclays) had developed from the staff associations of the NatWest and 
Barclays Banks respectively and continued to organise solely in those institutions. 
BIFU, in contrast, was an established trade union and organised in most financial 
institutions. The important structural distinction at local level was that NWSA and 
UNiFI (Barclays) had no branch structure whereas BIFU did. There was a high level 
of national bargaining in the finance industry, conducted either by their National 
Committees in NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) or by semi-autonomous National 
Institution Committees in BIFU (Blackburn 1967: 81-111). It will be argued that these 
structural distinctions did not diminish the centrality of the local level in the UNIFI 
amalgamation.
The concept of unionism which is endemic to research on the development of the 
unions involved in the UNIFI amalgamation (for example Blackburn 1967: 18-19, Gall 
1997: 219, Gall 2001: 356, Morris et al 2001: 242, Wills 1996: 363) is that of 
unionateness’. First developed by Blackburn and Prandy (1965) unionateness was
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‘a measure of the commitment of a body to the general principles and ideology of 
trade unionism’ (Blackburn & Prandy 1965:112) and comprised seven elements:
1. Whether a given body declares itself a trade union,
2. Whether it is registered as a trade union,
3. Whether it is affiliated to the TUC,
4. Whether it is affiliated to the Labour Party,
5. Whether it is independent of employers for purposes of negotiation,
6. Whether it regards collective bargaining and the protection of the interests 
of members, as employees, as a major function, and
7. Whether it is prepared to be militant, using all forms of industrial action that 
may be effective (Blackburn & Prandy 1965: 112).
Blackburn showed a marked distinction between BIFU’s high level of unionateness 
and the lower levels of the staff associations (Blackburn 1967: 79-111). A theme 
running through subsequent research is the increasing unionateness of NWSA and 
UNiFI (Barclays) and a consequent closing of that gap (Gall 2001: 356).
In common with the work of Carter (1991) on the MSF merger, a major problem with
the academic research on the UNIFI merger (Dempsey 2004, Morris et al 2001, 
Sayce 1999) is an almost complete absence of consideration of the position of the 
local context within the process. For Dempsey (2004), UNIFI is one of four case 
studies on union mergers concentrated on the role of full-time managers in the 
process, whilst Sayce (1999) is more concerned with the historical development of 
trade unionism in the banking industry with the UNIFI amalgamation as the 
culmination of that process. Morris and colleagues (2001) are primarily concerned 
with the UNIFI amalgamation but their focus is very much on relations between BIFU, 
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) as organisational entities. Macroeconomic influences 
such as changes in employment patterns and bargaining are considered, alongside 
the part played by national leaders in bringing the parties together. The position of 
the workplace is noticeably absent from these studies.
PRE-AMALGAMATION
BIFU, NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) all organised employees in the finance industry 
and particularly in the banking sector. As such, their membership characteristics 
were far closer than in the partner unions to MSF and UNISON. Yet this apparent
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affinity of membership and employer engagement concealed a long history of rival 
concepts of trade union principles and organisation and intense competition for 
membership, bargaining positions and recognition (for a useful survey of this history 
with particular reference to BIFU and UNiFI (Barclays) see Sayce 1999). A crucial 
historical distinction between them was their relative unionateness. The considerably 
greater size of BIFU compounded the rivalry, competition and degree of 
unionateness of the three unions.
The genesis of these distinctions lay in the foundation of BIFU as an independent 
national trade union, organising in the finance industry and affiliated to the TUC. As 
a corollary, employers created staff associations to represent the interests of their 
employees (see Blackburn 1967: 130-193 for a full history up to the 1960s and Sayce 
1999 for subsequent developments). Initially these staff associations were highly 
dependent on their respective employers for resources and benefited from their very 
paternalistic stance over the employment relationship. Labelled as ‘internalism’, 
Blackburn described the relationship between employers and staff associations in the 
following terms:
Banking is different from other occupations; in banking there is no split 
between labour and capital; no ‘us’ and ‘them’, for everyone is one of ‘us’. 
Therefore, we can best settle our problems amongst ourselves without 
interference from outsiders who do not understand us (Blackburn 1967: 98- 
99).
The foundation of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) was as staff associations in NatWest 
and Barclays banks. The breakdown of industry-wide national pay bargaining and 
increasingly restrictive employment policies from employers as technological change 
and restructuring followed de-regulation in 1986, led in the 1980s to increasingly 
combative industrial relations with both BIFU and the staff associations (Gall 2001). 
Consequently:
The traditionally pluralist and paternalistic employment practices have broken 
down, with many large employers adopting more robust and uncompromising 
positions towards employees and unions. This has been “matched” by the 
increasing unionateness of the unions [including the staff associations] as a 
response to this (Gall 2001: 357).
NWSA, UNiFI (Barclays) and the other staff associations adopted increasingly 
unionate policies including industrial action clauses, registration as independent trade
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unions, affiliation to the TUC, closer co-operation with other unions, employed 
officials and independence from employers (Gall 2001: 362, Morris et al 2001: 245).
However, the rival claims to unionate status, bargaining position and competition for 
members had irrevocably soured personal relations between past General 
Secretaries. There was mutual recrimination over the failure to surmount these 
divisions and move toward amalgamation. Not until the arrival within a short period 
of new General Secretaries in BIFU, NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), untainted with this 
history and keen to progress joint working against common employers, did 
amalgamation become a realistic prospect (Morris et al 2001: 245). One ex-BIFU 
full-time official gave a graphic description of the change in relations between the 
General Secretaries, and remarked that:
Ever since I've been involved with this union, we've been pushing the one 
union approach. We didn't get anywhere for years because our leader, the old 
General Secretary Lief Mills, didn't get on with the leaders of the other two. 
Fortunately, all the leaders were changed within a very short space of time. 
The industrial logic for merger was even more pressing then. We were all 
losing members because of redundancies, and there was a will with the new 
people to get together and talk (ex-BIFU regional full-time official interview 
2001).
From this quote, it is possible to isolate factors that favoured an amalgamation. First, 
a longstanding objective for a single union in the finance industry from BIFU, second 
the conjunction of changed leaderships supportive of amalgamation and third, 
industrial logic encouraging amalgamation. Enhanced by the increased 
unionateness of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) the catalyst was there for starting the 
amalgamation process.
From its foundation BIFU had a policy of a single union for the finance industry but 
the coterminous founding of employer-supported staff associations in virtually all 
banks and finance bodies had almost immediately frustrated this objective. BIFU’s 
policy was one where:
The associations were to be worn down and obliterated with no compromise, 
their memberships appropriated and their ideology exposed as false (Morris et 
al 2001: 242).
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This approach was not one that would foster good relations or establish an 
environment in which merger could be rationally considered! Meanwhile the staff 
associations became established and effective organisations in representing and 
bargaining for employees. Whilst membership for both continued to expand, and 
despite the antagonistic employment policies increasingly adopted by the employers, 
an effective stalemate established itself in the inter-union war (Morris et al 2001: 
243). There were tentative merger discussions but in such an environment, they 
soon perished (Morris et al 2001: 243). Thus, BIFU, NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) 
arrived at their amalgamation with no experience of previous mergers and 
established structures.
BIFU
BIFU, with its long history as an independent, unionate, TUC affiliated trade union 
had developed a ‘union’ structure familiar to most TUC unions; local branches, 
regional committees, national executive committee, annual conference and elected 
General Secretary (Undy et al 1981: 41-45). Semi-autonomous National Institution 
Committees for bargaining activity with individual banks and finance companies 
supplemented this structure (Blackburn 1967: 81-93). In addition, there had been a 
recent development of branches associated with large workplace sites such as call 
centres, which also had a level of autonomy over bargaining activity (Rose 2002). An 
ex-BIFU national full-time official elaborated on this development and commented 
that:
BIFU had quite a lot of institution branches. We had some huge branches that 
were basically white-collar factory branches. There was a Barclays 
Barclaycard Branch in Kirby. The only successful growth in any form of 
branch network, in any form of Office Reps, steward structures was in 
institution branches (ex-BIFU national full-time official interview 2007).
Whilst there was no independent funding of branches and much organisational 
activity was centralised on the National Executive and the General Secretary there 
was an expectation and facility for debate and dissent with the national leadership. 
An ex-BIFU local lay leader describing the Annual Conference maintained that:
There would be a lot of debate on issues and things that the NEC wanted to 
do. National Institution Committees didn’t have autonomy so they would be 
lining up people from branches. All the National Committees would say, you 
go and you speak about this or you vote about this because we don’t feel the
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decision that the NEC made was right (ex-BIFU local lay leader interview 
2001).
BIFU arrived at the point of amalgamation with the ‘form and character’ of a unionate 
trade union. It had membership across the finance industry and, if much of the 
bargaining with individual employers took place at a national level; its structure was 
justified in unifying and co-ordinating membership activity within the union itself. 
Most local union activity was concerned with individual member representation and 
workplace health and safety issues. Local geographical branches sought to co­
ordinate and support this activity, and provide a local forum for engagement with the 
wider union (ex-BIFU national lay leader interview 2001). ‘Institution’ branches in 
some large workplace sites combined both these activities and often engaged in full 
bargaining activity (ex-BIFU regional full-time official interview 2001).
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays)
Meanwhile NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) had largely retained their ‘staff association’ 
structures despite developing more unionate policies vis-a-vis the employer 
(Blackburn 1967: 93-111 for their earlier development and Morris et al 2001: 243 for 
moves toward a more unionate status). This structure was highly centralised on the 
National Executive Committee and the General Secretary for bargaining and 
organisational activity with only very informal links and communication elsewhere. As 
an ex-NWSA lay leader remarked:
I feel that [the UNIFI NEC] have far more control over the full-time officials 
than we used to have in NWSA. Although we didn't think it at the time I 
probably think that we were there to rubber-stamp most of the decisions (ex- 
NWSA national and local lay leader interview 2001).
The close internal relationships within the unions generated through employment in a 
single institution and a desire to distinguish them from a ‘union’ (such as BIFU), had 
resulted in no provision for local or regional levels of organisation. In addition, the 
practices of debate and dissent endemic to unionate unions were seen as 
unnecessary in the environment of a staff association where notions of a conflictual 
employment relationship had only been experienced in the very recent past. The 
same ex-NWSA lay leader commented on the introverted concerns of NWSA in 
remarking that:
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We'd have never have thought to have commented about something that we 
didn't think touched NatWest (ex-NWSA national and local lay leader interview 
2001).
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) had become increasingly unionate but their bargaining 
activity focused on a single large employer and their much smaller membership was 
spread over the entire country. The representation of individual members and 
dealing with such issues as health and safety, took place in the context of that single 
employer. Member identification was with that employer and its associated staff 
association. These close links did not produce an imperative to establish a network 
of local branches to co-ordinate local workplace activity or communicate through the 
union. The intimate relationship between the union and the employer, supplemented 
by a few specialist committees to represent the concerns of particular job 
specifications, could achieve that outcome (ex-NWSA national and local lay leader 
interview 2001).
Member-led or Leader-led
The tensions between local, regional and national levels of organisation and leaders 
and members exposed by Hyman (1979. 1989, 2001) appeared least evident in 
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays). Their earlier distancing from unionate practice and 
intimate relationships within the boundary of a single employer encouraged a lower 
level of the bureaucratisation which Hyman saw frustrating workplace self-activity and 
debilitating democratic accountability. Yet evidence suggests a relatively powerful 
national leadership, albeit communicating relatively freely with members, but 
nevertheless intent on pursuing its own policy agenda. The facility for challenging 
this leadership from the workplace was constrained by a lack of democratic forums, 
an apparent affinity of purpose between leaders and members that discouraged 
debate and dissent, and a legacy of differentiation from unionate practice. On the 
‘leader-led/member-led’ continuum (Fairbrother 2000a) the form and character1 of 
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) were concentrated toward ‘leader-led’ arrangements 
and practice.
BIFU, in contrast, presented a contradictory picture. There was a level of 
bureaucratic practice at regional and national levels of the structure occupied by full­
time officials and lay leaders. The national leadership held an influential position
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within the union power relationships, in part consolidated by the prevalence of 
national bargaining. However, evidence suggests that the ability of the national 
leadership to promulgate its policy was constrained by the need to accommodate the 
concerns of lay leaders promoting the position of workplace influence or scrutinising 
and debating national policy at regional and national democratic forums. The 
tensions outlined by Hyman in relation to democratisation and bureaucratisation were 
evident in BIFU but workplace influence was still an important presence in the power 
relationships that defined the union. Partly this democratising aspect is attributable to 
a structure of branches and regions that provided the formal facility for expressing 
dissent and engaging in debate. This approach was attributable, partly to BIFU’s 
unionate status that encouraged the practice, but also to the presence of local lay 
leaders interacting with and reflecting the concerns of members. On the ‘leader- 
led/member-led’ continuum the ‘form and character1 of BIFU displayed a ‘member- 
led’ characterisation when contrasted with that of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays).
In an earlier period, Blackburn had concluded for unions in the finance industry that: 
Both [BIFU and the staff associations] wished to be seen as responsible and 
respectable bodies, democratically run, without political strings and preferring 
co-operation and negotiation with the employers to the use of militancy 
(Blackburn 1967: 80).
If increased militancy in the face of employer antagonism had latterly changed this 
assessment, that change was prevalent for all the parties to the UNIFI amalgamation. 
In contrast to the heterogeneous characteristics of membership and industries in the 
MSF and UNISON mergers, BIFU, NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) had close affinities of 
both membership composition and industry location. However, their very different 
historical and organisational origins still set a scenario for their amalgamation that 
had the potential for an uncertain outcome in the context of local union organisation.
The UNIFI amalgamation brought together one union with a network of local 
branches constitutionally linked to regional and national levels of organisation. It also 
had wide experience of bargaining and representation across different employers. In 
contrast, the two other unions had hardly any of the same organisational features 
and a bargaining framework concentrated on one employer. The wider synergies of 
all three unions organising in a single industry and members with the same job 
profiles often working alongside each other were very clear. However, the
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disparities, which were particularly apparent in local workplaces, would require 
resolution within the amalgamation process. How that was achieved and the 
consequence for the position of the local context in the amalgamated union is the 
subject of the next section.
AMALGAMATION
An ex-BIFU senior national full-time official remarked that in approaching the 
amalgamation they had discussed the process of amalgamation with the General 
Secretaries of six recently merged unions to establish what they did and seek advice 
on what to avoid. The consensus was:
Not to get completely consumed in the process. Every one of them got 
consumed! You had to smooth people over, you had to argue with them, and 
you spent a lot of time dealing with that. Whereas, to a large extent, from the 
trade union members' point of view all they want to know is that the union's on 
the doorstep doing the job for them at their place of work. We did that but I 
think I took my eye off that quite a lot. That’s not what should have happened 
(ex-BIFU national full-time official interview 2007).
Such a comment re-emphasises the centrality of union activity at a local level as the 
priority for union members and the need to maintain that within a process of 
amalgamation.
Procedure for amalgamation
Like UNISON, there was an elongated period of negotiation over the terms of the 
amalgamation before the ballot of members to approve it. The formal amalgamation 
was followed by a shorter transitional period before implementation of the full terms 
of the amalgamation. Whereas in MSF, the pre-amalgamation period of negotiation 
was shorter but the post-amalgamation transitional and implementation period was 
much longer. Of note, there was a very amicable environment for the discussions 
and voting on the amalgamation with little evidence of dissent to the proposal (ex- 
BIFU national lay leader interview 2001). This environment was in marked contrast 
to that in UNISON and MSF where from the outset, and despite widely held 
commitments to the principle of amalgamation, issues of control and ‘form and 
character1 within the amalgamated union were hotly debated between and within the 
parties (Fryer 2000). As one local lay leader remarked:
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Just prior to the merger there was a lot more working together, so when the 
merger actually came about it was a good thing. Everybody was ready for it, 
everybody wanted it, all the members wanted it. It was welcomed (ex-BIFU 
local lay leader interview 2001).
Like UNISON, the expectation of the amalgamation process was that points of 
difference and potential disagreement between the partners could be resolved before 
an irrevocable decision to amalgamate had been taken. It also allowed for 
consultation and debate within each union over the direction of the negotiations, 
outside of the national leadership who were directly involved in those negotiations. A 
senior ex-BIFU national full-time official described the period like this:
The negotiations were long because we decided to do a rulebook before we 
did the merger. We needed to do it because people wouldn’t have signed up 
to it, the two staff unions wouldn’t have signed up to it. That was very difficult, 
because we then spent 18 months in purdah doing rules. The negotiations 
were longer than the Amicus merger, much longer in real terms. I was elected 
in ’96. We didn’t form UNIFI until May 1999 and it was three solid years of 
meetings (ex-BIFU national full-time official interview 2007).
BIFU had three times the membership of either NWSA or UNiFI (Barclays) but, and a 
possible source of contention, the value of BIFU’s assets were similar to both of them 
(Morris et al 2001: 249). BIFU sought to counter concern that the amalgamation was 
not simply a takeover of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) by acknowledging equal status 
for them in the negotiations and adopting a position of no preconditions. This 
comment from an ex-BIFU regional full-time official confirms the position of BIFU:
I think thafs what was the catalyst for actually getting the talks going, that the 
bigger union wasn't trying to grab them, at least not overtly but was willing to 
say, it's all up for grabs. Let's just talk (ex-BIFU regional full-time official 
interview 2001).
This position was particularly important, since BIFU’s policy for a single finance union 
had always been on a basis of its own structure and rules (Morris et al 2001: 242- 
243). As the largest union, with the strongest unionate background, and a familiar 
‘union’ structure, the adoption by BIFU of a no preconditions and equal status 
position was of particular significance, as evidenced by a senior ex-BIFU full-time 
official who remarked:
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For us to say we were giving equal status when we were three times bigger 
was a huge concession. We were saying to NWSA and little UNiFI (Barclays) 
we will treat you as an equal, we will give you one third of everything, there 
won’t be any complications (ex-BIFU national full-time official interview 2007).
The local context
However, once the negotiations got underway it soon became apparent that the three 
unions had ‘bottom lines’ which had particular relevance for the position of the local 
level. The single-employer unionism practised by NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) 
required the provision of autonomous bargaining arrangements for individual national 
employers. An ex-BIFU full-time official described the contrast with the practice in 
BIFU in this way:
[NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays)] wanted National Company Committees that 
would be totally responsible for making all the decisions on national 
bargaining. In BIFU, the [National Institution Committees] would have their 
meetings, have their negotiations and make recommendations, but unless 
those recommendations were endorsed by the National Executive Committee 
they were sent back to rethink (ex-BIFU regional full-time official interview 
2001).
In BIFU, their multi-employer bargaining and ‘union’ structure required the 
continuation of a similar form into UNIFI. Two particular aspects of this arrangement 
were identified by another ex-BIFU full-time official, who remarked that:
Whether or not there would be a regional structure in the new organisation.
We said there had to be, because we were national and you had to have some 
regional recognition that financial institutions operate regionally. The other big 
one was how would you elect the NEC, would it be by direct election from 
institutions or would it be by direct election from regions? A lot of BIFU people 
were wedded to the principal of regionalisation saying we don’t want to have 
people from institutions on the NEC (ex-BIFU national full-time official 
interview 2007).
These positions epitomise two conceptions of the local level within the wider union. 
In NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), the local level was located with a single employer, 
prompting the close connection between workplaces within a single employer and the 
ability of members in individual workplaces to identify with workers in other
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workplaces. It may be argued that the dose affinity of working for a common 
employer enhanced the ‘trade union collectivism’ of these members (see Ward 2007 
and Stephenson & Stewart 2001). Their demand for National Company Committees 
with bargaining autonomy sought to maintain that ethos within a multi-employer 
union.
BIFU already was a multi-employer union where the local level allowed for a 
bargaining relationship with individual employers, promoting or enabling a close 
connection between workplaces within an employer. These connections fadlitated 
co-operation between the separate workplaces that made up the branches that 
defined the union. Branches were drawn together via the regional form of 
representation. However, adivity with individual employers also had to be integrated 
within the adivities of the wider union. BIFU’s regions were an integral part of the 
strudure which provided those opportunities and which induded a strudure of 
National Institution Committees with semi-autonomous bargaining powers which 
mirrored the single company bargaining relationship of NWSA and UNiFI (Bardays).
The ‘bottom lines’ of the partners to UNIFI did not assume the positions of dissent 
and difference which marked their presence in the amalgamation negotiations of 
MSF and UNISON. The negotiations resulted in industrially autonomous National 
Company Committees meeting NWSA and UNiFI (Bardays)’s aspirations and fitting 
well with BIFU’s existing semi-autonomous National Institution Committees. 
Complementing these arrangements a regional and branch strudure dosely 
mirroring that of BIFU was established. Morris and colleagues (2001) concluded that: 
The outcome was a geographic strudure based around regions and a 
company-based negotiating strudure. The former had responsibility for 
recruitment and organisation plus the execution of national policy; the latter 
has responsibility for bargaining (Morris et al 2001: 248).
Underpinning this strudure was the network of individual workplaces. These were 
closely integrated into the negotiating strudure through the National Company 
Committees, and the operation of the wider union through branches and regions. It 
appeared that the extended pre-merger period of negotiation had enabled two 
apparently divergent construdions of union organisation to be incorporated within a 
single strudure.
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Leaders
The willingness of the three new General Secretaries to be active in promoting the 
amalgamation was a crucial part of its successful completion (Morris et al 2001: 245). 
However, despite their pre-eminence, without the support and co-operation of lay 
leaders the amalgamation would not have been concluded. Certainly, in BIFU, the 
presence of these leaders at branch and regional level was an important influence in 
the outcome. As confirmed by an ex-BIFU full-time official in this way:
BIFU had a strong branch and regional structure. Part of the process of doing 
the Rules Commission [for UNIFI] was for me to go out round the country 
holding meetings of Regional Chairs and prominent players and talk to them 
on the progress we were making. They were very influential and had we not 
persuaded them then the merger would not have taken place (ex-BIFU 
national full-time official interview 2007).
The apparently seamless congruity of relationships in NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) 
allowed their national leaderships to proceed in the negotiations with little hindrance. 
An ex-NWSA lay leader contrasted the structure of NWSA with that of BIFU showing 
how it produced these dose relationships, and remarked that:
Our structure was very different to BIFU's because they did have a central 
function, a regional office function, officers, and so on. We just had our central 
function being the Executive Coundl. We didn't have any regional function at 
all. We had national officers, Assistant General Secretaries and their 
assistants. But then below that there were just the Regional Organisers. We 
didn't have as many layers of structure (ex-NWSA national and local lay leader 
interview 2001).
These two comments show that in BIFU, as with the partners to MSF and UNISON, a 
structure with lay leaders active at various levels required meetings across the 
country for meaningful consultation, whereas in NWSA and UNiFI (Bardays) their 
smaller size and the close affinity between leaders allowed for a continuing two-way 
flow of consultation. The influence of leaders was an important factor in the ultimate 
success of the amalgamation but mediated through the quite different characteristics 
of each partner union. These practices reinforced their experience of union activity 
and went with them into UNIFI.
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This experience of the amalgamation negotiations illustrates the divergent ‘form and 
character’ between BIFU and the other two unions. In NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), 
the apparent ease of communication and close affinities within a single employer 
countered the distancing of members from effective influence over their leaders. 
However, the role and activity of the National Committee, personified in that of the 
General Secretary, was the focus of this relationship. In practice, the position of the 
national leadership was a hegemonic one even if expressed in a congenial and 
inclusive manner; NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) were ‘leader-led’ unions. The 
insistence on bargaining autonomy for National Company Committees in UNIFI partly 
reflected that relationship. Against that, BIFU saw the influence of members on their 
leaders. The presence of National Institution Committees with a high level of 
bargaining autonomy was a particularly stark example. The diffuse nature of the 
organisational practice via the General Secretary and full-time officials, National 
Executive Committee, Annual Conference, Regional Councils and branches opened 
up forums where dissent and debate took place. The unionate ‘character’ of BIFU 
encouraged those features. The evidence of widespread consultation over the 
merger proposals supports a view that the workplace membership retained a 
capacity to influence the national leadership. Comments from an ex-BIFU national 
full-time official (Interview 2007) suggested a high level of national organisational 
activity in BIFU accompanied by challenge and debate over questions of policy. 
Contrasted with ‘leader-led’ NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), BIFU was ‘member-led’.
The concentration on structure in the amalgamation negotiations excluded 
appreciation of these different internal relationships and ways of working. Thus 
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays)’s insistence on autonomous National Company 
Committees as a condition for the amalgamation might preserve the close and 
amicable relationships characteristic of their single company identity. Equally, 
continuing the presence of BIFU’s structure allowed its associated features of dissent 
and debate to be maintained in the amalgamated union. As an ex-BIFU full-time 
official commented in relation to the three sets of lay leaders:
[In BIFU] we were a bit more politically savvy, with a small ‘p’. Their lay 
people believed that if the General Secretary said the moon is green and it 
flows round the sun on a Tuesday afternoon then that’s what it did. Whereas 
ours were a bit more spiky, you had to justify your existence (ex-BIFU national 
full-time official interview 2007).
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everybody going phew, oooh! (ex-NWSA national and local lay leader 
interview 2001).
The twin-track structure of industrial autonomy in the National Company Committees 
and organisational integrity through BIFU’s structure seemed to satisfy the 
aspirations of all the partners, although they had different conceptions of 
unionateness.
Post-amalgamation local union organisation
The major structural issue that had particular relevance for local union organisation 
was adapting the structure of regions and branches in BIFU to accommodate NWSA 
and UNiFI (Barclays). The transitional National Executive decided on the regional 
boundaries and the need for an elected regional committee to oversee regional 
activity. These decisions mainly replicated the existing BIFU model (Morris et al 
2001: 249). Decisions on the branch structure then devolved to the new regions but 
again the result largely replicated the existing pattern of BIFU. This outcome was 
confirmed by an ex-BIFU lay leader in replying to a question on whether the UNIFI 
branch structure continued that in any of the predecessor unions:
Yes, it has. You've got to understand the only model for branch structure that 
existed prior to merger was in BIFU. We got all the activists within a region 
together to decide what branches there would be. Unfortunately, the debate was 
dominated by old BIFU people. That's a good thing and a bad thing. It's a good 
thing in the fact that if there hadn't been any BIFU people there we would never 
have ended up with a branch structure and the bad thing is that there is a 
perception that it's BIFU mark 2, which we didn't want it to be (ex-BIFU national 
lay leader interview 2001).
However, a former NWSA lay leader had no difficulty with this outcome, and 
commented that:
There wasn’t that much wrong in the structure of the old BIFU. It was working 
for servicing the members, so there was no need to change it (ex-NWSA 
national and local lay leader interview 2001).
The crux of the issue lay with the bargaining relationship practised by the 
predecessor unions, its presence in the workplace and translating it into the context 
of the merged union. This was whether the relationship was with a single employer 
as in NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), or multiple employers as in BIFU. Members in
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workplaces co-operated with each other to achieve common objectives, either 
against a single employer in NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), or against one of many 
employers in BIFU. Members were located in individual workplaces but acted across 
many others to achieve their bargaining aims (see Ward 2007). The different 
practices of BIFU against those of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) are a reflection of its 
multi-employer basis rather than more fundamental divisions of union practice.
Integrating local bargaining activity in the work of the union was compounded by 
wider issues of democratic accountability and debate on questions of union policy 
and organisation. In NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), their relatively small membership 
and location in single institutions meant that accountability and debate centred on a 
single national committee, supported by a few specialised and area committees. In 
BIFU, these issues required a network of local branches to co-ordinate and legitimate 
decision-making.
Leaders
The role of full-time officials and lay leaders in fostering this phase of the 
amalgamation process was crucial. Their continued commitment to maintaining an 
environment of goodwill, compromise and an absence of preconditions gave 
reassurance (particularly to NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays)) that the amalgamation 
remained on a basis of equal status for the three partner unions. Not only did this 
commitment lubricate the amalgamation process and avoid the dissension that had 
been a feature of the MSF and UNISON amalgamations, it was also expected to 
facilitate lay activists from the predecessor unions participating in the new and 
revised structures of UNIFI. However, those from former BIFU rapidly populated the 
structures once they were opened up to elections. An ex-BIFU local leader described 
the early development of the UNIFI structures as:
If you look at the Finance and General Purposes Committee of the NEC, the 
first one following the merger had some people on there from [NWSA and 
UNiFI (Barclays)]. If you look at it now, apart from the Vice-President, 
everybody else on F&GPC is old BIFU (ex-BIFU local lay leader interview 
2001).
This development might have been anticipated in those parts of the structure that 
strongly reflected the structures of BIFU but it also manifested itself within the 
NatWest and Barclays National Company Committees that had been expected to be
213
the redoubt of lay leaders from former NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays). An ex-BIFU 
national official stated that:
Rory (the former NWSA General Secretary) thought that the NWSA people 
would dominate the RBS/NatWest structure but within a year, the chair of the 
committee was an ex-BIFU person. You had to stand for election, and people 
from BIFU said OK we’ll do it. Plus the fact I think people from NWSA felt as 
though their time was over. We had the numbers and we probably had the 
talent, both in the lay and full-time structure (ex-BIFU national full-time official 
interview 2007).
In branches, there was a similar lack of involvement from former members of NWSA 
and UNiFI (Barclays). An ex-BIFU local leader suggested that the main problem was 
unfamiliarity with a branch structure, and remarked that:
It was a real problem for [NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays)] because they didn't 
have a traditional union branch, which fed into a region and it was a very hard 
concept for them to latch onto. What we have found across the country is that 
very few old NWSA people go to branches or to regions. They still don't see a 
need for them; they don't see how they help (ex-BIFU local lay leader interview 
2001).
Some suggested that the problem was partly attributable to individuals from former 
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) simply using the opportunity provided by the change to 
cease active involvement. However, the consensus from a number of interviews with 
former BIFU and NWSA lay leaders and full-time officials was that a combination of 
factors persuaded some former NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) lay leaders to cease 
activity and advantaged those from former BIFU in contesting for positions.
• Former BIFU was numerically larger and so its activists were in the majority 
and had the support of the largest group of members.
• Former BIFU’s lay leaders were more used to campaigning in contested union 
elections.
• Former BIFU’s lay leaders were more challenging of employers.
• Former BIFU’s lay leaders were more challenging of the national leadership of 
the union.
• Former NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) lay leaders were unused to activity within 
a unionate union structure.
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• Former NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) lay leaders dealt with a single employer 
rather than a large number (ex-BIFU local lay leader interview 2001, ex-BIFU 
national full-time official interview 2007).
Apart from the issue of numerical size, these factors reflected differences between 
the partner unions. BIFU’s structure was largely replicated in UNIFI. Former BIFU 
lay leaders had long experience of this structure and the use of its electoral 
processes to secure positions within it. They understood and had the ability to utilise 
the formal procedures prescribed by the structure to achieve their policy objectives. 
They understood the use of informal contacts and influence, facilitated by those 
formal procedures. In addition, the structure was characterised by an environment of 
dissent and debate, one with which they were familiar. For them, the establishment 
of National Company Committees and changes to the representation on other 
committees was understood as variations to a familiar structure and thus they were 
able to accommodate to the new arrangements relatively easily.
In contrast, the experience of former NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) lay leaders had 
been in unions whose structure was centralised on a single national committee that 
incorporated bargaining and organisational functions and was characterised by 
informal and congenial personal relationships. This environment was directly related 
to the unions’ bargaining relationship with single employers and their origins as staff 
associations. The formal and informal procedures of BIFU’s ‘union’ structure, 
including that of contested elections, was outside their experience as was the 
environment of dissent and debate which was facilitated by it. Faced by the twin 
disadvantages of inexperience of a new and potentially more contentious structure 
and the numerically larger cohort of former BIFU lay leaders, it appears that a 
sizeable proportion decided against continuing activity in what must have seemed an 
alien environment.
The different experiences of these lay leaders can also be seen as a reflection of the 
tensions endemic to their previous unions, those between national and workplace, 
leaders and members, democracy and bureaucracy, and characterised as ‘leader- 
led’ or ‘member-led’. An amiable hegemony exercised by the national leadership 
characterised NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays). Tensions’, in the sense of rivalry 
between alternative positions of policy or power, were barely evident and the result
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was dominance by a small national coterie of experienced lay leaders and full-time 
officials. In contrast, there was dissent and debate within BIFU, evidenced through 
its structure and the involvement of full-time officials and lay leaders within it. This 
environment extended to national bargaining activity in the National Institution 
Committees where most members experienced their closest and regular connection 
with their union and so with their leaders. The unionate process of dissent and 
debate in BIFU allowed for the voice of members to be heard at the interface 
between members and leaders, and local and national. Mediated through the activity 
of their leaders, a ‘member-led’ form of unionism was produced. Senior lay leaders 
in all the partner unions were prepared to accommodate themselves to the change, 
and often welcomed it as the price of continuing their active involvement.
The UNIFI workplace
These developments are illustrated in the post-amalgamation history within the 
NatWest bank where employees had been organised by NWSA and BIFU. In UNIFI, 
the former BIFU NatWest National Institution Committee and the bargaining function 
of the NWSA National Committee subsumed into the new NatWest National 
Company Committee. Below the previous national committees, both unions had 
organised a network of local representatives in high street branches and other work 
locations. In BIFU these representatives were complemented by its regional and 
branch structure. For UNIFI members in the NatWest there had been a virtually 
seamless transition from the partner unions’ organisations. In the words of an ex- 
NWSA lay leader:
We knew from day 1 that the 19th May we were no longer the constituent 
unions, we were UNIFI, and that was how we had to deal with things. And that 
message going down worked because we united almost instantly so to speak. 
And I'd say that, that was at all levels as well (ex-NWSA national and local lay 
leader interview 2001).
In the new National Company Committee, many of the senior lay leaders from BIFU 
and NWSA continued in active involvement. However, within a relatively short period 
individuals from former BIFU occupied the leading positions, as evidenced by the 
earlier remarks of an ex-BIFU full-time official. However, at local level the change 
had been even more marked with proportionately more former NWSA lay leaders
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stepping down from union activity in favour of their former BIFU counterparts. Two 
ex-BIFU lay leaders described the situation in their workplace:
In some offices you've got two reps. You've got one from the Staff Association 
and one from BIFU. It has tended in my experience that the BIFU rep has sort 
of taken a full lead in the most part and the NatWest Staff Association reps 
have fell by the wayside. They would say, you seem to know what you're 
doing, I don't want to be political, I'm not an activist but BIFU are activists so 
you get on with it (ex-BIFU local lay leader interviews 2001).
These remarks suggest perceptions about BIFU and NWSA that were current in the 
workplace, and which were a crucial influence over the post-merger development of 
UNIFI.
• BIFU was a much larger union overall and so its workplace representatives 
were going to be more experienced and better trained than those in NWSA.
• BIFU had a ‘political’ edge to its activities against the apolitical stance of 
NWSA. This ‘political’ edge would translate into UNIFI and those from NWSA 
had little interest in that form of activity.
• BIFU representatives were seen as being more antagonistic against the 
employer. Those from NWSA either saw this as a benefit to the union but one 
where their inexperience ruled them out of participating in it, or activity that 
could jeopardise their future career if they were too closely associated with it.
In the context of the amalgamated union, the ascribed character of BIFU prevailed.
The wider union
Morris et al argue that:
The structure of [UNIFI] is closer to the organising principles of staff unionism 
in a number of respects. This suggests that the UNIFI merger was analogous 
to a reverse takeover in which the larger party formally acquires the smaller 
one but the latter assumes control (Morris et al 2001: 249).
The presence of National Company Committees with bargaining autonomy, redolent 
of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), would support this conclusion. However, the 
dominant position of lay leaders from former BIFU in many of these committees and 
to an even greater extent at regional and branch level suggests an alternative 
analysis. It seems that whilst the structure of UNIFI and the position of the local level 
within it represent an amalgam of structures from the partner unions, those from
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NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) in the form of National Company Committees and 
representative of a ‘leader-led’ form have become subsumed into the ‘member-led’ 
form characteristic of BIFU.
CONCLUSION
The UNIFI amalgamation took place in an environment of compromise, amicable 
agreement and a seamless transition into the amalgamated union. This outcome 
might seem surprising given the history of rivalry in the bargaining relationship, 
intense competition for membership and stark ideological differences between the 
unionate trade unionism of BIFU and the staff association antecedents of NWSA and 
UNiFI (Barclays). However, this chapter has illustrated that a threatening industrial 
situation, an undoubted synergy of industry and member characteristics, a marked 
move toward more unionate positions by NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) and the 
coincidental arrival of General Secretaries committed to breaking with the historical 
mould, all produced propitious conditions for a successful amalgamation. This 
environment was in stark contrast to the internecine battle for control in MSF and the 
intense period of debate and negotiation in UNISON. For MSF and UNISON, this 
experience revolved around rival conceptions of union organisation with issues of 
‘ethos’ and ‘character* often being unsaid and concealed within issues of ‘form’, but 
keenly understood and fought over by the rival protagonists. If anything the national 
orchestration of the amalgamation was even more apparent in UNIFI than in MSF 
and UNISON, and local union organisation appeared to have an even lower influence 
over the process. However, the outcome of the UNIFI merger, as in MSF and 
UNISON, was for a model of union organisation involving of workplace representation 
and involvement to predominate in the internal organisation of the new union. This 
was as much concerned with the lay leaders and workplace representatives who 
populated it as the new structure itself.
The structure largely reproduced that of BIFU. It included local branches and 
regional committees but more importantly, in the context of the centralised employer 
engagement and consequently stretched form of local union organisation 
characteristic of the finance industry, a ‘form’ which facilitated and encouraged 
dissent and debate within the union. On the ‘leader-led/member-led’ continuum, it 
was closer to the ‘member-led’ formulation. Married to this ‘member-led’ form of
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unionism was NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays)’s enterprise unionism in the form of 
National Company Committees with bargaining autonomy. These committees had a 
level of national hegemony that placed them toward the ‘leader-led’ formulation. The 
twin-track approach to ‘form’ neatly incorporated two potentially rival conceptions of 
unionism. It established organisational integrity through the adoption of BIFU’s 
structure and industrial bargaining autonomy analogous to that of NWSA and UNiFI 
(Barclays) through the National Company Committees. Implicit in the formalised 
structure of BIFU, however, were features of dissent and debate that were in contrast 
to the highly centralised but harmonious and informal operation of NWSA and UNiFI 
(Barclays).
Once the process of nomination and election got underway former BIFU lay leaders 
and workplace representatives rapidly populated the new structure. Even though 
UNIFI appeared to synthesise successfully the structures of all its predecessors, the 
operation of these structures largely became the province of lay leaders accustomed 
to the ‘member-led’ unionism of one. The factors that produced this outcome were 
associated with the familiarity those from BIFU had with the ‘member-led’ form of 
unionism, their greater numbers and an aura of greater antagonism with the 
employer. The overriding outcome was for UNIFI to adopt the ‘member-led’ form of 
unionism previously associated with BIFU.
As with the MSF and UNISON mergers, a similar pattern associated with dissent and 
debate and so ‘member-led’ forms of unionism was evident, rather than one where a 
centralised organisation sought to exclude such influence in favour of discipline and 
adherence to the national leadership’s policies or ‘leader-led’. The amicable and 
integrated, but ‘leader-led’ relationships of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) are distant 
from the ‘leader-led’ discipline of COHSE, NUPE and TASS. However, there remains 
a common synergy of ‘member-led’ dissent and debate between ASTMS, BIFU and 
NALGO which is reflected in the ‘form and character* of the amalgamated unions.
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Chapter 9
FORM AND CHARACTER 
A COMPARISON
All three case studies have now been analysed and their circumstances related to 
the experience of each other. This chapter has a wider purpose. It will compare and 
contrast the amalgamations and summarise the differences and similarities between 
them, laying particular emphasis on the position of local union organisation. 
Outcomes for local relationships in the three amalgamations will be identified and 
explained. The argument is that the progress and outcome of a trade union 
amalgamation is determined by the interaction of the ‘form and character1 (as defined 
by Fryer 2000) of the participants with particular reference to the local context. It is 
the individual tensions between ‘form and character’, national and local, bureaucracy 
and democracy, and the relationship between leaders and members that shape the 
outcome (Hyman 1979, 1989, 2001). Where those features emphasise the centrality 
of the local level, or ‘member-led’ rather than ‘leader-led’, it means that members 
within workplaces may be able to shape the progress and outcome of the 
amalgamation (Fairbrother 2000a). The corollary to this argument is that without a 
full appreciation of the local context a full understanding of the process of 
amalgamation will not be available.
The research questions that have guided this research are repeated here (page 
56) since this assessment will seek to provide responses to them from the data and 
analyses contained in the earlier chapters.
1. What is the place of the local branch and workplace organisation within the 
amalgamation process?
2. How do the ‘leader-led’ and ‘member-led’ forms of unionism influence the 
position of the local branch and workplace organisation in a process of 
amalgamation?
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3. How do the relationships of leaders within the local branch and workplace 
organisation and those in the wider union influence the position of the local 
level in a process of amalgamation?
The chapter will present the distinctiveness of the three amalgamations. It will then 
be possible to concentrate attention on the local context in these amalgamations. 
Five issues are considered:
• The structure and features of local branch and workplace organisation and 
their relationship with the wider union,
• The process by which local branch and workplace organisation transferred 
from the predecessor unions into the amalgamated union,
• The presence of agreements and policies from the amalgamation that 
impinged on local branch and workplace organisation in the amalgamated 
union,
• The presence and influence of leaders and factions at all levels on the position 
of the local branch and workplace organisation in the amalgamation process, 
and
• The influence exercised by the particular procedure of amalgamation chosen 
by the predecessor unions on the position of the local branch and workplace 
organisation.
Then the outcomes that confirm the argument and respond to the research questions 
will be isolated, together with the influences that produced them.
The MSF amalgamation represented a recently confidant and buoyant period of 
private sector trade union growth in the 1970s (Eaton & Gill 1988). In contrast, the 
UNISON amalgamation was a product of the Thatcherite 1980s and clearly located in 
the public sector (Ironside & Seifert 2000) whilst UNIFI was firmly positioned in the 
finance industry and the more defensive period of the 1990s (Morris et al 2001). The 
partners to the MSF amalgamation, ASTMS and TASS, also epitomised the powerful 
and charismatic left-wing trade union leader in the person of Clive Jenkins and Ken 
Gill, respectively the General Secretaries ASTMS and TASS. TASS also exhibited 
the continued influence of the Communist Party in trade union affairs through the
centralised leadership and control of TASS by a CP-led faction. This history was in 
contrast with the public sector ethos of UNISON, the more accountable leadership of
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the UNISON partners and the apolitical introverted world of the finance unions in 
UNIFI.
The trade unions involved in the UNISON amalgamation mainly organised in local 
government, the NHS and, to a lesser extent, further and higher education. 
Together, they would hold very strong positions across all occupations excluding the 
medical and education professions. Amalgamation would consolidate and 
strengthen their existing positions and retain a clear identity as a public sector trade 
union, despite the depredations of privatisation and outsourcing. For UNIFI there 
was a similar situation. BIFU, NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) were all located in the 
finance sector and recruited across all occupations. Amalgamation would maintain 
that identity and strengthen their position within it. MSF would have a different 
experience. ASTMS and TASS were predominantly private sector trade unions but 
did not hold dominant positions in the sector or with individual employers. ASTMS, in 
particular, had membership in a wide variety of technical, supervisory, professional 
and managerial occupations in engineering and finance, and smaller presences in 
the third sector, the NHS and universities. TASS was more closely identified with 
engineering, although this only covered the numerically smaller technical, 
professional and managerial occupations within it. Amalgamation would result in a 
disparate organisation, albeit with some strengthening of its position in engineering.
If the industrial location of the amalgamations, at least for UNISON and UNIFI, had a 
particular identity and provided a good rationale for amalgamation, the characteristics 
of the members of all three unions were heterogeneous. MSF members occupied a 
wide variety of skilled, professional and managerial jobs (Eaton & Gill 1988). 
UNISON members had similar occupations to these but also included a high 
proportion of low paid manual and clerical occupations, most of whom were female 
(Terry 2000a). UNIFI too, had a high proportion of low paid female members and like 
UNISON recruited across all job categories (Morris et al 2001). Although all three 
amalgamations were sometimes categorised as being of ‘white-collar’ workers 
(providing another rationale for them to amalgamate), the reality was different.
Unlike the predecessor unions to the UNISON and UNIFI amalgamations both 
predecessors to MSF had developed through a series of mergers and, for one, de­
merger. For ASTMS, merger had resulted in rapid diversification from its genesis in
222
engineering. Some of these mergers had been facilitated through the establishment 
of autonomous sections and varying patterns of workplace and branch organisation. 
For TASS, the disintegration of the AUEW Federation merger confirmed its location 
in engineering but also encouraged its expansion into professional and managerial 
membership. Their recent history meant that ASTMS and TASS came to the MSF 
amalgamation with very recent experiences of merger. In UNISON and UNIFI, the 
predecessor unions had relatively coherent structures, settled membership patterns 
and clear identities in the public sector and finance industry, but they had little recent 
experience of merger.
However, this thesis is concerned with the local context in a process of 
amalgamation and when that is opened up to scrutiny further levels of distinctiveness 
become apparent. Reflecting back on UNISON, most members were located in 
workplaces within large local employers such as local authorities and NHS hospitals 
and represented a substantial proportion of the total workforce. Although historically 
there had been a high level of national bargaining over pay and conditions, local 
issues of individual representation, reorganisation and implementation of national 
agreements had also been present. Increasingly it was the latter and a diminution of 
national bargaining that concentrated union bargaining activity with individual 
employers. The amalgamation sought to rationalise UNISON’S structure by 
associating a single UNISON branch with each employer and other employers 
providing privatised and outsourced services to it, and integrating those branches 
into its regional and national structures. The branch became the focus of local 
bargaining with employers and the basis for representation and activity within the 
union itself. Many of these branches had 100s and even 1000s of members, and to 
facilitate their functions and activity the union allocated considerable resources and 
autonomy to them.
COHSE, NALGO and NUPE, the unions that came together to form UNISON, had 
grown through the post-war development of public services. Until the 1970s, the 
three unions were highly centralised in line with the conduct of national bargaining. 
However, policy in COHSE and NUPE was heavily influenced by full-time officials in 
contrast to a high level of lay member involvement in NALGO. NALGO branches 
also had a much higher level of autonomy over activities such as education and 
publicity in the workplace and considerably more resources than did their COHSE
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and NUPE counterparts. From the 1970s, all three saw the development of steward 
systems in workplaces (for NUPE see Fryer et al 1974). In NALGO, this 
development of decentralisation built on an existing level of lay involvement and 
influence. However, in COHSE and NUPE their more direct experience of the 
harsher industrial and political environment of the 1980s encouraged a re­
assessment in favour of a disciplined and co-ordinated form of unionism under the 
direction of full-time officials. At the commencement of the discussions for 
amalgamation these histories produced a situation where COHSE and NUPE were 
close-knit organisations where the General Secretary and full-time officials played a 
prominent role in directing policy and organisation whereas NALGO still prided itself 
on the prominent roles played by its lay leaders and the autonomy of its branches 
(see Terry 1996).
Most UNIFI members also worked for large employers and in some represented the 
majority of the workforce. Many of these employers were national organisations such 
as the Clearing Banks where pay and conditions continued to be bargained at a 
national level whilst employees were located in much smaller high street branches 
and administration centres where union bargaining activity mainly concerned 
individual representation. In addition, NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) had their origins 
as staff associations with the NatWest and Barclays Banks respectively and their 
memberships were still overwhelmingly located with these two institutions, with a 
relatively unstructured but close communication between local workplaces and the 
National Committee. This background was in contrast to BIFU, which had 
membership across the finance industry and had organised itself as a unionate trade 
union with local branches, regional councils and a national conference, none of which 
were part of the NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) structures (see Blackburn 1967, Morris 
et a12001). BIFU, NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) were settled organisations, but with a 
long history of mutual rivalry and contention emanating from this history. In practice, 
the national bargaining framework with large financial institutions encouraged a level 
of centralised leadership in all three that was distinctive.
Like BIFU, ASTMS and TASS had familiar union structures (see Undy et al 1981: 41- 
45), but their members’ workplaces were quite different. Whether employed in 
engineering, finance, the NHS, the third sector or universities their members 
invariably constituted a relatively small, if distinct, section of the total workforce. The
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size and location of their employers also varied widely, from the plants of large 
national and multi-national manufacturers through large single-site insurance 
companies and NHS hospitals to much smaller specialised engineering firms. 
Bargaining too, had rapidly changed from formalised national arrangements to a 
situation where it was largely concentrated at the level of local employers and local 
plants of large conglomerates. Members were firmly located in local workplaces 
where bargaining often took place alongside much larger union groups and in 
engineering with the other amalgamation partner. Local branches were an 
incoherent structure with an often tenuous connection to workplaces even though 
they remained the basis for representation and activity within the union itself.
The bureaucratic tendencies identified by Hyman (1979, 1989, 2001) as potentially 
stifling internal contention and leading to the hegemony of national leaders were 
most clearly evident in COHSE, NUPE and TASS. Whilst not as exposed in the 
centralised leadership of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), the introverted and dose 
relationships engendered within a single national employer produced a similar lack of 
dissent and debate. ASTMS, BIFU and NALGO were all large multi-employer unions 
with a level of bureaucracy in their organisational activity. What distinguished them 
was the potential for local influence on the activity of their leaders. The inddence 
and power of that influence was inevitably variable and sometimes fragile, but 
remained an essential feature of their operation and activity. With reference to the 
‘leader-led/member-led’ continuum identified in chapter 3 (see also chapters 6, 7 and 
8), COHSE, NUPE, NWSA, TASS and UNiFI (Bardays) were ‘leader-led’ while 
ASTMS, BIFU and NALGO were ‘member-led’.
Local union organisation has two functions that will be particularly relevant to the 
later discussion, bargaining adivity with the employer and a constitutional 
relationship with the wider union. In ASTMS and TASS, and subsequently MSF, the 
two functions were largely separated. In a situation where bargaining became 
increasingly localised for specialised sections of the workforce this produced a high 
level of autonomy for union workplace groups engaged in bargaining whilst union 
branches maintained the relationship with the wider union (Smith 1987). Branches 
carried out both functions in all the predecessors to UNISON and subsequently in the 
amalgamated union. However, a crucial difference was that NALGO branches 
related to one employer and had a high level of autonomy whereas those in COHSE
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and NUPE were more reliant on full-time official support and often only represented 
sections of the union’s membership within a single employer. The same functions in 
NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) related to a single employer and were largely carried out 
at a national level. The whole union constituted a workplace group and a branch 
within a single organisation. Meanwhile, BIFU had the same national bargaining 
relationship with employers, but established geographical branches to undertake the 
constitutional relationships within the wider union (Blackburn 1967).
The distinctiveness portrayed here also extended to the progress of the 
amalgamations and the attention paid to local union organisation. The MSF 
amalgamation was effectively an enabling decision that left ASTMS and TASS as two 
separate sections with a co-ordinating national structure. Decisions over the 
structure and rules of the fully amalgamated union, including the position of local 
union organisation, were left to a post-amalgamation Rules Conference. In practice, 
the subsequent internal contestation for control of the union, one almost exclusively 
played out at a national level, consumed attention to such an extent that local 
organisation was largely left to develop by itself (Carter 1991). The UNISON 
amalgamation was a very different process. The decision to amalgamate was made 
on an agreement that encompassed a wide range of organisational and policy 
issues, including the future position and shape of local branch organisation. It was 
also an elongated process with a high level of debate and negotiation between and 
within the parties (Fryer 2000). The failure to resolve the issue of the branch in the 
Final Report that formed the basis for the amalgamation and the post-amalgamation 
decisions in UNISON on workplace organisation, illustrated its iconic status for the 
three participant unions. The parties to the UNIFI amalgamation also engaged in a 
lengthy pre-amalgamation period of negotiation. Unlike MSF and UNISON, this was 
a largely amicable and non-confrontational experience, which agreed the future 
shape of local representation, but left the detailed work on its implementation until 
after the amalgamation (Morris et al 2001).
WORKPLACES AND BRANCHES
In each case study, the workplace was a key level of union organisation and 
operation. It follows that amalgamation cannot be adequately understood without 
consideration of the local context within the amalgamation process.
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In MSF, the prevalent situation was for autonomous workplace groups or committees 
to be the principal focus of the bargaining relationship, with local branches having the 
constitutional relationship with the wider union. A senior former TASS full-time official 
confirmed in 2007 that this was a continuation of the situation in ASTMS and TASS 
before the amalgamation, and remarked that:
For branches little changed. In MSF, branches should have merged but that 
didn’t happen for long periods and for some it never happened and continues 
to this day. So life carried on much as it always had. In workplaces things 
also continued as before where different groups of employees were 
represented. Change was sometimes generated by employer pressure to 
reduce representation now there was a single union but otherwise there was 
little change in many places (ex-TASS regional full-time official interview 
2007).
The arrangements reflect the bargaining environment for most members of MSF 
where, even within large conglomerate companies, it was localised and MSF often 
represented smaller specialised groups within a much larger workforce. The 
haphazard nature of the dramatic expansion of MSF’s predecessors (particularly 
ASTMS) compounded this situation. The legacy was one of fragmented workplace 
bargaining autonomy and branch boundaries variously based on workplaces, groups 
within workplaces and geographical areas, all of which transferred into MSF.
In UNISON, branches co-ordinated and led much of the bargaining with employers, 
and represented the interests of workplace members within the wider union. The 
autonomous and powerful position of UNISON branches was confirmed by the 
comments of a group of UNISON Health and Safety representatives in 2007, who 
said that:
Everything runs smoothly, the branch seems to know what they’re doing and 
the majority of employees are members. The senior reps negotiate with the 
top managers including the Chief Executive and this gives confidence to other 
reps that issues are taken forward. UNISON is constructed to help branches. 
Issues in other branches are known about and support is given to them 
(UNISON Health and Safety representatives interview 2007).
It should be recognised that the organisational and bargaining context of UNISON 
branches and its antecedents was mainly that of large, localised public bodies. In
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addition, following amalgamation the union represented either the large majority or a 
substantial proportion of union members. Bargaining had also become increasingly 
devolved from the previously dominant national structures. This environment was a 
very different situation to the fragmentary bargaining environment that characterised 
MSF.
UNIFI illustrated a further variation where the constitutional relationship within the 
union was conducted through geographical branches, workplace groups were 
engaged with the employer in representing members, but the bargaining relationship 
was mainly conducted through autonomous National Company Committees. A 
former BIFU senior full-time official confirmed in 2007 that this largely reflected the 
BIFU practice and, even where they were adopted from NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) 
as the National Company Committees, BIFU representatives rapidly gained 
ascendance:
The BIFU system dominated. We moved from Area Councils under BIFU to 
Regional Councils under UNIFI. On the National Company Committees for 
employers where NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) had been dominant, BIFU had 
50 per cent of representation after elections. The branch structure reflected 
the BIFU structure (ex-BIFU national full-time official interview 2007).
UNIFI and its predecessors had a similarly settled background to UNISON. The 
major difference in their bargaining environment was that, whilst union members 
were employed by national financial institutions and with amalgamation constituted 
the majority in many locations, bargaining was concentrated at a national level.
PROCESS OF TRANSFER
At the point of amalgamation, local union organisation transferred into the 
amalgamated unions in an unchanged form. Straightforwardly there were pre­
amalgamation agreements on the future of local organisation in UNIFI and UNISON 
presaging some form of change but in MSF, agreement was limited to maintaining 
the status quo. What is important is the underlying tension between divergent 
constructions of trade union practice that produced these agreements and then 
moulded their implementation.
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In practice, the formal agreements for the UNIFI amalgamation allowed the structures 
of both NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) and that of BIFU, to transfer with little change or 
rancour. This produced an integrated structure for the amalgamated union of 
National Conference, Regional Councils and branches from BIFU and National 
Company Committees with bargaining autonomy from NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays). 
However, there appeared to be little acknowledgement or appreciation that the 
genesis of this structure was two divergent concepts of trade union practice. In 
contrast, agreement (in UNISON) or victory (in MSF) was achieved only after much 
argument and negotiation. Only in UNISON did this result in an integrated form 
analogous to that of UNIFI, one redolent of NALGO branches. In MSF, the 
amalgamation process only regulated branch funding arrangements and branch 
representation at Annual Conference. However, there was a real understanding that 
the practice and ethos of MSF was also being decided and this would have a greater 
influence on the presence of the workplace in the amalgamated union. The question 
in the negotiations for all three amalgamations became: Would there be nationally 
centralised control or influence from and accountability to autonomous workplaces, a 
dominant role for full-time officials or one circumscribed by lay leaders accountable to 
the local level, discipline and direction in policy or dissent and debate (see Hyman 
1979, 1989, 2001)? These were debates at the heart of the ‘leader-led/member-led’ 
continuum (see Fairbrother 2000a).
In UNIFI, these issues came to the fore once its integrated form was populated at the 
termination of the initial one-year transitional period. Then it became apparent that 
the lay leaders and workplace representatives of BIFU would be advantaged through 
their familiarity with its structure, their greater numbers and their expertise with 
electioneering. They quickly populated the key local levels and beyond, even to the 
National Company Committees that were modelled on NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) 
arrangements.
A similar process occurred in the transition of COHSE, NALGO and NUPE branches 
into UNISON. The policy of Proportionality and Fair Representation was only 
legislated for at national level and ensured a strong presence of low paid female lay 
leaders from former COHSE and (particularly) former NUPE when the first elections 
to the National Executive took place, but it was a different story in branches. There 
the formal structures, autonomy and employer-based boundaries were familiar
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territory to former NALGO lay leaders and representatives but relatively unknown to 
the informal and more full-time official dependent experience of those from COHSE 
and NUPE. Once the transferring branches merged into or became fully-fledged 
UNISON branches, the former NALGO cohort of lay leaders mostly gained 
ascendance (for an example see Cunnison 2002). As a senior former NALGO official 
remarked in 2007:
The merger hasn’t changed the culture in workplaces as much as I wanted. It 
is still male dominated on the lay side with power still with former NALGO male 
Branch Secretaries. It is not as much a manual worker union as I hoped it 
would be. There is a dichotomy between the formal policies of the union [on 
Proportionality and Fair Representation] and the situation in workplaces. 
There is a parallel universe in some workplaces where merger does not 
appear to have taken place. The structures and profile are as in the former 
union and that tends to be NALGO (ex-NALGO full-time regional official 
interview 2007).
In UNIFI and UNISON there was post-amalgamation implementation of an integrated 
form of structure which was closely analogous to one or more of the predecessor 
unions but, importantly, was imbued with a character and facility which encouraged 
lay leader and workplace representative participation, or ‘member-led’. This 
arrangement soon allowed those from the predecessor unions who were accustomed 
to this form of unionism to assume leader and representative roles at the expense of 
those used to a ‘leader-led’ formulation. Their presence effectively consolidated the 
‘member-led’ form of unionism in the amalgamated unions.
In contrast to this structured transformation, workplace organisation in ASTMS and 
TASS, whether as autonomous workplace bargaining groups or branches, 
transferred into MSF in unchanged form with no expectation of any future alterations. 
Partly this reflected the haphazard and separated arrangements already prevalent in 
ASTMS and TASS but also the seeming impossibility of reconciling the stark divide 
between the hegemonic and centralised, or ‘leader-led’, control of the Broad Left in 
TASS and the anarchic and disputatious, or ‘member-led’, organisation of ASTMS. 
The position of local organisation was inextricably entwined with both. This situation 
allowed lay leaders and workplace representatives from both unions to continue their 
roles into MSF with little change. However, the post-amalgamation playing out of the
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divide at national level, which eventually resulted in the dominance of the ASTMS 
position, also meant a continuation of the ASTMS ‘member-led’ tradition in 
workplaces and branches and its extension to those transferring from TASS.
AGREEMENTS AND POLICIES
The presence or absence of agreements and policies facilitated the transition of local 
union organisation into the amalgamated unions. They either preceded the formal 
amalgamation or were part of the implementation period. This process involved the 
policies of the predecessor unions, the influences on the process of negotiation, the 
agreements that produced the amalgamated unions and the position of local union 
organisation within them.
The decision of the partners to the UNIFI amalgamation to resolve points of 
difference between them and reach agreement on the structure of their new union in 
advance of the formal amalgamation produced a relatively harmonious and seamless 
transition into UNIFI. None of the bitter infighting that followed the MSF 
amalgamation took place or the further period of debate, decision, and difficult 
implementation in workplaces, that occurred in UNISON. Against those experiences 
and allied to the non-confrontational and no preconditions stance of the partners, the 
chosen process could be counted a success. The difficulty was that the further 
objective of ensuring the continued presence of lay leaders and workplace 
representatives from all three partners to the amalgamation was much less 
successful. It was suggested earlier that this result was partly attributable to the 
ultimate prevalence of a particular form of unionism, but it could also be argued that 
by consciously seeking to avoid confrontational questions within the formative 
process, sections of the new union were left unprepared for such an outcome.
Bolting together the ‘union’ structure of BIFU and the autonomous national 
bargaining arrangements of NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays) appeared to satisfy both 
positions and avoided confrontation. What was not apparent was that the 
concession made by BIFU over the autonomy of the National Company Committees 
had much less relevance to the actual structure or bargaining practice of BIFU. A 
senior ex-BIFU full-time official remarked in 2007 that:
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Autonomy was not a real issue for BIFU since the [BIFU] National Executive 
rarely stopped [BIFU] National Institution Committee agreements. It was 
always a myth but fostered to prevent earlier mergers (ex-BIFU full-time 
national official interview 2007).
From this basis, there can be little surprise that former BIFU lay leaders were readily 
able to accommodate themselves to this change at national level. Against that, the 
structure of Regional Councils and branches had no equivalence with the informal 
network of lay leaders and workplace representatives that complemented the 
National Committees in NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays). When agreement on the detail 
of this structure became necessary during the implementation period, and with no 
alternative models available, that of BIFU was adopted en bloc. The straightforward 
accommodation to the structure of UNIFI available to those from BIFU was not 
repeated in NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays).
As illustrated in chapter 8 the position of the workplace in BIFU and then UNIFI was a 
largely separated one. National bargaining and representation in the workplace was 
separately organised to representation and influence in the wider union through 
branches. The amalgamation agreement replicated existing practice and particularly 
that of BIFU. Nevertheless, and despite its separated structure, what it did enable 
was a predominance of lay leaders and workplace representatives used to the 
operation of such a ‘member-led’ structure and its associated facility for expressing 
influence and dissent from local level. Evidence suggests this was the expected 
outcome for those from BIFU and even those from NWSA were accepting of the 
change in ethos that it represented. In no sense was there any suggestion of 
disagreement, more that of agreement over a better way of doing things.
There were two sorts of agreement on the future shape of UNISON: those that set 
down the structure (‘form’), and those that established new ways of working 
(‘character1). However, the latter might also affect questions of structure. The 
agreement on structure effectively embedded that of NALGO in UNISON. This 
structure emphasised an integrated branch organisation for bargaining and influential 
representation within the union, branch autonomy, and a high level of branch 
resources. Meanwhile, whatever the undoubted benefit of the policies on 
Proportionality and Fair Representation for widening participation in union activity, a 
sub-text of these policies was of ensuring power in UNISON (at least at national
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level) was not to be the domain of articulate, well-educated, male activists from 
NALGO (Terry 1996: 102). Post-amalgamation the structural agreement on the 
branch was reinforced with further decisions on branch funding and branch mergers 
that would cement in place the NALGO form. There was little disagreement between 
the parties over the principle of Proportionality and Fair Representation. However, it 
became apparent that the laudable aims of the policies would whither, against power 
struggles and the overriding need to retain lay leaders and representatives in the 
workplace (whatever their gender, job or pay level) (Cunnison 2002; UNISON full­
time regional official interview 2007).
The most intense debate and negotiation between and within the parties was over 
questions of structure. The intensity of the debate reveals a sub-text of rival 
concepts of union practice between the disciplined ‘leader-led’ approach of COHSE 
and NUPE and the atmosphere of ‘member-led’ dissent and debate that partially 
characterised NALGO (see Fryer 2000). The position of the branch in any UNISON 
structure would facilitate and encourage one of these conceptions. Finally, these 
developments proved to be more redolent of NALGO. That position enabled former 
NALGO lay leaders and representatives to continue their involvement in a familiar 
terrain and became a disincentive to those from COHSE and NUPE. The continued 
presence of individuals from former NALGO went to reinforce the structure and 
ensure its associated ethos continued into UNISON (see Terry 1996, 2000a).
The only agreement on the position of local union organisation in MSF was not to 
have one (see Carter 1991). Considering the wide variation in member and 
workplace location, bargaining arrangements and branch boundaries (even within 
ASTMS and TASS as separate organisations), instituting any common structure 
would have been fraught with difficulty. The straightforward and ‘easy’ answer was 
to leave arrangements where they were and, after all, this had been the practice 
through the predecessor unions’ previous experience of merger (see Melling 2004, 
Smith 1987). However, the position of branches (as opposed to workplace groups or 
committees) in ASTMS and TASS was sharply contrasted on the ‘leader- 
led/member-led’ continuum, between the hegemonic control of the Broad Left in 
TASS which heavily restricted their participation and presence in the wider union and 
their open, if argumentative, presence in ASTMS. Bargaining arrangements in 
workplaces were often located outside the branch structure and here Broad Left
233
control in TASS became increasingly patchy, with groups from both unions often 
meeting and acting together. In the hothouse of the post-amalgamation confrontation 
for control of MSF, the position of branches became one of the iconic battlegrounds, 
particularly over their representation at Annual Conference and their independent 
funding (see Carter 1991). Once this had been settled, largely in favour of the 
‘member-led’ position of ASTMS, the environment of debate and questioning of the 
national leadership’s policies was also reasserted.
Within this messy and separated structure, many lay leaders and representatives 
continued their activity in environments little changed from their previous experience, 
apart from the introduction of branch funding for former TASS branches and a 
dramatic increase in their representation at Annual Conference. For former TASS 
workplaces, the defeat of Broad Left centralised control enhanced autonomous 
workplace bargaining autonomy, and increased representation provided opportunities 
for influence over policy formation and organisation at regional and national levels. A 
former TASS official reflecting back on the change commented in 2007 that:
I liked the democracy in ASTMS, the ability to voice opinion and not be 
pilloried for not being in the correct club (i.e. the Broad Left) (ex-TASS full-time 
regional official interview 2007).
Comments in chapter 6 show that these changes were largely welcomed by those 
from former TASS whilst the initial concerns of those from ASTMS over subjugation 
to Broad Left control were allayed.
LEADERS AND FACTIONS
In all three amalgamations, national leaders conducted the negotiations to achieve 
amalgamation. Their role in taking account of the position of local union organisation 
was critical to the outcome. Organised factions also played a crucial role in two of 
the amalgamations.
The national leaderships of the partner unions to UNIFI adopted positions open to 
compromise and agreement. This position particularly applied to those from BIFU 
who insisted that they brought no preconditions to the discussions even though BIFU 
was numerically much the largest union to the amalgamation and it had a 
longstanding policy of creating a single finance industry union (although one in its
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own image) (see Morris et al 2001). This open approach undoubtedly assisted the 
reaching of agreement on structure, but obfuscated the deeper and potentially more 
troublesome issues of ‘character’. The particular characteristics of workplaces 
associated with large employers conditioned to national bargaining (see Ward 2007) 
ensured that the position of local organisation in the amalgamated union was 
acknowledged in the negotiations, and communicated and consulted on with lay 
leaders in the wider union.
Leaders in MSF and UNISON in the amalgamation process were far more intent on 
promoting rival constructions of union practice in relation to the position of local 
organisation (see Carter 1991 for MSF and Fryer 2000 for UNISON). Whilst this 
resulted in a level of friction and argument, it also exposed the fissures of 
disagreement for debate. From the outset in UNISON, national leaders from NALGO 
promoted a position in the negotiations of ‘branch autonomy’ and ‘lay control’. They 
were also very conscious of the need to satisfy the NALGO Annual Conference that 
these ideals were being met. Equally, leaders from COHSE and NUPE were just as 
concerned to maintain the unity and discipline under national leadership that they 
saw as their unions’ most valuable attributes. Both constructions included a 
complimentary position for local union organisation. A divide was established at the 
start of the amalgamation process between ‘member-led’ and ‘leader-led’ 
approaches, albeit within an overall commitment to achieve the amalgamation. As 
the debate and negotiation within and between the parties ebbed and flowed, it was 
NALGO, through its leaders, which effectively set the agenda to which the leaders of 
COHSE and NUPE had to respond (see Fryer 2000, Terry 1996).
In retrospect, it seems clear that the prime objective of national leaders in ASTMS 
and TASS came to be who would control MSF (see Carter 1991). Evidence 
suggests that national control of the union, including branches, was the objective of 
the Broad Left faction of TASS well before the amalgamation. How far the national 
leadership of ASTMS acknowledged and responded to this threat is unclear, 
although the evidence suggests they did little to combat or organise against it. 
However, comments from ex-ASTMS and ex-TASS leaders show that the prospect 
was well known and was very effectively organised against after the amalgamation to 
such an extent that ASTMS gained the ascendancy. The position of local 
organisation, and particularly that of branches, became part of the key reference of
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the two groups that attempted to define the focus of the amalgamation. The success 
of ex-ASTMS leaders at national level established the position of local organisation in 
MSF as one that broadly followed the ASTMS model. Nonetheless, while it remained 
a separated and fragmentary one, the prospect of a leader-led’ Broad Left control 
was removed and ‘member-led’ autonomy of bargaining activity at local level and 
representation and influence in the wider union was retained.
Organised factions were not a feature of the UNIFI amalgamation but in MSF and 
UNISON their role was very influential. The Broad Left exercised hegemonic control 
in TASS. Its controlling position had shaped the union’s structure and controlled both 
the appointment of its full-time officials and the selection of delegates to its Annual 
Conference. Its hegemony meant that any suggestion of opposition or questioning of 
national policy or organisation could be rapidly nullified. Having failed to extend its 
writ within the AUEW Federation, and then being largely instrumental in its collapse 
(see Smith 1987), it clearly saw the anarchic ASTMS as easy prey for its well-oiled 
machine (see Carter 1991). A level of self-delusion built on the stifling of opposition 
and debate, seemed to confirm agreement throughout TASS with its policies and 
control.
The success of the ASTMS stance in the confrontation of the early years of MSF was 
built on the latent ability of the ASTMS section to engage in disciplined voting 
patterns at the Rules and Annual Conferences of MSF. However, this capacity was 
enhanced by gaining the support of elements in the TASS section anxious to escape 
from Broad Left dominance. Subsequently those supportive of the ASTMS position 
formed their own faction as MSF for Labour, ostensibly as a support for the Labour 
Party but soon acting as an organised opposition to the CP-led Broad Left. MSF for 
Labour certainly represented a political divide with the CP but it also consolidated the 
values of ASTMS within MSF ensuring there would be no resurgence of Broad Left 
hegemony after its earlier defeat (see Carter 1991).
The position of local union organisation was intrinsically bound up in the ultimate 
ascendancy of the ASTMS position. For the Broad Left, the workplace was at the 
furthest extension of its dominance but capable of being controlled through its 
restricted representation in the wider union and the influence of Broad Left appointed 
full-time officials. What the faction failed to recognise was that once the local level
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had the opportunity to regain representation and influence in the union and 
bargaining autonomy in the workplace, the ability of the Broad Left to exercise 
‘leader-led’ control would be fatally undermined.
The influence of factions in the UNISON amalgamation was mainly restricted to their 
roles within NALGO, but that did not diminish their influence over the position of local 
union organisation. Much of the internal debate within NALGO was orchestrated 
between a widely based Broad Left faction and an alliance between Trotskyite Far 
Left and Right Wing factions. The latter portrayed the amalgamation as leading to a 
weakening of the sacrosanct NALGO values of ‘branch autonomy’ and ‘lay control’. 
For the Far Left, the amalgamation involved an objective of constraining their ability 
to promote Far Left policies and support for industrial action. For the Right Wing, the 
amalgamation amounted to an attack on their large branch-held assets and the 
imposition of full-time official control of their activities. The Broad Left upheld the 
same NALGO values but saw them being translated into a stronger and more 
influential public sector union. The confrontation between the two eventually saw 
success for the Broad Left and, as the evidence shows, those ‘member-led’ NALGO 
values were embedded in UNISON.
Thus, the ultimate success of ‘member-led’ concepts was a conscious objective of 
certain leaders and factions in MSF and UNISON. If leaders in the UNIFI 
amalgamation did not openly expound such objectives, their reticence contributed to 
an analogous outcome. Nonetheless, in each case the ‘form and character’ of the 
local level provided a fertile ground for the emergence of participative branches in 
each amalgamated union.
PROCEDURE FOR AMALGAMATION
The final issue to be considered is how far the form of amalgamation procedure 
chosen by the participant unions in the amalgamations influenced the position of 
local union organisation. Two can be identified, the lengthy pre-amalgamation period 
of negotiation and agreement to realise a form and policies for the amalgamated 
union in the UNIFI and UNISON amalgamations, and the much shorter pre- 
amalgamation negotiation to produce an enabling agreement in the MSF 
amalgamation. Both of these formats resulted in a post-amalgamation
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implementation period. In UNIFI and UNISON, this period implemented agreements 
from the amalgamation, whilst in MSF it produced arrangements to amalgamate two 
autonomous sections into a single entity.
Evidence on the UNIFI and UNISON amalgamations suggests that without this 
lengthy pre-amalgamation period and the detailed agreement on form and (for 
UNISON) policies, an amalgamation would not have been possible. In BIFU and 
NALGO, the period also involved meeting the concerns of lay leaders, regions and 
local level and meant an extensive process of internal consultation, debate and 
agreement alongside that going on between the parties to the amalgamation. The 
reality was that, without internal agreement, the wider union held a prospective veto 
over the final decision. The chosen procedure reflected a distinctive working out of 
the relationships that made up ‘form and character* as expressed through 
representation and influence at local level. There was no equivalent representation 
and influence for local union organisation in NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays), and whilst 
constitutionally a similar position existed in COHSE and NUPE, the dominant and 
influential role of the national leadership made its use an unlikely prospect. This 
extended pre-amalgamation period of internal debate presaged a continuation of the 
representation and influence of local union organisation.
Evidence on the MSF amalgamation suggests three concerns in the wider ASTMS 
over the pre-amalgamation agreement. First, that the intentions of TASS and the 
Broad Left were to gain control of the amalgamated union and that the agreement to 
accord equal status to the two post-amalgamation sections (despite the larger 
membership of ASTMS) might allow them to achieve this through the exercise of 
disciplined block voting within the NEC and National Conference. Second, that the 
ASTMS national leadership did not share these concerns. Third, that the engineering 
section of ASTMS, in conjunction with the engineering based TASS, had an objective 
of restoring their previous dominance in ASTMS within MSF. For TASS and the 
Broad Left these divisions confirmed their view that the disputatious and 
heterogeneous ASTMS would be easy prey to their disciplined and well-organised 
agenda to take control of MSF. What they failed to take account of was that the 
considerably more open post-amalgamation process for determining the rules of 
MSF might allow the local level to become prominent. The result was defeat for the 
Broad Left and the adoption of those values through the rules and practice of MSF.
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Despite the clear intention that the format for the amalgamation would facilitate 
TASS’s agenda for taking control of MSF, this foundered in the face of a newfound 
unity and discipline from those in the ASTMS and TASS sections favouring a 
‘member-led’ alternative (see Carter 1991).
The intentions of national leaders in choosing a particular procedure for the 
amalgamation process could be to facilitate or frustrate representation and influence 
for the workplace in the amalgamated union. National leaders’ assessment of the 
relative strength of their own union’s ‘form and character’ and the policies they were 
intent on pursuing for the amalgamated union against those of their partners, also 
influenced the decision. Values associated with autonomy, representation and 
influence for the local level as against centralised control and influence from the 
national leadership were the outcome in these amalgamations. Ultimately, it was the 
promotion and support for those ‘member-led’ values that was ascendant whatever 
the role and influence of any particular form of amalgamation process.
CONCLUSION
It is now necessary to draw out the outcomes and provide some rationale for them. 
This will show that the evidence from the research supports the overall argument of 
the thesis and responds to the research questions.
The local context is a potent influence in the amalgamation process. In an exposed 
form this has been seen within the structural ‘bottom lines’ of negotiating positions, 
as exampled by NALGO and BIFU over the constitutional position of branches, and 
as autonomous bargaining agents by NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays). In the process of 
debate, negotiation and agreement within and between the individual partners the 
local branch became a crucial site of the amalgamation process in its own right, as in 
NALGO, UNISON and the ASTMS section of MSF. Leaders and factions have also 
appropriated the position of the workplace as a union branch in the amalgamation 
process to support arguments and agendas for centralised control (TASS, COHSE, 
NUPE), dissent and debate (ASTMS, BIFU, NALGO), and representation and 
influence for the local level (ASTMS, BIFU, NALGO). However, it is a particular set 
of characteristics and structural location for the workplace, as focused through 
branches within particular unions, which have enabled particular concepts of trade
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union practice to predominate over alternatives in these amalgamations. Those are 
representation, influence and autonomy and, in various constructions, are evident in 
ASTMS, BIFU and NALGO, in contrast to the centralised leadership and control 
found in COHSE, NUPE, NWSA, TASS and UNiFI (Barclays). In response to the 
question of the place of local union organisation within the amalgamation process, 
this assessment shows its crucial influence in various elements of the process.
The tensions exposed here between the workplace, expressed via branches, and 
national structures, and between leaders, example the concerns identified in 
Hyman’s bureaucratisation theory (1979, 1989, 2001). These tensions appear in 
their extreme form in COHSE, NUPE, NWSA, TASS and UNIFI (Barclays) although 
this is not to suggest that ASTMS, BIFU and NALGO exhibited no pressures toward 
the bureaucratisation of these relationships. ASTMS, BIFU and NALGO all had 
larger memberships than the other unions and had complex organisational 
structures. It is suggested that the equivalent tensions in these unions evidenced an 
emphasis in favour of workplace and member leadership and that this prevailed in 
the transformation into the amalgamated unions. As Fairbrother (2000a) and others 
(see Heery & Kelly 1994, Terry 1986) have suggested, bureaucratic tensions are 
better envisaged as being on a continuum between leader-fed’ and ‘member-led’ 
characterisations and the assessment supports that contention.
The assessment suggests that the application of those features within the 
amalgamation process resulted in ‘member-led’ forms of organisation within 
branches but based on workplaces. ‘Leader-led’ control relies on an ability to either 
manipulate the structure to nullify opposition (TASS) or construct a practice where 
there is an environment of implicit trust and/or resistance to criticism of the national 
leadership (COHSE, NUPE, NWSA, UNiFI (Barclays)). The evidence suggests that 
the grip of national leaders loosened once an atmosphere encouraging dissent and 
debate was established. Some of those previously accustomed to a centralised 
leader approach, as happened in the TASS section of MSF, could no longer promote 
or maintain this form of control in the open environment of MSF and UNISON. These 
participatory values also equate with core trade union values of debate, 
accountability and representation and they became the accepted principles attaching 
to the position of local union organisation in all three amalgamations. Thus, the 
assessment responds to the questions of the influence within a process of
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amalgamation of forms of unionism and relationships of leaders by seeing the forms 
of unionism as the overarching influence on the position of local union organisation in 
the process, and the relationships of leaders as the medium through which that 
influence is mediated.
Finally, the assessment and evidence point to an advantage that accrued to lay 
leaders and workplace representatives familiar with the operation of a ‘member-led’ 
model. In UNISON and UNIFI, those from NALGO and BIFU were able to populate 
the form more readily than their counterparts and consolidate their ascendancy. A 
‘member-led’ form was remade in the amalgamated union. Since local union 
organisation in MSF largely continued unchanged (albeit in an environment redolent 
of ASTMS), the need to re-populate it did not arise and most lay leaders and 
representatives continued their activity.
The local context has now been examined in all three amalgamations. There has 
been considerable variation between the location and nature of ‘the workplace’ and 
the experience and process of amalgamation. Despite this variation, a ‘member-led’ 
concept of trade union practice and values that favours the voice and autonomy of 
local union organisation and its leaders in an environment that facilitates and 
encourages dissent and debate became dominant in the amalgamated unions. The 
assessment suggests it is not the process of amalgamation that determined the 
result, but the presence of a particular construction of union practice.
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Chapter 10
CONCLUSION
As this thesis nears completion, I am voting in elections to the first NEC of Unite the 
Union. Unite the Union will be the largest affiliate in the TUC with 1.4million 
members. Even before being fully formed, its Joint General Secretaries have 
postulated on the union’s close links with the United Steelworkers in the USA 
developing into a full merger. Unite the Union is the result of an amalgamation 
between Amicus and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), it could 
have been even larger if the General Municipal and Boilermakers (GMB) had not 
decided against continuing with the initial three-way discussions for the new union. 
Amicus itself was the result of an amalgamation between MSF and the Amalgamated 
Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU) that subsequently attracted the Graphical 
Print and Media Union (GPMU) and UNIFI to join with them. The union grapevine is 
speculating that GMB will now amalgamate with UNISON. Of the three 
amalgamations used as case studies for this thesis MSF and UNIFI have 
disappeared into Unite the Union and UNISON appears to be actively considering 
amalgamation with a union that many regarded as its archrival in local government.
Meanwhile my trade union activity remains concentrated on the local organisation of 
my union’s members and the bargaining relationship with their employer. Little 
seems to have changed here apart from a migration through name changes, from 
MSF through Amicus to Unite the Union. The question that first started to interest me 
in the UNISON amalgamation remains: What is the position of local union 
organisation within a process of trade union amalgamation? This thesis has 
attempted to tease out some answers to this question from other research 
complemented by empirical research located in three actual amalgamations: MSF, 
UNIFI and UNISON.
It soon became apparent that there were significant gaps in current writing. 
Research on trade union mergers was almost exclusively concerned with action at a
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national level whilst that on the workplace and local union organisation had no place 
for consideration of its position within a situation of merger. It seemed self-evident 
from the research and my personal experience that union activity in the workplace 
was central to an understanding of trade union practice. Meanwhile, trade union 
mergers had been a prevalent feature of unions’ organisational behaviour throughout 
their history and, if anything, had accelerated in recent decades. It seemed that 
without consideration of the local context a full understanding of amalgamation would 
not be available. Connecting the two, therefore, seemed an important and relevant 
exercise that would contribute to filling gaps in existing research and expanding 
knowledge on trade union practice. From the survey of the literature on union 
amalgamations, a first research question was formulated:
• What is the place of the local branch and workplace organisation within the 
amalgamation process?
The research concentrated on three forms of relationship within a process of 
amalgamation and within trade unions:
• Between local, regional and national levels of structure,
• Between the lay leaders, full-time officials and factions who inhabit the 
structure, and
• Between the individual unions engaged in the amalgamation.
To provide an analytical basis for exploring these relationships within the three case 
study amalgamations three complementary areas of research were utilised. First, 
attention was given to the presence of bureaucratic tendencies within unions, which 
can encourage leadership domination and influence at the expense of member self­
activity and is seen in the presence of tensions between levels of structure and 
between members and leaders (on this theme, see Hyman 1979, 1989, 2001; see 
also Tannenbaum 1968a and van de Vail 1970). Second, the research drew on the 
writing of Fairbrother (2000a) and others (for example Batstone et al 1977; Heery & 
Kelly 1994; Terry 1986) on forms of unionism, which sought to distinguish between 
‘member-led’ and ‘leader-led’ unions. This work starts to identify the unions involved 
in the amalgamations and the amalgamated union in terms of their operation and 
ethos. Third, and closely related to the work on ‘member-led’ and ‘leader-led’ unions, 
is the work of Fryer (2000) and Waddington and others (2005) on developing an 
analytical framework for examining the position and policies of unions within a 
process of amalgamation. Their writing uses a construction of ‘form and character’ to
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distinguish between the structure and practice of individual unions. Consideration of 
these relationships and the associated literature generated two further research 
questions:
• How do the ‘leader-led’ and ‘member-led’ forms of unionism influence the 
position of the local branch and workplace organisation in a process of 
amalgamation?
• How do the relationships of leaders within the local branch and workplace 
organisation and those in the wider union influence the position of the local 
level in a process of amalgamation?
The contexts within which these relationships took place were identified as those 
external to the trade unions and those that were internal to their operation. The 
external circumstances were the socio-economic environment prevalent during the 
period of the amalgamation and the contemporary bargaining relationship trade 
unions had with their associated employers. The internal environment of the trade 
unions was their historical development and the features that distinguish trade unions 
from each other.
THEMES
To engage with these concepts and their associated research questions in the 
context of union amalgamations, the literature on union mergers and union activity in 
the workplace was supplemented with that on the case study amalgamations and the 
unions involved in them. This literature was used to shape and underpin the 
empirical research with individual unions. The resulting empirical study investigated 
a number of interrelated themes and provided the basis for a comprehensive 
assessment of the research questions.
Amalgamation
Amalgamation is often seen as an event in trade union organisational development 
by the literature. As an event, it is largely influenced by the national leadership 
working in the context of the contemporaneous bargaining relationship with 
employers, the organisational and financial stability of the union and the socio­
political and economic conditions (Waddington 1995; Undy 1999; Undy et al 1981). 
However, amalgamation is not simply an event. It is a process with the potential for
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long-term effects on the organisation and activity of the union. These effects are 
seen internally with its members, its lay leaders and representatives and between its 
various levels of organisation, and externally with employers (Waddington et al 
2005). The long-term effect determines the final shape of the amalgamated union. 
The research was concerned, not just with the ’urge to merge’, but also with the long­
term effects and outcomes, and particularly with how these play out in the context of 
local union organisation.
Once amalgamation was seen as a process that includes the actual event of 
amalgamation, the presence of local organisation as a key player became much 
more apparent. Within this process, two features were seen to either facilitate or 
frustrate the position of local union organisation. A procedure that allowed for an 
elongated pre-amalgamation period of negotiation was likely to represent, at least for 
some of the parties to the amalgamation, recognition of an internal need to consult 
with and satisfy the concerns of local union organisation. This experience was 
particularly evident in BIFU and NALGO. A short pre-amalgamation period, which left 
all questions of structure for resolution within the amalgamated union, frustrated the 
raising of concerns from outside the national leadership, as occurred with ASTMS. 
The presence of agreements and policies from the pre-amalgamation period could 
have a similar effect. Thus, the agreements for the formation of UNISON and UNIFI 
predicted a form and position for local union organisation that replicated the form of 
particular unions, NALGO and BIFU. Against that, the UNISON policies of 
Proportionality, Fair Representation, Member-Centred and Partnership Working, 
whatever their intrinsic merits, were seen to have sub-texts that might frustrate the 
position of local union organisation. One anticipated effect of Proportionality and Fair 
Representation was to secure a permanent voice within UNISON for lay leaders 
analogous to those leaders in COHSE and NUPE. An interpretation of the objectives 
within Partnership Working was to ensure a continuing influence for full-time officials 
within UNISON as it had been experienced in COHSE and NUPE, whilst Member- 
Centred appeared to question the ability of lay leaders to represent the interests of 
members. Potentially the four policies struck at the NALGO values of ‘branch 
autonomy* and ‘lay control’.
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Workplace practice and ethos
Two forms of unionism were identified for the research, 'member-led' and 'leader-led' 
(Fairbrother 2000a). ‘Member-led’ unions encourage the involvement of union 
members at a local level through the availability of democratic forums and a strong 
identification with local union organisation. They exhibit a relatively high level of 
workplace autonomy in their bargaining activity and relationship with full-time officials, 
some control of local resources and a significant input into the development of union 
policy. The national leadership's role is more attuned to the promulgation of advice 
and provision of support than direction of activity (Fairbrother 2000a). As a result, the 
local lay leader is in a stronger position to influence policy and express opposition to 
national advice. In the case studies ASTMS, BIFU and NALGO epitomised different 
constructions of ‘member-led’ unions.
‘Leader-led’ unions rely more on identification with the union itself to gain the active 
support of their members, although they also provide democratic forums. They are 
characterised by a strong national leadership that uses a hierarchical structure to 
direct the operation of the union through to the local level. The local union 
organisation tends to be one that is relatively dependent on the support and advice of 
full-time officials and national level in its bargaining activity, and accepting of 
nationally driven policy and national control of resources (Fairbrother 2000a). The 
role of the local lay leader is limited by constraints from the national leadership and a 
difficulty in gaining a purchase on the formulation of policy without their support. 
COHSE, NUPE, NWSA, TASS and UNiFI (Barclays) were characteristic of ‘leader- 
led’ unions.
Both forms of unionism have common features: some form of local union 
organisation, democratic structures, full-time officials, and local and national lay 
leaders (Undy et al 1981). Given these commonalties, discerning a difference 
between the behaviour and influence of the two forms appears difficult. Yet 
differences are readily apparent to those involved in union activity as members, lay 
leaders or full-time officials.
In ‘member-led’ unions:
• Members relate more closely to their local union organisation,
• Lay leaders locate themselves more firmly with their local union organisation,
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• There is a greater propensity to take local decisions over issues,
• Full-time officials have less influence and involvement over local issues, and
• The policies and actions of national leaders are more likely to be questioned.
In ‘leader-led’ unions, these experiences are nuanced away from the local level and 
directed towards full-time officials and national leaders (Fairbrother 2000a). 
However, it would be inaccurate to suggest that this pattern was in any sense a 
complete reversal of membership-led experience. Local activity remained an 
important element of ‘leader-led’ unions. Nonetheless, it did appear that ‘member- 
led’ unions were more likely to emerge in the post-amalgamation situation, as the 
members of the predecessor unions sought position in the new union.
In the amalgamation process, the ‘member-led’ unions sought retention of the 
position and role of the local union organisation and were largely successful in 
achieving this goal. As a result, member-led forms of union organisation played a 
distinct role in the amalgamation process and with that role came the ability to 
influence the outcomes in ways favourable to such organisational arrangements. 
Against this, the ‘leader-led’ unions were more the recipient of policy formulated by 
the national leadership and had little facility to question or modify it, particularly at the 
local level. Thus, working within an already existing and valued organisational form, 
the influence of the ‘member-led’ form was inevitably going to be exercised in favour 
of its own form of unionism at the expense of rivals.
Leaders and factions
The research showed that lay leaders in both forms of unionism had a crucial role in 
the workplace, where they were frequently the immediate representatives of 
members with the employer (Batstone et al 1977; Darlington 1994, 2002; Fosh & 
Cohen 1990; Greene et al 2000; Heery & Kelly 1994; McBride 2004). As such, they 
held important and personally rewarding positions in the union. Tenure of office often 
led to closer involvement, leadership positions and increasing facilities from the 
employer to engage in union activity (Hyman 1979). Some assumed very entrenched 
roles in the union and in the workplace. A small number used the advantages that 
flowed from their local activity to secure election to regional and, for a few, national 
leadership roles.
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For those in the ‘leader-led’ unions there was a tendency to emphasise ‘individual’ 
leadership capacities, in the absence of an effective set of membership active 
procedures and practices. Without an organisational form requiring periodic elections 
and reporting procedures through the union, accountability could be tenuous and the 
basis of the role unclear or confirmed more by the authority of the union's full-time 
officials than any local union organisation (Fairbrother 2000a). Against that, the lay 
leader’s role in the ‘member-led’ unions was likely to be secured through the local 
union organisation, apart from those few elected to national positions. Their position 
was secured on a ‘trade union collectivity’ based on regular elections, membership 
activity and accountability to the union through robust local union organisation 
(Fairbrother 2000a).
Both sets of leaders were important means of communicating union policies and 
encouraging members to support them. As such, they held important roles for the 
national leadership to utilise and influence in promoting their policies to the 
membership. The nature of their position in the ‘leader-led’ unions potentially made 
them susceptible to such influence. Their counterparts in the ‘member-led’ unions 
were much less susceptible to this type of influence since their positions were 
secured through a local union organisation that was an integral part of the union's 
structure.
In the amalgamation process, the influence of lay leaders could be pivotal in securing 
the amalgamation (Terry 1996; Waddington et al 2005). In both ‘member-led’ and 
‘leader-led’ unions, they had two characteristics in common: as promoters of the 
amalgamation amongst members in the workplace, and holding a level of concern 
over their personal positions in any amalgamated union. However, leaders who were 
active in the ‘member-led’ unions had the greater facility to influence the 
amalgamation process. They exercised this influence in terms of its overall shape, its 
progress and in securing their positions in the amalgamated union. They were able 
to exercise this influence through location in local union organisations that had the 
constitutional facility to promote policies replicating their pre-existing organisational 
forms in the amalgamated union. Two immediate advantages accrued from this 
process. First, it was possible to preserve a structure that they were well used to 
working within and second, they were able to preserve their positions in local union 
organisations. The outcome was either transfer in an unaltered form into the
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amalgamated union or adaptation to the new situation but with essentially the same 
organisational form.
In contrast, those from the ‘leader-led’ unions were much more reliant on their 
personal relationships within the union to either influence the amalgamation process 
or secure their positions in the amalgamated union. Not only that, they were then 
faced with an unfamiliar structure populated by those from a predecessor union with 
experience of its operation and secure positions in transferred or adapted local union 
organisations. In such circumstances, many only briefly survived the transition and 
that only served to increase the influence and presence of those from the ‘member- 
led’ union (see also Cunnison 2002; UNISON 1995).
Full-time officials in the ‘member-led’ form of unionism had more of an advisory and 
support role, whereas in the ‘leader-led’ form they also had a more directive role in 
promoting the national leadership's policies and, often, a leadership role in bargaining 
with the employer. This role implied that in the amalgamation process, full-time 
officials were likely to be more successful at promoting the national leadership's 
policy and resisting alternatives in the ‘leader-led’ unions (Carter 1991; Terry 1996). 
In the ‘member-led’ unions, the presence of formal local union organisation meant a 
facility to foster alternatives to the policies being promoted by full-time officials, a 
facility either absent or imperfectly formed in those that were ‘leader-led’ (Carter 
1991; Terry 1996).
The relationship between national leaders and local union organisation could be 
difficult but also mutually supportive. These features were particularly evident in the 
‘member-led’ unions where local union organisation constituted a considerable power 
base in its own right with workplace members developing the ability to challenge the 
national leadership over policy issues (Carter 1991; Terry 1996). In the ‘leader-led’ 
unions, alternative power bases were much less apparent. In this instance, there 
was the appearance of a seamless congruity of view from the General Secretary to 
the ordinary member (Carter 1991; Terry 1996). Where this form of association was 
not apparent, forms of factionalism were more likely to emerge.
Lay national leaders were invariably the prime promoters of amalgamation. Along 
with the General Secretary, they were directly elected into their positions and had
249
democratic legitimacy, a legitimacy that could be used in support of a policy of 
amalgamation. In the ‘leader-led’ unions, that legitimacy was more apparent 
because of the relative weakness of formal local union organisation and the remote 
prospect of challenge to the national leadership's policy. However, in the ‘member- 
led’ unions not only did local union organisation have democratic legitimacy to 
challenge that of the national leadership but it also had the facility through the 
structure of the union to promote such challenges. Almost by definition, the national 
leadership was more predisposed to heed the views of local union organisation in the 
‘member-led’ than in the ‘leader-led’ unions (Carter 1991; Terry 1996).
Self-evidently leaders acting individually or in concert initiated and promoted the 
amalgamations and then took them through the process which saw a re-formed union 
emerge. The research showed that leaders acted within and gained their influence 
from particular forms of unionism. The initiative and promotion of amalgamation was 
a product of individual action. Once that 'event' was completed and produced a 
'process', the forms of unionism within which those leaders acted and which 
characterised the unions participating in the amalgamation became the major 
influence on its eventual outcome.
Factions were an influential presence in the UNISON and MSF amalgamations but in 
markedly different ways, ways that were redolent of the ‘member-led’ and ‘leader-led’ 
forms of unionism. In the UNISON amalgamation, NALGO was subject to a high 
level of internal debate heavily influenced and organised through factions. However, 
all these factions had the objective of securing representation and influence for local 
union organisation. The debate was over the precise form in which this objective 
would take place and preventing the ‘leader-led’ leanings of COHSE and NUPE from 
circumscribing the position of local union organisation in UNISON. In the MSF 
amalgamation, the Broad Left faction in TASS had a clear objective of extending their 
centralised control of TASS into MSF (Carter 1991). This agenda did not succeed 
largely due to the greater resilience, deeper roots and stronger adherence to the 
‘member-led’ form promoted by the ASTMS section in the post-amalgamation 
confrontation (Carter 1991).
What the research has shown is that although many union amalgamations aspire to 
the creation of an organisation, which is recognisably different to any of its
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predecessors, in practice the form of unionism of one tends to prevail. Where a 
union did not have an active form of local union organisation, as was the case in two 
of the predecessors to UNIFI, the seeming vacuum was filled by the model of 
member representation in the third union. At least for one of the parties to the 
amalgamation their institutions are embedded in its successor. Thus, the case 
studies for UNISON, MSF and UNIFI show a tendency in UNISON for a NALGO 
‘form and character* to be evident at the workplace, in MSF for the legacy of ASTMS 
to be dominant and in UNIFI that of BIFU. NALGO, ASTMS and BIFU are all 
examples of the ‘member-led’ form of unionism. The position of local union 
organisation becomes central to the outcome of a process of amalgamation and it is 
a position that emphasises its representation and influence that has the greatest 
influence over the progress and outcome of the amalgamation. This outcome is 
through its ability to utilise organisational practice, its ethos of local representation 
and influence and its institutional presence, to secure its ‘form and character* in the 
amalgamated union. The outcome also responds to the research questions by 
showing the crucial place of local union organisation within the amalgamation 
process, the influence of forms of unionism on the position of local union organisation 
within an amalgamation and the relationships of leaders within unions mediating the 
place of local union organisation and the influence of forms of unionism.
IMPLICATIONS
The pace of merger activity for British trade unions in the 21st Century shows no sign 
of abating and, if the pronouncements of the Unite the Union Joint General 
Secretaries have credibility, could extend to an international basis. What this 
research has shown is that these grand visions take a lengthy period to reach a 
settled situation and, in the meantime, an often painful and disorganised period has 
to be endured. As a senior Unite the Union official remarked in relation to the Amicus 
amalgamation,
Those involved in branches went through a period of uncertainty after the 
merger over reduced funding, questions of control and power and the ability to 
get things done. There was also a pain factor in workplace industrial activity 
with more difficulty in activists and members getting hold of full-time officials. 
That could benefit workplace organisation by forcing them to do more but 
there was no time for officers to build organisation and the demands on
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officers remained the same (Unite the Union full-time national official interview 
2007).
Taking account of this downturn in activity, particularly in workplaces, ought to be a 
real concern for unions when considering the prospect of amalgamation.
However, the principal lesson for unions from this research is to ensure the position 
of local union organisation, whether as a workplace union group or as a union 
branch, is taken account of within a process of amalgamation. This objective means 
recognising that its position is largely dependent on the ‘member-led’ or ‘leader-led’ 
form of unionism that characterises individual unions and in a process of 
amalgamation the presence of these alternatives are likely to result in competing 
agendas to replicate one of them in the amalgamated union. Whilst the research 
suggests that these issues were acknowledged in the UNISON amalgamation, the 
outcome still favoured the agenda of NALGO over those of COHSE and NUPE. In 
the MSF amalgamation, local union organisation barely featured as an extant issue in 
the negotiations for the amalgamation and yet it became a crucial influence in the 
post-amalgamation confrontation between the rival forms of unionism of ASTMS and 
TASS. The divergent conceptions of the workplace between the participants to the 
UNIFI amalgamation left the resolution of its formal position in the amalgamated 
union to the post-amalgamation implementation period. However, even within this 
harmonious process its presence and influence epitomised different conceptions of 
unionism and contributed to an outcome, which favoured that of BIFU over the 
alternative that was practised by NWSA and UNiFI (Barclays).
Unions should also be concerned over the role and influence of leaders in a process 
of amalgamation. Whether as lay individuals within workplaces and the wider union 
or as full-time officials the research showed their importance. It also demonstrated 
that, like local union organisation, their presence was mediated through the ‘member- 
led’ or ‘leader-led’ form of unionism that characterised their unions. The relative role 
and influence of leaders, between lay individuals and full-time officials and between 
those present within workplaces and those in the wider union, was shown to be 
conditioned by these divergent forms of unionism. Unless these differences are 
acknowledged and taken account of within the amalgamation process, the result can 
be a loss of valuable expertise and resources as leaders conditioned to one form of
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unionism become marginalised within the amalgamation process, an outcome that 
was particularly evident in the UNIFI and UNISON amalgamations.
The role and influence of factions were particularly evident in the MSF and UNISON 
amalgamations. Although these were differently expressed, between the objective of 
the dominant Broad Left in TASS to achieve an equivalent hegemony in MSF and the 
internal debate within NALGO over securing its ideals in UNISON, their presence 
was indicative of either ‘leader-led’ (TASS) or ‘member-led’ (NALGO) forms of 
unionism. The evidence in the study suggests that factions could become the 
progenitors of internal and intra-union dissent and debate based on rival forms of 
unionism and this could result in extended periods of introspection and confrontation. 
Within a process of amalgamation, unions need to look for ways of surmounting such 
problems whilst acknowledging the presence of influential groups outside the formal 
structures of the unions.
When promoting the union amalgamations in this study national leaders were 
invariably ready with valedictory promises of a ‘new union’ rising from the ashes of its 
predecessors, newborn with no taint of past practices and ethos (for an example see 
MSF 1988b). The research shows that this objective was largely unachievable 
against the deeply embedded and reified practice and ethos of those predecessors. 
It was better to face up to these competing issues and seek solutions before the 
amalgamation degenerated into the internecine warfare seen in MSF.
It has to be admitted that this research is limited by the range of case studies. 
Extending it to a wider range of union amalgamations and failures to amalgamate 
would provide a more rounded picture. Thus, the focus of the research on the 
position of local union organisation in a process of amalgamation could be extended 
into other successful amalgamations such as that which created Public and 
Commercial Services in the Civil Service or the relative failure to achieve 
amalgamations between unions in the railway industry or in the teaching profession. 
Such a broader focus would enrich the research with further comparison from a 
particularly circumscribed sector like the Civil Service and sectors such as the 
railways and teaching where the synergies for amalgamation appear inescapable but 
remain unachieved.
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Unions are also becoming increasingly heterogeneous in terms of membership 
characteristics and industrial location. Taking account of that development is 
important for a fuller understanding of union amalgamations. Since the start of this 
research, MSF and UNIFI have both merged with other unions eventually to create 
Unite the Union. As unions become increasingly diffuse and internationalised, the 
position of local union organisation, as the core site for members’ affinity with their 
union, becomes an ever more crucial issue in terms of its organisation and activity, 
and its relationship with the wider union. Developing the research into these 
expanding dimensions would open up the research beyond the current remit, 
although the result may be analytically rich.
An important issue within the research was the role and influence of ‘member-led’ 
and ‘leader-led’ forms of unionism and that of leaders and factions within the 
amalgamation process. Whilst that built on a substantial body of previous research 
and extended it to encompass the position of local union organisation within 
amalgamations, the continuing progress of amalgamations is generating changed 
conditions and relationships within individual unions and in the context of 
amalgamation. It follows that research in these areas needs to be continuously re­
appraised against these developments.
This research has concentrated on local union organisation in the context of 
amalgamation, not just as an isolated facet of union organisation but also as an 
integral part of the whole union. The presumption is that amalgamation should be 
viewed as a 'process' rather than an 'event'. In this respect, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the presence of ‘member-led’ and leader-led’ forms of unionism and 
note how these different forms influence and replicate themselves within the 
amalgamation process. By adopting this approach, the study demonstrates how 
local union organisation has been affected and influenced by amalgamation and in 
turn how local union organisation has affected and influenced amalgamation in the 
whole union. Leaders play their part within the amalgamation process, and in the 
course of this history shape the outcome, the emergent form of unionism of the 
amalgamated union. The ‘member-led’ form of unionism has been most successful 
in influencing the amalgamation process and laying the foundation for a lasting 
impact. Thus, local union organisation continues to be important, both for members 
at work, and for the amalgamated union.
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Appendix 1
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
QUESTIONS FOR STEWARDS ETC
1
What, in your view; has been the impact o f the merger on workplace organisations?
Describe the merger from your point o f view?
STEWARDS AND OTHER LAY ACTIVISTS 
3
Has your role in the union changed as a result o f the merger? If so, how? If not, 
what happened? _____  ______________________
Has the merger changed the steward organisation within the workplace? If so, give 
one example of
1. How it has improved.
2. How it has deteriorated.
If there has been no change, why not?_____________________________________
RATIONALE FOR MERGER 
5
What, in your opinion, was the relevance o f the merger to workplace organisations?
What, in your opinion, were the main reasons for the merger?
MERGER PROCESS 
7
Did any elements within the proposals for merger generate opposition within 
workplace organisations? If so, what were the reasons?________________
Did any proposals for merger generate support within workplace organisations? If so, 
what were the reasons?
How was any opposition within workplace organisations about the proposed merger 
answered?
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10
12
15
19
20
What was the effect on stewards’ activity and their relationship with members during the 
period of discussion and debate over merger?_____________________ _______
Did national leaders seek the support o f workplace organisations for the merger? If 
so, how? If not, what did they do?________________________________________
If there was opposition from workplace organisations to the merger, what did national 
leaders do?
If there were successes for the workplace organisation resulting from merger, how 
were they produced? _____
If there were problems for the workplace organisation resulting from merger, how 
were they overcome?___
Was there any effect on the bargaining strength of the workplace organisation during 
the period o f discussions and debate over merger and implementation of the merger? If 
so, how? If not, what happened?___________________________________________
Was workplace organisation and operation affected by the period o f discussions and 
debate over merger and implementation o f the merger? If so, how? If not, what 
happened?__________________________________________________________
What was the involvement in discussions and debate within and between the unions 
over merger of:
1. Workplace organisations?
2. Members?
How influential was the involvement in discussions and debate within and between the 
unions over merger of:
1. Workplace organisations?
2. Members?
What, if  any, were the problems and successes for the workplace organisation as a 
result o f merger? Give one example o f
1. A problem.
2. A success.
To what extent were negotiations over the merger influenced by the presence in the 
merging unions of.
1. Different forms of decision-making? E.g. central, regional, officers, lay members.
2. Different organisational structures? E.g. branches, conference, regions, National 
Executive.
WORKPLACE ORGANISATION 
21_______________________________________________________________
Describe the changes that have taken place in the workplace organisation in the 
period since merger.___________________________________________
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22
24
26
27
Is the workplace organisation different in the merged union from that in the preceding 
union? If so, how? If not, what happened?_____________ ____________________
As a result o f merger, has the workplace organisation become more or less 
independent from the wider union? If more, how? If less, what happened?
Were there any changes in the wider union in the way decisions are made as a result 
of merger? If so, how did these affect in the workplace organisation?_____________
Were there any changes in the organisational structure of the wider union as a result 
of merger? If so, how did these affect the workplace organisation?_______________
Has the workplace organisation improved or deteriorated as a result o f merger? Give 
one example o f
1. How it has improved.
2. How it has deteriorated.
How effective has the workplace organisation been as a result o f merger? Give one 
example o f it being more effective and one o f it being less effective
1. In bargaining with the employer.
2. In influencing wider union policy.
3. In involving members.________________________________________________
MEMBERS
28
29
30
Have members become more or less involved with the wider union as a result o f 
merger? If more, how? If less, w hy?___________________________________
Have members become more or less involved with the workplace organisation as a 
result o f merger? If more, how? If less, why?______________________________
Has merger changed the way in which the workplace organisation deals with 
members’ interests? E.g. Pay, Conditions, Grievance and Discipline. If so, how? If 
not, what happened?___________________________________________________
UNION STRUCTURES AND GOVERNMENT
31
32
Were any reforms of wider union structures and government as a result of merger 
intended to impact on workplace organisations? If so, in what ways?__________
Has merger changed the union’s democratic accountability to its members? If so, give 
one example of
1. How democratic accountability has been enhanced?
2. How democratic accountability has been reduced?_______________________
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33_________________________________________________________________
Who exercises power and control over resources and policy within the union? How 
has this changed as a result o f merger? ________________________
RELATIONSHIPS
34
35
36
Has the workplace organisation’s relationship with employers changed as a result of 
merger? If so, how? If not, what happened?
Has merger affected the relative levels o f power o f national and workplace levels of 
organisation within the union? If so, how? If not, why was this?_______________
Has the workplace organisation’s relationship with FTOs changed as a result of 
merger? If so, how? If not what happened?
Has the workplace organisation’s relationship with national and regional levels o f the 
union changed as a result o f merger? If so, how? If not, what happened?________
POLITICS
38
39
40
Did political views influence the merger? If so, were these from within the union or 
from political parties? How did they influence the merger?___________________
Are you a member o f a political group? If so, how did this influence your involvement 
in the merger? If not, what happened?______________________________________
Were groups within the union involved in influencing the merger? If so, how? If not, 
what happened? Was this at every level in the union?________________________
FINALLY
41
42
43
What is your view o f the merger?
Following the merger, how do you think the workplace organisation could be 
improved?_______  ___________________________
What, if  anything, do you think the merger:
1. Has achieved?
2. Will achieve?
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Appendix 2
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
QUESTIONS FOR FULL-TIME OFFICIALS
1
Describe the merger from your point o f view?
Describe briefly what, in your view, has been the impact o f the merger on workplace 
organisations?_________________________________________________________
STEWARDS & OTHER LAY ACTIVISTS
3___________________________________________________________________
Has the merger changed the steward organisation within the workplace? If so, give 
one example of
1. How it has improved.
2. How it has deteriorated.
If there has been no change, why not?_____________________________________
RATIONALE FOR MERGER
4
What, in your opinion, was the relevance o f the merger to workplace organisations?
What, in your opinion, were the main reasons for the merger?
MERGER PROCESS 
6
If there were problems for the workplace organisation resulting from merger, how 
were they overcome?________________________________________________
Did any elements within the proposals for merger generate opposition within 
workplace organisations? If so, what were the reasons?________________
Did any proposals for merger generate support within workplace organisations? If so, 
what were the reasons?
How was any opposition within workplace organisations about the proposed merger 
answered?
What, if  any, were the problems and successes for the workplace organisation as a 
result o f merger? Give one example o f
1. A problem.
2. A success.
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11
12
13
15
What was the effect on stewards’ activity and their relationship with members during the 
period o f discussion and debate over merger?______________ _______________
If there was opposition from workplace organisations to the merger, what did national 
leaders do?
Did national leaders seek the support o f workplace organisations for the merger? If 
so, how? If not, what did they do?________________________________________
If there were successes for the workplace organisation resulting from merger, how 
were they produced?  _______
Was there any effect on the bargaining strength o f the workplace organisation during 
the period of discussion and debate over merger and implementation of the merger? If 
so, how? If not, what happened?___________________________________________
Was workplace organisation and operation affected by the period of discussion and 
debate over merger and implementation o f the merger? If so, how? If not, what 
happened?_________________________________________________________
What was the involvement in discussions and debate within and between the unions 
over merger of:
1. Workplace organisations?
2. Members?
How influential was the involvement in discussions and debate within and between the 
unions over merger of:
1. Workplace organisations?
2. Members?
To what extent were negotiations over the merger influenced by the presence in the 
merging unions of:
1. Different forms of decision-making? E.g. central, regional, officers, lay members.
2. Different organisational structures? E.g. branches, conference, regions, National 
Executive.
WORKPLACE ORGANISATION 
20
22
Describe the changes that have taken place in the workplace organisation in the 
period since merger.  ________________________________
Were there any changes in the organisational structure o f the wider union as a result 
of merger? If so, how did these affect the workplace organisation?
Has the workplace organisation improved or deteriorated as a result of merger? Give 
one example o f
1. How it has improved.
2. How it has deteriorated.
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23
24
25
Is the workplace organisation different in the merged union from that in the preceding 
union? If so, how? If not, what happened? ________________________
Were there any changes in the wider union in the way decisions are made as a result 
o f merger? If so, how did these affect in the workplace organisation?_____________
As a result o f merger, has the workplace organisation become more or less 
independent from the wider union? If more, how? If less, what happened?
How effective has the workplace organisation been as a result o f merger? Give one 
example o f it being more effective and one o f it being less effective
1. In bargaining with the employer.
2. In influencing wider union policy.
3. In involving members.
MEMBERS
27
28
29
Have members become more or less involved with the workplace organisation as a 
result o f merger? If more, how? If less, why? ______________________
Have members become more or less involved with the wider union as a result o f 
merger? If more, how? If less, why? ___
How has merger changed the way in which the workplace organisation deals with 
members’ interests? E.g. Pay, Conditions, Grievance and Discipline. If so, how? If 
not, what happened?
UNION STRUCTURES AND GOVERNMENT 
30
32
Who exercises power and control over resources and policy within the union? How 
has this changed as a result o f merger?___________________________________
Were any reforms of wider union structures and government as a result of merger 
intended to impact on workplace organisations? If so, in what ways?__________
Has merger changed the union’s democratic accountability to its members? Give one 
example of
1. How democratic accountability has been enhanced?
2. How democratic accountability has been reduced?______________________
RELATIONSHIPS
33_______________________________________________________________
Has the workplace organisation’s relationship with FTOs changed as a result of 
merger? If so, how? If not, what happened?__________ ___________
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34
Has merger affected the relative levels o f power o f national and workplace levels of 
organisation within the union? If so, how? If not, why was this?_______________
Has the workplace organisation's relationship with national and regional levels o f the 
union changed as a result o f merger? If so, how? If not, what happened?_____
Has the workplace organisation’s relationship with employers changed as a result of 
merger? If so, how? If not, what h a p p e n e d ? _______________
POLITICS
37
Were groups within the union involved in influencing the merger? If so, how? If not, 
what happened? Was this at every level in the union?  ________________
Did political views influence the merger? If so, were these from within the union or 
from political parties? How did they influence the merger?___________________
FINALLY
39
40
What is your view o f the merger?
Following the merger, how do you think the workplace organisation could be 
improved?_______________ ______________________________________
What, if  anything, do you think the merger:
1. Has achieved?
2. Will achieve?
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